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Article 6

100 N.C. L. REV. 1209 (2022)

MANAGING THE POLICE EMERGENCY*
ADAM A. DAVIDSON**
There is a policing emergency in the United States. Police across the country
cause massive, widespread, and unpredictable physical harm—killings,
beatings; psychological harm—negative stress-related birth and educational
outcomes, general worsened mental health; and sociological harm—advancing
the racial, gender, and economic hierarchies that undermine our work towards
an equal society. Even after the largest protest movement in U.S. history in
summer 2020, the traditional political process has failed to make significant
inroads against this emergency.
This Article begins to explore in depth the legal ramifications of recognizing the
policing emergency. It suggests that among the most important ramifications is
unlocking a previously unappreciated tool for reform: emergency managers.
As defined here, emergency managers are individuals or small groups
empowered by state or local governments to exercise the powers of the
government in response to an emergency when traditional political systems
cannot or will not respond adequately or quickly enough. The current state of
policing constitutes just such an emergency demanding immediate action.
Emergency managers—thus far limited to the fiscal and educational realms—
can be a powerful tool for addressing this policing emergency. To achieve their
goals, emergency managers have been imbued with a range of powers—from
providing oversight to usurping all of the powers of local elected officials. The
broad emergency powers and unitary nature of this position subvert the
piecemeal nature of both local politics generally and of the police reform project
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specifically and can allow the emergency manager to break through procedural
and political barriers that have previously served to uphold the status quo.
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INTRODUCTION
Complicated questions arise when sketching the exact contours of the
policing emergency. But for many people, that such an emergency exists cannot
be seriously contested. We have created a system wherein it is a regular
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occurrence for police to injure, shoot, and kill people—disproportionately Black
and Brown people—in gruesome and disturbing ways. Is it possible that there
is no emergency when police shoot to death a twelve-year-old child playing in
a park?1 Or when they shoot a woman dead who was sleeping in her own home?2
Or suffocate a man to death while he exclaims that he can’t breathe, and civilians
plead with them to stop?3 Or do the same to another man, but this time with a
knee on his neck for over eight minutes?4 Or continue to put their knees on
civilians’ necks again,5 and again,6 and again,7 even after massive protests about
the use of this very tactic? How about when they turn a traffic stop into a
shooting, killing one father8 and paralyzing another,9 each time while the men’s
children look on, and each time with seven shots? Or kill a teenager cornered in
an alley when he seemingly tried to pull up his pants?10 Or kill two men in the

1. Tamir Rice. See Shaila Dewan & Richard A. Oppel Jr, In Tamir Rice Case, Many Errors by
Cleveland Police, Then a Fatal One, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/23/
us/in-tamir-rice-shooting-in-cleveland-many-errors-by-police-then-a-fatal-one.html [https://perma.cc
/BJ7Y-86AC (dark archive)].
2. Breonna Taylor. See Richard A. Oppel Jr., Derrick Bryson Taylor & Nicholas BogelBurroughs, What To Know About Breonna Taylor’s Death, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2021, 12:26 PM), Error!
Hyperlink reference not valid.https:// www.nytimes.com/article/breonna-taylor-police.html
[https://perma.cc/U366-JJ65 (dark archive)].
3. Eric Garner. See Katie Benner, Eric Garner’s Death Will Not Lead to Federal Charges for N.Y.P.D.
Officer, N.Y. TIMES (July 16, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/16/nyregion/eric-garner-casedeath-daniel-pantaleo.html [https://perma.cc/3YWS-LG7X (dark archive)].
4. George Floyd. See Evan Hill, Ainara Tiefenthäler, Christiaan Triebert, Drew Jordan, Haley
Willis & Robin Stein, How George Floyd Was Killed in Police Custody, N.Y. TIMES, https
://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/31/us/george-floyd-investigation.html [https://perma.cc/XW5V-FFAL
(dark archive)] (Nov. 5, 2020).
5. Sircarlyle Arnold. See @msolurin, TWITTER (Jan. 5, 2021, 7:40 PM), https://twitter.com/
msolurin/status/1346617602907512834 [https://perma.cc/8R8J-EQ7B].
6. Donni Wright. See Ashley Southall, Officer Who Pressed a Knee into Bystander’s Neck Leaves
N.Y.P.D., N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/28/nyregion/nypd-officer-francisco-garcia.
html [https://perma.cc/G6M9-PYXR (dark archive)] (Nov. 5, 2020).
7. An unidentified man in Allentown, Pennsylvania. See Brakkton Booker, Police Investigate
Incident Where Officer Appeared To Use Knee To Restrain Suspect, NPR (July 14, 2020, 7:02 PM), https://
www.npr.org/2020/07/14/890503313/police-investigate-incident-where-officer-appeared-to-use-kneeto-restrain-suspe [https://perma.cc/9YQU-KLRS].
8. Philando Castile. See Mitch Smith, Minnesota Officer Acquitted in Killing of Philando Castile,
N.Y. TIMES (June 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/16/us/police-shooting-trial-philandocastile.html [https://perma.cc/U62Z-KYV2 (dark archive)].
9. Jacob Blake. See Christina Morales, What We Know About the Shooting of Jacob Blake, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 16, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/article/jacob-blake-shooting-kenosha.html [https://
perma.cc/365E-CZGC (dark archive)].
10. Timothy Thomas. See John Larson, Behind the Death of Timothy Thomas, NBC NEWS (Apr. 9,
2004, 7:29 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna4703574 [https://perma.cc/UAM5-Q9ZB];
Twenty Years Later: The Death of Timothy Thomas and the Uprising That Followed, CIN. & HAMILTON
CNTY. PUB. LIBR. BLOG (Apr. 16, 2021), https://cincinnatilibrary.org/blogs/post/20-years-latertimothy-thomas/ [https://perma.cc/W984-AVL4].
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same city within a month—one allegedly holding a sandwich,11 the other holding
a cellphone,12 and neither suspected of any crime? Or shoot another teenager to
death accused of, at worst, taking some cigarillos from a convenience store?13 Or
beat a man so severely that they fracture his skull and give him permanent brain
damage, while a dozen other officers look on, commenting like they’re watching
a prizefight?14
Is it possible that these events do not constitute an emergency? As a
rhetorical matter, no. These events have sparked massive protests, riots, and
uprisings, and have shifted political and social winds around the country and
world. Laypeople of all stripes would likely say this meets their definition of an
emergency. But perhaps surprisingly, as a legal matter, the answer is maybe.
That is because there is no singular definition of emergency in the legal world.
Deciding what does or does not constitute an emergency is a question most
often left to political actors. And there are numerous examples of those political
actors declaring emergencies that seem trifling, while ignoring events that seem
like they require desperate action.
But this lack of an objective definition does not mean that the “emergency”
label lacks power. Quite the opposite. Instead, the declaration of an emergency
by the state empowers government to take action beyond its usual ken, to take
that action outside of the usual political processes, and often leads the courts to
give deference to these actions.15
While defining “emergency” may seem to be a political battle, this Article
will argue that, to the extent the law defines emergency at all, emergencies tend
to have three characteristics.16 First, an emergency involves significant harm.17
Second, something about that harm is unpredictable or uncontrollable.18 And
11. Casey Goodson Jr. See Will Wright, Columbus Police Kill Black Man Weeks After Protests Against
Brutality, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/22/us/columbus-ohio-shooting.html [https
://perma.cc/A7R6-EUVY (dark archive)] (May 14, 2021).
12. Andre Maurice Hill. See id.
13. Michael Brown. See What Happened in Ferguson?, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.ny
times.com/interactive/2014/08/13/us/ferguson-missouri-town-under-siege-after-police-shooting.html
[https://perma.cc/3RYG-LCNN (dark archive)] (Aug. 10, 2015).
14. Rodney King. See Anjuli Sastry Krbechek & Karen Grigsby Bates, When LA Erupted in Anger:
A Look Back at the Rodney King Riots, NPR (Apr. 16, 2017, 1:21 PM), https://www.npr.org/2017/04/26/
524744989/when-la-erupted-in-anger-a-look-back-at-the-rodney-king-riots [https://perma.cc/4YHN865N].
15. See, e.g., Alexander Mehra, Legal Authority in Unusual and Exigent Circumstances: The Federal
Reserve and the Financial Crisis, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 221, 223–24 (2010); David Zaring, Litigating the
Financial Crisis, 100 VA. L. REV. 1405, 1405–08 (2014); Michelle A. Dauber, Comment, Pandemic Fears
and Contemporary Quarantine: Protecting Liberty Through a Continuum of Due Process Rights, 54 BUFF. L.
REV. 1299, 1306–08 (2007); Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be
Constitutional?, 112 YALE L.J. 1011, 1016–20 (2003).
16. See infra Section I.A.
17. See infra Section I.A.
18. See infra Section I.A.

100 N.C. L. REV. 1209 (2022)

2022]

MANAGING THE POLICE EMERGENCY

1213

third, that harm cannot be prevented through the regular political process.19
These characteristics are not all mandatory, and a particularly strong showing
in one may make up for deficiencies in others. For example, a sufficiently
harmful event may be an emergency even if it was predictable, and a sufficiently
unpredictable event may require the use of emergency powers even if it is
comparatively less harmful. While declaring any particular event an emergency
is largely left to political decision-makers, these three factors tend to appear
either explicitly or implicitly in emergency powers statutes; in emergency
doctrine, specifically in the Court’s treatment of the Contract Clause; and in
dictionary definitions of “emergency.”
The state of policing in the United States fits this definition to a tee.
While police killings are hypersalient examples of the harm caused by this
emergency, they are only the tip of the iceberg. Instead, the policing
emergency’s harms—harms which are disproportionately borne by racial and
ethnic minorities and others already subjugated in our society—are threefold.
These harms are physical—stops, searches, pat downs, beatings, killings;
psychological—the well-documented effects that this violence has on
communities that spread far beyond the individuals subjected directly to the
violence; and sociological—that police have been used to maintain unjust
hierarchies in our society.20 And these harms are great in magnitude. Even
though a police killing or other police interaction may, at first glance, appear to
affect only the person who is physically harmed, research has shown that these
killings have negative effects on the health and well-being of a much wider
group. But even ignoring these broader harms, millions of people have direct
police contact every year, and for large groups of the population that contact
can be stressful at its best and demeaning, assaultive, or deadly at its worst.21
And the policing emergency’s harms are unpredictable to the point they
appear random. Look again at the litany of seemingly mundane situations
19. See infra Section I.A.
20. See, e.g., I. Bennett Capers, Policing, Race, and Place, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 43, 46
(2009) [hereinafter Capers, Policing, Race, and Place] (“[L]aw enforcement . . . tak[es] into consideration
racial incongruity in assessing whether reasonable suspicion exists to justify a Terry stop. As a result of
this practice, law-abiding minorities entering predominantly white neighborhoods are frequently
stopped and questioned as to the reason for their presence in the neighborhood.”); Aya Gruber, Policing
and “Bluelining,” 58 HOUS. L. REV. 867, 873 (2021) (describing “bluelining” as “maintaining raced and
classed spatial and social segregation through the threat and application of violence”); Paul Butler,
Walking While Black, NAT’L L.J. (Nov. 10, 1997, 12:00 AM), https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/
almID/1202421509992/walking-while-black/ [https://perma.cc/7K6V-DBG2 (dark archive)]; see also
Devon W. Carbado, (E)Racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH. L. REV. 946, 956–57 (2002)
[hereinafter Carbado, (E)Racing]; Deborah N. Archer, The New Housing Segregation: The Jim Crow
Effects of Crime-Free Housing Ordinances, 118 MICH. L. REV. 173, 199–200 (2019); Jeffrey Fagan &
Elliott Ash, New Policing, New Segregation: From Ferguson to New York, 106 GEO. L.J. ONLINE 33, 52–
53 (2017).
21. See infra Section I.C.3.
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described at the beginning of this piece that led to deadly encounters. A child
playing with a toy gun in a park. A man on his cell phone in his car. Traffic
stops and petty crimes. The variety of situations in which police have killed
makes it virtually impossible for any individual to make choices that would
allow them to eliminate the possibility of being killed by the police. This is
especially so because the police’s power to initiate an encounter is nearly
limitless. Traffic laws have been written so that virtually any driver can be
legally stopped, and police have further been given the leeway to stop someone
when they read those laws incorrectly.22 Pedestrians, meanwhile, are protected
only by a “reasonable suspicion” requirement for involuntary stops, reasonable
suspicion which can serve entirely as pretext, and by no affirmative requirement
to ensure that a “voluntary” stop is, in fact, voluntary.23 Ultimately, this means
that for large swaths of the population, the only options for dealing with the
policing emergency are harm minimization—most infamously “the talk” given
to young people of color by their family members about surviving police
encounters—and prayer.
Finally, the policing emergency has persisted through every tool of the
traditional political process. Despite massive political will built up against the
current state of policing, most clearly seen through the protests against police
brutality in summer 2020, there has been minimal change.24 But this moment
in time is just another example of the police’s long-observed ability to resist
reform. Whether through police unions, police culture, or other more
idiosyncratic tactics, the police’s ability to withstand traditional political
processes is well established.25
When described in these broad strokes, it may seem some version of the
policing emergency is present in nearly every police department in the country.
That is because this core of the policing emergency stems from aspects and
effects of policing that transcend jurisdiction.
Stated simply, this transcendent core is violence. The violence of police is
inherent to how we have chosen to implement public safety across the country.
This can be seen not only through the national responses to police violence, but
also through doctrine. Indeed, the core legal regulations shaping police behavior
stem from the Federal Constitution.
22. See Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 57 (2014).
23. See Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2069–70 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); Ohio v.
Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 35 (1996).
24. See, e.g., Astead W. Herndon, How a Pledge To Dismantle the Minneapolis Police Collapsed, N.Y.
TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/26/us/politics/minneapolisdefund-police.html [https://
perma.cc/2VF4-GCLN (dark archive)] (Nov. 3, 2021); see also Sarah Holder, Fola Akinnibi &
Christopher Cannon, ‘We Have Not Defunded Anything’: Big Cities Boost Police Budgets, BLOOMBERG
(Sept. 22, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2020-city-budget-police-defunding/ [https://
perma.cc/7LSY-F9JT (dark archive)].
25. See infra Section I.C.
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But having the same core does not mean that the policing emergency is
the same, whether in form or intensity, in every jurisdiction in the country.
Policing is ultimately a local enterprise, and there is considerable variation in
both policy and personnel across the more than ten thousand law enforcement
departments in the country. Recognizing this variation, this Article argues that
people seeking to identify how the policing emergency has manifested in their
jurisdiction should look to five categories: excessive force, corruption, lack of
accountability,26 cover-ups, and supremacist ties or behaviors.27 Though they
are neither exhaustive nor dispositive, these categories seek to capture the
problems with policing that are routinely decried by both activists and
academics of all stripes and to make identifying the policing emergency a more
tangible exercise.
With the policing emergency identified, the question naturally arises:
what do we do about it? This Article suggests one possible answer, emergency
managers. As I define the term, an emergency manager is an individual or small
group granted the powers of a state or local government in a time of emergency
to address that emergency outside of the normal democratic process.
Emergency managers have been used for nearly a century in the context of fiscal
emergencies and for decades to rescue academically failing schools.28
Throughout this history, they have come in many stripes and have been imbued
with a range of powers. At their least intrusive, emergency managers serve to
oversee local governments and to provide them with expert advice.29 But at their
most powerful, an emergency manager can be imbued by a state government
with the power to fully usurp the powers of local government.30 These most
powerful emergency managers, most (in)famously Kevyn Orr in Detroit and
others empowered by the same Michigan statute, have been decried as
antidemocratic dictators by commentators and activists alike.31
That criticism is not wholly warranted. Unlike previous scholarship, this
Article is the first to view emergency managers prospectively, importing them
to a new context—policing. Doing so shows that most of these criticisms do not
intrinsically apply to emergency managers, and are instead tied to the political
economies in which emergency management has been used. Previously,
emergency managers were used in the fiscal and educational contexts by
conservative mayors and governors to seize power from disproportionately

26. See, e.g., Alice Speri, Ryan Devereaux & Sam Biddle, New York Police Are Attacking Protestors
— They Know They Won’t Face Consequences, INTERCEPT (June 2, 2020, 6:45 PM), https://theintercept.
com/2020/06/02/new-york-police-protesters-george-floyd/ [https://perma.cc/XC56-5WUY].
27. See infra Section I.C.
28. See infra Part II.
29. See infra Section II.A.1.
30. See infra Section II.A.2.
31. See infra Section II.A.2.
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more liberal, minority localities.32 The emergency managers appointed by those
conservative leaders have then implemented conservative policies in these
liberal places, policies that the locality was unlikely to choose for itself.33
Stepping back from that particular political economy, the application of
emergency managers to fiscal crises, academically troubled schools, and to
police begins to show that emergency management is, at its core, a tool. Like all
tools, emergency management has strengths and weaknesses, and is appropriate
for some situations but not others. While the dictatorial nature of emergency
managers has been decried as antidemocratic in the fiscal and educational
contexts, it is exactly this dictatorial nature that makes it a powerful tool for
police reform.
Too often, police reform has failed not because the people do not want it,
but because structural impediments stand in its way. Police exercise outsized
political power,34 are protected from investigation and termination by union
contracts and a culture—the fabled Blue Wall of Silence—that protects bad
actors and expels whistleblowers,35 and may also be protected from political
forces by the structures of local government itself.36
An emergency manager can cut through these impediments. The ability
to subvert the procedural, structural, and political roadblocks that have stifled
previous attempts at change is the tool’s greatest strength. Even in their weakest
form, empowering emergency managers to provide oversight could break down
the Blue Wall of Silence and increase accountability. And in their strongest
form, emergency managers are empowered by the state to seize control over the
entire functioning of local government. Here, an emergency manager could
abrogate union contracts, fire problem officers, change policies, reorient
budgets, and radically alter the operation of the police to create structural
changes that greatly reduce the police’s power to inflict violence.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I explores how to define
“emergency” generally before pinpointing the policing emergency’s violent
core. It then suggests how that emergency might be identified in each of the
thousands of local police agencies across the country. Part II shifts to emergency
managers. It explores the history and powers of emergency managers, through
a discussion of the laws and literature around emergency management in the
fiscal and educational contexts. Part III discusses how emergency managers
32. See infra note 249 and accompanying text (discussing the demographics of cities and school
districts placed under emergency control).
33. See infra Section II.C.
34. See Sam Blum, Police Unions Wield Massive Power in American Politics — For Now, ROLLING
STONE (July 7, 2020, 2:45 PM), https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-features/policeunions-politics-george-floyd-breonna-taylor-1024473/ [https://perma.cc/374Y-M9EP].
35. See Aziz Z. Huq & Richard H. McAdams, Litigating the Blue Wall of Silence: How To Challenge
the Police Privilege To Delay Investigation, 2016 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 213, 214–19.
36. See Herndon, supra note 24.
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might be used to solve the policing emergency. It first explains why emergency
managers could work and should be used in this context and then focuses on the
questions lawmakers should consider as they build policing emergency
managers. Part IV considers the major objection to emergency managers, that
they should not be used because they are an antidemocratic force.
I. THE POLICING EMERGENCY
A.

Defining Emergency

Before describing the policing emergency, this part will first tackle a
baseline issue, identifying what an “emergency” is. There is no universal
definition of emergency within the law.37 And especially when the term is used
by political actors, definitions can seem even less cohesive.38 Nevertheless, that
does not mean the term is completely without meaning.
To think through the question, it is helpful to begin with a dictionary
definition. Merriam-Webster defines emergency as “an unforeseen
combination of circumstances or the resulting state that calls for immediate
action” or “an urgent need for assistance or relief.”39 Similarly, the Oxford
English Dictionary defines emergency as “a state of things unexpectedly arising,
and urgently demanding immediate action.”40
These definitions capture three facets of an “emergency” that repeat
throughout the law.41 First, they note that “emergency” denotes an urgent need
for relief. This sense of urgency is often due to the magnitude of the potential
(or actualized) harm. Second, these definitions identify an emergency as
requiring “immediate” action. Legally, this often translates to the suspension of
usual deliberative processes in favor of unilateral executive action. These
unilateral decisions are justified in part because of the third part of an
emergency. As both Merriam-Webster and Oxford note, emergencies are often

37. See Karin Loevy, What Is an Emergency? The Legal Politics of Defining the “Un-Definable,” 22
ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 155, 158 (2015) (noting that in traditional emergency powers theory “[i]t is
common knowledge that emergencies, are unexpected events, and therefore essentially un-definable”).
38. See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck, Anne Joseph O’Connell & Rosa Po, Unorthodox Lawmaking,
Unorthodox Rulemaking, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1789, 1810 (2015) (describing the use of “non-emergency
emergency rulemaking,” or rulemaking using emergency procedures “for utterly routine matters”).
39. Emergency, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/emergency
[https://perma.cc/RT56-ZS7J] [hereinafter Emergency, MERRIAM-WEBSTER].
40. Emergency, OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY, www.oed.com/view/Entry/61130 [https://perma.
cc/ERY8-7Y8M (staff-uploaded, dark archive)] [hereinafter Emergency, OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY].
41. See, e.g., Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 439–40 (1934) (affirming the
ability of state governments to abrogate contracts when there is “urgent public need demanding such
relief” from causes physical, economic, or otherwise akin to “fire, flood, or earthquake”).
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“unforeseen”42 or “arise unexpectedly.”43 It is in part this surprise nature that
justifies the suspension of usual order.44
But even within dictionary definitions, not all emergencies are surprises.
In 2019, Oxford recognized “climate emergency” as its word of the year.45
“Climate emergency” is defined as “a situation in which urgent action is
required to reduce or halt climate change and avoid potentially irreversible
environmental damage resulting from it.”46 This definition suggests that an
emergency may exist even if it is foreseeable, or even foreseen,47 so long as the
magnitude of harm is great enough to warrant immediate action. Thus, while
most people think of unexpected emergencies as the “classic” emergency,48 the
rise of the “climate emergency” shows that a broader definition is also
recognized as valid.
Importantly, the law is not bound to the mast of dictionary definitions,
and emergencies in other situations show just how wide of a berth political
actors have when defining and declaring (or declining to declare) an emergency.
In addition to the expected emergencies—such as weather events or the
COVID-19 pandemic—politicians have declared emergencies in many other
contexts. Perhaps most related to the policing emergency, over twenty state and
local governments have already declared racism a public health crisis.49 Utah,
followed by fifteen other states, has declared pornography a public health
emergency.50 Multiple state and local governments have also declared

42. Emergency, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, supra note 39.
43. Emergency, OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY, supra note 40.
44. See L. ELAINE HALCHIN, CONG. RSCH. SERV., 98-805, NATIONAL EMERGENCY POWERS
2–3 (2021) Error! Hyperlink reference not valid.(noting that “emergency conditions” are those which
“have not attained enough of stability or recurrency to admit of their being dealt with according to
rule.” (quoting EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS, 1787–1957, at 3 (4th
rev. ed. 1957))).
45. Word of the Year 2019, OXFORDLANGUAGES, https://languages.oup.com/word-of-theyear/2019/ [https://perma.cc/6CYL-GDA3].
46. Id.
47. Warnings about climate change date back to at least the 1970s. See, e.g., James P. Sterba,
Problems from Climate Changes Foreseen in a 1974 C.I.A. Report, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 1977, at A10.
48. See, e.g., Alan S. Trust, What Constitutes an E-Mergency: Not Your Parents’ Emergencies: Part I,
29 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 42, 42 (2010) (identifying “the classic view of an emergency” as one involving
unforeseen exigent circumstances).
49. See Christine Vestal, Racism Is a Public Health Crisis, Say Cities and Counties, STATELINE (June
15, 2020), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2020/06/15/racism-isa-public-health-crisis-say-cities-and-counties [https://perma.cc/65ND-GA4B] (identifying twentyfour states or localities, including Michigan, Ohio, Wisconsin, and Denver, Colorado, as having made
these declarations); see also Gov. Sisolak Proclaims Racism a Public Health Crisis, OFF. NEV. GOVERNOR
(Aug. 5, 2020), https://gov.nv.gov/News/Press/2020/Gov__Sisolak_proclaims_racism_a_public_
health_crisis/ [https://perma.cc/AU4N-DDJQ].
50. See Alex Stuckey, Utah Ceremonially Declares Porn a ‘Public Health Crisis,’ SALT LAKE TRIB.
(Apr. 20, 2016, 7:32 AM), https://archive.sltrib.com/article.php?id=3795327&itype=CMSID
[https://perma.cc/6VMH-KA7M]; Mattie Quinn, Is Porn a Public Health Crisis? 16 States Say Yes.,
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homelessness emergencies.51 The Governor of New Mexico recently declared a
state of emergency “due to the ongoing and pervasive threat of riots and
insurrection” surrounding President Joseph Biden’s inauguration.52 And
Presidents, acting under the National Emergencies Act,53 have declared sixtytwo emergencies with thirty-seven still in effect.54 These emergencies have
ranged in substance, from blocking government property from numerous
countries, including Iran,55 to prohibiting transactions with drug traffickers,56 to
stopping cyber criminals,57 to taking immigration-related action on the southern
border.58
Perhaps unsurprisingly given the breadth of these declared emergencies,
statutes empowering political actors to declare emergencies tend to be written
broadly.59 The Federal Disaster Relief Act, for instance, defines emergency as
any “instance for which, in the determination of the President, Federal
assistance is needed to supplement State and local efforts and capabilities to
save lives and to protect property and public health and safety, or to lessen or
avert the threat of a catastrophe in any part of the United States.”60 Other
emergency statutes do not define emergency at all, simply leaving declarations
to the discretion of an official. Delaware simply states that the Governor can
proclaim a state of emergency “upon a finding that an emergency or disaster has
occurred or that such occurrence or threat of that occurrence is imminent.”61
Florida says only that “[a] state of emergency shall be declared by executive

GOVERNING (July 17, 2019), https://www.governing.com/archive/gov-pornography-public-healthcrisis-states.html [https://perma.cc/X2K9-H69P].
51. J.B. Wogan, Why Governments Declare a Homeless State of Emergency, GOVERNING (Nov. 6,
2015), http://www.governing.com/archive/gov-when-cities-declare-homeless-state-of-emergency.html
[https://perma.cc/GK85-3JUD].
52. KRQE Staff, Gov. Lujan Grisham Declares State of Emergency Leading up to Inauguration, KRQE
NEWS, https://www.krqe.com/news/new-mexico/gov-lujan-grisham-declares-state-of-emergency-lead
ing-up-to-inauguration/ [https://perma.cc/5W5P-9GSN] (Mar. 12, 2021).
53. National Emergencies Act, Pub. L. No. 94-412, 90 Stat. 1255 (1976) (codified as amended at
50 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1651).
54. HALCHIN, supra note 44, at 15.
55. Id.; see also Exec. Order No. 12170, 44 Fed. Reg. 65729, 65729 (Nov. 14, 1979).
56. Exec. Order No. 12978, 60 Fed. Reg. 54579, 54579 (Oct. 21, 1995).
57. Exec. Order No. 13694, 3 C.F.R. § 297 (2015).
58. Proclamation No. 9844, 3 C.F.R. § 12 (2019) (revoked by Exec. Order No. 14022, 86 Fed.
Reg. 17895 (Apr. 1, 2021)).
59. See, e.g., Legislative Oversight of Emergency Executive Powers, NAT’L CONF. ST.
LEGISLATURES, https://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/legislative-oversight-of-execu
tive-orders.aspx#2021 [https://perma.cc/C4MF-PF5H] (Jan. 4, 2022) (noting that every state
empowers its governor to declare an emergency but finding that as of May 2020, twelve states had no
legislative limits on those declarations).
60. The Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-707,
§ 103(b)(1), 102 Stat. 4689, 4689 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 5122(1)).
61. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 20, § 3115(c) (LEXIS through 83 Del. Laws, c. 266).
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order or proclamation of the Governor if she or he finds an emergency has
occurred or that the occurrence or the threat thereof is imminent.”62
While there are some more specific definitions of emergency, these are
often contained within statutes addressing more specific problems. For
example, Iowa has a statute addressing a “public order emergency,” which
defines its scope as addressing “such substantial interference with the public
peace as to constitute a significant threat to the health and safety of the people
or a significant threat to public or private property.”63 Illinois likewise has a
targeted emergency declaration statute, but to a focus on atomic explosions,
natural disasters, and telecommunications failures.64
Beyond these explicitly political statutes, the exigency exception to the
Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement likewise shows just how broadly
(and loosely) we have defined emergency.65 The Supreme Court has defined
exigency within this context as a “compelling need for official action and no
time to secure a warrant.”66 That exception appears limited to a short list of
possibilities: “hot pursuit of a fleeing felon, imminent destruction of evidence,
the need to prevent a subject’s escape, and risk of danger to the police or
others.”67 But the possibilities within those circumstances are capacious. Far
from being limited to just entering burning buildings,68 courts have allowed
police to justify warrantless searches as exigent even when, for example, they
did not have probable cause to believe their target committed the crime that
justified the exigency,69 when they seemingly had ample time and opportunity

62. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 252.36(2) (Westlaw through laws and j. ress. in effect from the 2021 1st
Reg. Sess. and Spec. “A” and “B” Sesss. of the 27th Leg.); see also MICH. COMP. LAWS § 10.31(1)
(2021) (repealed) (empowering the governor “[d]uring times of great public crisis, disaster, rioting,
catastrophe, or similar public emergency within the state, or reasonable apprehension of immediate
danger of a public emergency of that kind, when public safety is imperiled”).
63. IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 29C.2(8)–.3 (Westlaw through legislation from the 2021 2d
Extraordinary Sess.).
64. 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 3305/2(a) (Westlaw through P.A. 102-695 of the 2021 Reg.
Sess.).
65. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14–15 (1948).
66. Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978).
67. United States v. Evans, 549 F. App’x 397, 402 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v.
Williams, 354 F.3d 497, 503 (6th Cir. 2003)); see also Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006);
Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 149 (2013).
68. See Tyler, 436 U.S. at 509–10.
69. See, e.g., United States v. Caraballo, 831 F.3d 95, 104 (2d Cir. 2016) (“[T]he officers thought
they lacked probable cause to arrest Caraballo on Barratt’s murder, [although] they properly considered
him their ‘primary suspect.’”).
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to obtain a warrant,70 or when the police’s explanation of potential harm is
dubious, at best.71
The leeway in this area is perhaps clearest, however, when examining
events that meet the definition of an emergency but go unaddressed. The
politicization of COVID-19 may be the most recent example of this. While
some politicians took extreme, if necessary, measures to prevent COVID-19’s
spread—issuing stay-at-home orders, shutting down businesses and houses of
worship, mandating masks—others took none of these steps.72 Indeed, some
state-level officials took steps in the opposite direction, mandating that
localities and government offices not take steps that they believed would lessen
COVID-19’s effects, such as mandating vaccination or limiting business
occupancy.73
But perhaps the most graphic example of this political leeway in the
emergency space is lynching. A detailed history of lynching in the postReconstruction United States is far beyond the scope of this Article.74 But a
bare-bones account of lynchings in the early twentieth century will show that
problem meets even a strict dictionary definition of an emergency. The harm
was obviously great. From 1877 to 1950, more than 4,000 “racial terror
lynchings” occurred throughout the American South.75 These lynchings were
often brutal acts of torture witnessed, at times, by thousands of people.76 And
their effects extended far beyond those killed. Lynchings helped to perpetuate
racial and economic hierarchy,77 and caused “devastating” harm to the “physical,
mental, and emotional well-being of African Americans” unfortunate enough to
70. See, e.g., United States v. Iwai, 930 F.3d 1141, 1148–61 (9th Cir. 2019) (Bybee, J., dissenting)
(noting the possibility of an anticipatory warrant, that officers had obtained multiple warrants over the
previous days of their investigation, and that they had multiple hours to obtain a warrant before
entering Iwai’s home).
71. See, e.g., Evans, 549 F. App’x at 407 (Griffin, J., concurring) (noting that the police justified
their search by referencing a mother’s fear of harm to her child from the father, when the mother
actually said that she feared what would happen to the child if the police rushed into the house).
72. See, e.g., Greg Allen, Fla. Republican Gov. DeSantis Cancels COVID-19 Restrictions Statewide,
NPR (May 4, 2021, 5:06 AM), https://www.npr.org/2021/05/04/993384848/fla-republican-govdesantis-cancels-covid-19-restrictions-statewide [https://perma.cc/9UP8-UEF7] (noting that Florida
did not have a statewide mask mandate).
73. See, e.g., id.; Jake Zuckerman, DeWine Signs Bill To Temporarily Ban School COVID-19 Vaccine
Mandates, OHIO CAP. J. (July 15, 2021, 12:50 AM), https://ohiocapitaljournal.com/2021/07/15/dewinesigns-bill-to-temporarily-ban-school-covid-19-vaccine-mandates/ [https://perma.cc/DK4H-8PN7].
74. For a more detailed account, see EQUAL JUST. INITIATIVE, LYNCHING IN AMERICA:
CONFRONTING THE LEGACY OF RACIAL TERROR (3d ed. 2017) [hereinafter LYNCHING IN
AMERICA], https://eji.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/lynching-in-america-3d-ed-080219.pdf [https
://perma.cc/2S2P-HR7U].
75. Teri Dobbins Baxter, Dying for Equal Protection, 71 HASTINGS L.J. 535, 563 (2020) (quoting
LYNCHING IN AMERICA, supra note 74, at 4). While rarer, lynchings occurred in the North as well. Id.
at 565.
76. Id. (“A 1917 lynching in Memphis, Tennessee attracted thousands of spectators.”).
77. Id. at 565–68.
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witness them.78 Indeed, lynching was one cause of the Great Migration, in
which millions of Black people moved to northern states in part “to escape the
racial terror exemplified by lynchings.”79
Lynchings were also largely unpredictable. While nominally linked to
allegations of Black criminality, those allegations could be falsified, and other
lynchings occurred merely because of social norm violations or bad luck.80 In
other words, like a tornado, one might be able to predict that a lynching would
occur, but figuring out exact parameters could happen only shortly before it was
too late. Finally, lynchings totally subverted normal criminal justice processes.
Not only were lynchings mob violence that subverted traditional criminal
punishment, but despite their public nature, lynchers went on to escape
punishment themselves en masse. “[A]fter 1900, only 1 percent [of lynchings]
resulted in a lyncher being convicted of any criminal offense.”81 Lynchings
therefore seem to fit well within the bounds necessary for emergency action.
But when faced with this emergency, politicians at the local, state, and national
levels demurred in the face of white, Southern resistance.82 Stated plainly, these
leaders saw an emergency occurring on a grand scale, and they made the political
choice not to act. That is the breadth of discretion in which defining and
declaring emergencies sits.
These examples—whether historical, legal, or definitional—ultimately
suggest that despite my cataloguing of three factors, emergencies are ultimately
judged by a discretionary, totality-of-the-circumstances test. Sometimes grave
harm is enough, other times it is ignored. The usual processes may be suspended
because of an emergency’s sudden nature, but other times they may be
suspended for expediency’s sake or maintained despite some sudden harm. And
some emergencies are sudden, but others simmer for years, decades, or perhaps
even centuries.
B.

The Policing Emergency

With the idea of an emergency defined generally, the natural next question
is: What is the policing emergency? I do not attempt to explore the full contours
of the policing emergency. That project—which would necessitate both
significant historical analysis and in-depth evaluation of each of the many
78. Id. at 567.
79. Id. at 568.
80. See id. at 563–64; see also OKLA. COMM’N TO STUDY THE TULSA RACE RIOT OF 1921,
TULSA RACE RIOT 11 (2011), https://www.okhistory.org/research/forms/freport.pdf [https://
perma.cc/6JGM-VDKP] (noting that the charges against the man that set off the Tulsa Massacre were
“later dismissed and highly suspect from the start”); Emmett Till’s Accuser Admits She Lied, EQUAL JUST.
INITIATIVE (Jan. 31, 2017), https://eji.org/news/emmett-till-accuser-admits-she-lied/ [https://perma.
cc/N2MG-AV8L].
81. LYNCHING IN AMERICA, supra note 74, at 48.
82. See id. at 48–50; Baxter, supra note 75, at 566–67.
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thousands of local police agencies across the country—is far beyond this
Article’s scope. Instead, I identify only the policing emergency’s core. That core
is violence.
Specifically, that core is the harm that extends from the police’s violence.
Those harms occur on three levels. The first, most obvious level is physical
harm. This is police shootings; beatings; frisks; tight handcuffs; pepper spray;
tasers; and the manifold other ways that police physically accost individuals.
Second is the psychological harm. This harm extends far beyond those directly
physically harmed by police to those who witness, are exposed to, and are
threatened by police’s physical violence. Third, there is sociological harm. This
is the harm of hierarchy. It is the police’s tendency, both historical and modern,
to take actions that maintain the racial, economic, and other hierarchies that we,
as a country, claim to want to dismantle.83
These harms track neatly onto the three qualities of an emergency
described above. They are large in magnitude, often unpredictable,84 and
traditional processes have proven largely unable to address them. To further
explain these harms and to show how they map onto the definition of an
emergency, the remainder of this part will use the summer 2020 protests,
uprisings, and riots as a case study.
Summer 2020 saw what may have been the largest protest movement in
U.S. history.85 Polls suggest that between fifteen and twenty-six million people
protested during May and June 2020.86 By comparison, the Women’s March of
2017 turned out about three million people, and the civil rights marches in the

83. Past authors in this area have adopted the World Health Organization’s definition of police
violence: “The intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another
person, or against a group or community, that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in
injury, death, psychological harm, maldevelopment or deprivation.” See, e.g., Denise Herd, Cycles of
Threat: Graham v. Connor, Police Violence, and African American Health Inequities, 100 B.U. L. REV.
1047, 1049–50 (2020). I deviate from this definition to include sociological violence because the
WHO’s definition does not capture the police’s role in maintaining the various negative hierarchies, as
has been by highlighted by both abolitionists and academics in recent years. See, e.g., Monica C. Bell,
Anti-Segregation Policing, 95 N.Y.U. L. REV. 650, 659 (2020) [hereinafter Bell, Anti-Segregation Policing];
#8TOABOLITION, https://www.8toabolition.com/ [https://perma.cc/N44H-N3Z8].
84. To be more precise, the unpredictability I refer to here is the emergency’s stochasticity. While
trends in the harms police cause may certainly be analyzed, predicting on whom those harms will befall
at any given point is virtually impossible, and so it is likewise impossible for any given individual to
take sufficient preventive measures to guarantee they will avoid those harms.
85. Larry Buchanan, Quoctrung Bui & Jugal K. Patel, Black Lives Matter May Be the Largest
Movement in U.S. History, N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/
07/03/us/george-floyd-protests-crowd-size.html [https://perma.cc/J95M-EAAS (dark archive)].
86. Id. (citing polls taken between June 4 and June 22).
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1960s involved only hundreds of thousands.87 These millions of protestors
across the country were joined by protestors internationally.88
1. Physical Harms
These protests began in response to the sort of shocking physical violence
that often causes people to take to the streets, a horrific video of Derek Chauvin
killing George Floyd by keeping a knee on his neck for 9 minutes and 29
seconds while onlookers recorded, begging him to stop or for other police to
intervene. But the protests quickly became about more than that one horrific
event, as people from across the country reckoned with the harm that their own
police departments had caused.89 Names of victims of police brutality rang out.
At the same time, protestors and the activists leading and organizing them
focused not only on these most egregious acts of police, but the routine violence
that the entire policing system has inflicted on the Black, Brown, poor, disabled,
LGBTQIA, sex worker, and other communities that were historically
subjugated, politically disfavored, or for other reasons have remained the
disproportionate targets of police violence.90
Unlike previous protests, which focused on repercussions for the specific
officers involved or policy reforms designed to curb specific abuses, these
protests made more expansive calls for change.91 Protestors now called for
remaking the entire policing system under the theory that the sorts of
previously identified “abuses” were not abuses at all, but were instead the
regular functioning of the policing system.92
While this mass movement illuminated the depth of the citizenry’s
dissatisfaction with the police, it was the acts of the members of that system—
the police and their allies in government—that showed the emergency itself.
Across the country, police responded to calls for reform or abolition with
violence against protestors. Tear gas, batons, and impact munitions were
87. Id.
88. See Jen Kirby, “Black Lives Matter” Has Become a Global Rallying Cry Against Racism and Police
Brutality, VOX (June 12, 2020, 7:30 AM), https://www.vox.com/2020/6/12/21285244/black-livesmatter-global-protests-george-floyd-uk-belgium [https://perma.cc/Q3M2-TJH5].
89. See Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor, Did Last Summer’s Black Lives Matter Protests Change Anything?,
NEW YORKER (Aug. 6, 2021), https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/did-last-summersprotests-change-anything [https://perma.cc/Z9B6-628P (dark archive)] (noting the widespread
symbolic responses of officials across the country in response to protests in their jurisdictions).
90. See, e.g., #8TOABOLITION, supra note 83; Mariame Kaba, Yes, We Mean Literally Abolish the
Police, N.Y. TIMES (June 12, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/12/opinion/sunday/floydabolish-defund-police.html [https://perma.cc/M8EH-FVVV (dark archive)].
91. See, e.g., #8TOABOLITION, supra note 83; Christopher Wilson, Group Behind Moderate Police
Reform Proposal Issues Apology for Distracting from Defunding and Abolition Movement, YAHOO! NEWS
(June 10, 2020), https://www.yahoo.com/video/police-reform-8cantwait-project-zero-cofounderapology-143505275.html [https://perma.cc/24TH-U7WX].
92. See, e.g., #8TOABOLITION, supra note 83; Wilson, supra note 91.
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commonplace. Some police drove their cars into crowds of protestors,93 and
some politicians defended them.94 A wall of mothers was filmed peacefully
protesting; they were later attacked by police.95 One NYPD officer said over
the dispatch radio in response to protestor movement, “Shoot those
motherfuckers.”96 A teenage organizer in Chicago had her front teeth knocked
out.97 Much of this violence was captured on video for the world to see.98
This police violence was not a surprise to many police critics or veterans
of protests past. The police violence in Ferguson, Missouri, during protests
after Officer Darren Wilson killed Michael Brown was rampant, ensnaring
protestors and journalists alike.99 But the widespread and indiscriminate nature
of the violence bolstered activists’ claims that these were not the acts of a few
bad apples; this was the nature of the police.
The physical harm suffered by these protestors was emblematic of the
physical harm regularly meted out by the police. While it is difficult to quantify
exactly how many people are directly physically harmed and how (whether or
not with legal justification) by the police each year, that number is likely in the
millions. The Bureau of Justice Statistics’ Police-Public Contact Survey
likewise suggests that over twenty-eight million people over the age of sixteen
are subjected to police-initiated contact, with well over one million people

93. See Alec Snyder, Video Appears To Show Detroit Police Car Driving into Protestors, CNN (June
30, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/29/us/detroit-police-car-plows-protesters-trnd/index.html
[https://perma.cc/2HBJ-BRHS]; Li Cohen, Video Shows NYPD Vehicles Driving into Protestors in
Brooklyn, CBS NEWS (May 31, 2020), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/video-shows-nypd-vehiclesdriving-into-protesters-in-brooklyn-2020-05-31/ [https://perma.cc/2F5A-9PWH].
94. Henry Austen, Suzanne Ciechalski & Tom Winter, New York Mayor Bill de Blasio Defends
Police After Video Shows NYPD SUV Driving into Protesters, NBC NEWS (May 31, 2020), http://www.nbc
news.com/news/us-news/new-york-mayor-bill-de-blasio-defends-police-after-video-n1220246 [http://
perma.cc/GD42-2HE4].
95. Tim Dickinson, From the Administration That Brought You Kids-in-Cages, It’s Tear-GassedMoms, ROLLING STONE (July 22, 2020, 7:48 PM), https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politicsnews/from-the-administration-that-brought-you-kids-in-cages-its-tear-gassed-moms-1032760/ [https:
//perma.cc/J4GY-K2A2].
96. Speri et al., supra note 26.
97. See Maxwell Evans, 60 Protestors Sue City, Alleging Chicago Police Abused Them ‘Without
Justification’ at Summer Protests, BLOCK CLUB CHI. (Nov. 19, 2020), https://blockclubchicago.org/2020/
11/19/60-protester-sue-city-alleging-chicago-police-abused-them-without-justification-at-summer-pro
tests/ [https://perma.cc/9K4C-K3HB].
98. See, e.g., Martha Bayne & Jason Schumer, What Happened May 30?, S. SIDE WKLY., https://
protesttimeline.southsideweekly.com/ [https://perma.cc/988F-LFZ3] [hereinafter Bayne & Schumer,
May 30]; Jim Daley, Martha Bayne & Jason Schumer, What Happened July 17?, S. SIDE WKLY.,
https://protesttimeline.southsideweekly.com/july-17/ [https://perma.cc/5VVA-LEZJ].
99. See, e.g., Wesley Lowery, In Ferguson, Washington Post Reporter Wesley Lowery Gives Account of
His Arrest, WASH. POST (Aug. 14, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/in-fergusonwashington-post-reporter-wesley-lowery-gives-account-of-his-arrest/2014/08/13/0fe25c0e-2359-11e486ca-6f03cbd15c1a_story.html [https://perma.cc/B55S-LEKA (dark archive)].
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subjected to police’s force or threatened force in a given year.100 Most of the
people who experienced this force perceived it as excessive.101
Or, consider the practice of stop and frisk. Even after lawsuits brought
huge reductions in the number of stops, police in just three cities seem to make
nearly 200,000 stops per year. The Chicago Police Department (“CPD”)
stopped over 54,000 people in just the first half of 2016, down from 250,000 in
a four-month period of 2014.102 NYPD made about 13,000 stops in 2019 and
10,000 stops in 2020, down from a high of over 685,000 in 2011.103 And police
in Philadelphia made almost 77,000 stops in 2019 after seeing drops in the
number of stops greater than 30% in previous years.104
While these numbers may seem stark, it is only by identifying what a frisk
or stop actually looks like that one can contextualize the magnitude of this harm.
Ice Cube once rapped that police would “search a n*gga down, grabbin his
nuts.”105 As it turns out, he was not exaggerating. He was describing the police’s
training.106 Too often these stops are “state-sanctioned sexual assault,” with all
of the harm the actions underlying that label entails.107 But even frisks that do
100. See ERIKA HARRELL & ELIZABETH DAVIS, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., NCJ 255730,
CONTACTS BETWEEN POLICE AND THE PUBLIC, 2018 – STATISTICAL TABLES 3 (2020), https://bjs.
ojp.gov/content/pub/pdf/cbpp18st.pdf [https://perma.cc/C8BT-TTXV].
101. Id. at 6.
102. See Russell L. Jones, Stop-and-Frisk: Its Effect on African American Communities—A Tale of Three
Cities, 45 U. DAYTON L. REV. 357, 374–75 (2020); ARLANDER KEYS, THE CONSULTANT’S SECOND
SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT 9 (2018), https://www.aclu-il.org/sites/default/files/field_documents/the
_consultants_second_semi-annual_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/TZ7N-2PKR].
103. See N.Y. C.L. UNION, STOP-AND-FRISK IN THE DE BLASIO ERA 4 (2019) [hereinafter DE
BLASIO ERA], https://www.nyclu.org/sites/default/files/field_documents/20190314_nyclu_stopfrisk_
singles.pdf [https://perma.cc/TY4N-XPS2]; Stop, Question, and Frisk Data, NYPD, https://www1.nyc.
gov/site/nypd/stats/reports-analysis/stopfrisk.page [https://perma.cc/7VR9-T6ZS] (July 23, 2021)
(drawing from the 2019 and 2020 Excel files).
104. Plaintiffs’ Tenth Report to Court on Stop and Frisk Practices: Fourth Amendment Issues at
3–4, Bailey v. City of Philadelphia, No. 10-05952 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 20, 2020) [hereinafter Plaintiffs’
Tenth Report], https://www.aclupa.org/sites/default/files/field_documents/104_plaintiffs_tenth_rep
ort_on_4th_amendment_issues.pdf [https://perma.cc/8TF9-XPGM].
105. NWA, Fuck tha Police, on STRAIGHT OUTTA COMPTON (Ruthless Records 1988).
106. See Seth W. Stoughton, Terry v. Ohio and the (Un)forgettable Frisk, 15 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.
19, 29 (2017) (“The groin and buttocks bear special mention, as it had been drilled into me in training
that criminals knew and took advantage of the fact that officers were naturally uncomfortable searching
these areas.”).
107. Alanna Vagianos, Bloomberg’s Stop-and-Frisk Was “State Sanctioned Sexual Assault” of Men of
Color, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 2, 2020, 4:47 PM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/bloombergstop-and-frisk-sexual-assault_n_5e56d9aac5b68f79fdc45404 [http://perma.cc/9685-AAUJ] (describing
a stop of a Black college student outside of a party wherein “an officer groped his private areas,
thoroughly feeling around between his thighs and his testicles,” after which the student said he “‘felt
empty’ the rest of the night”); see also, e.g., Josephine Ross, What the #MeToo Campaign Teaches About
Stop and Frisk, 54 IDAHO L. REV. 543, 544 (2018); Paul Butler, Sexual Torture: American Policing
and the Harassment of Black Men, GUARDIAN (Aug. 14, 2017, 7:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/
us-news/2017/aug/14/stop-and-frisk-policing-black-men-torture-sexual-harassment-paul-butler [https:
//perma.cc/UH5T-49R6].
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not amount to sexual assault are physically uncomfortable, to say the least.
Professor Seth Stoughton describes his tactics as a former police officer as being
designed to “physically control [a suspect’s] movement.”108 These tactics
included “grabbing the suspect’s thumbs or . . . interlaced fingers” while they
were in a handcuffing position, twisting the person’s “wrists, thumbs, or
fingers” to create tension, bending someone “far forward” over a car,
“intentionally disrupting the suspect’s” balance, and at times actually
handcuffing the person.109
These stops, as uncomfortable (or worse) as they may be, flip the old
adage—that it is better to let ten guilty people go free lest one innocent suffer—
on its head. Analyses of stops regularly find that the vast majority of people
stopped are innocent of any crime, and only rarely is any sort of contraband
recovered. In 2017, 67% of people stopped by NYPD were not issued any
summons or arrested, down from a high of 90% in earlier years.110 In Chicago,
only 28% of stops in the measured period resulted in any enforcement action
by the police.111 And in Philadelphia, of nearly 4,000 stops in the sample
provided by the police department, fewer than 200 recovered any type of
contraband.112
Finally, I end this section where I began. Police killings, while seemingly
unpredictable, when looked at in this context seem much closer to an expected,
albeit extreme, manifestation of the violence that permeates our policing
system.113 And even those killings are all too common. While there is no allencompassing database of police killings, the Washington Post estimates that
police shoot to death about 1,000 people per year.114 Like other police statistics,
these killings are not equally distributed. Black Americans are killed at a rate of
thirty-seven per million per year, more than twice the rate of white

108. Stoughton, supra note 106, at 25.
109. Id. at 25–26.
110. DE BLASIO ERA, supra note 103, at 25.
111. KEYS, supra note 102, at 16.
112. Plaintiffs’ Tenth Report, supra note 104, at 9.
113. America’s affinity for firearms might seem to blame for this fatality rate. But of the nearly
7,000 police killings the Washington Post has catalogued since 2015, some 429 involve people who were
totally unarmed, and another 249 involve people holding a toy weapon. See Fatal Force, WASH. POST,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/investigations/police-shootings-database/ [http://perma.cc
/2F7T-CU9A] (Jan. 7, 2022). Even if every police killing where the deceased had a gun was removed,
the rate of killings by American police would still be noticeably higher than that in similar countries.
See Alexi Jones & Wendy Sawyer, Not Just “a Few Bad Apples”: U.S. Police Kill Civilians at Much Higher
Rates than Other Countries, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (June 5, 2020), https://www.prisonpolicy.
org/blog/2020/06/05/policekillings/ [https://perma.cc/NCF3-6HCD] (finding that U.S. police kill
civilians at a rate of 33.5 killings per 10 million, while the next closest country, Canada, has police that
kill at a rate of 9.8 killings per 10 million; removing U.S. police killings involving a suspect armed with
a gun would lower the U.S. rate to approximately 14.1 killings per 10 million (33.5 * .41)).
114. See Fatal Force, supra note 113.
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Americans.115 And Black people are even more disproportionately represented
among those who are killed by police while unarmed than they are among police
killings generally.116
Still, fewer than two thousand people per year may not sound like much
in a country of over 330 million. But consider this number in the context of
homicides more generally. According to one study, which calculated police
killings as occurring at the rate of 1,500 per year, police homicides accounted
for around 10% of all homicides in the United States in a given year.117 But even
that does not tell the whole story. Most homicides are committed by someone
who knows their victim.118 When compared to the killings that many people
seem to fear most—those committed by a stranger—the picture is materially
worse as fully one-third of stranger-killings in a year are committed by police.119
Second, contrast this mass of state-sanctioned death against one of the
only other sources of state-enacted killing, the actual death penalty. That
penalty often requires years, even decades, of process to be imposed.120 Short
time frames between conviction and execution are so difficult to square with
notions of due process that the Supreme Court’s acquiescence to the
Department of Justice’s quest to kill thirteen people in six months was described
by Justice Sotomayor as “justice on the fly”121 and “not justice.”122 Indeed, in the
forty-three-year era of the modern death penalty, fewer than 1,600 people have
been executed.123 That is about one-and-a-half years of fatal cop shootings.

115. Id. (reporting rates of police killings of 37 per million for Black people, 28 per million for
Hispanic people, 15 per million for white people, and 5 per million for people classified as “Other”).
116. Id. (reporting that Black people represent 1,557 of 6,842 people (23%) in the database but 137
of 429 (32%) unarmed people shot and killed by police).
117. See Patrick Ball, Violence in Blue, GRANTA (June 8, 2020), https://granta.com/violence-inblue/#_ftnref9 [https://perma.cc/NP6D-RVBD]; see also KRISTIAN LUM & PATRICK BALL, HUM.
RTS. DATA ANALYSIS GRP., ESTIMATING UNDOCUMENTED HOMICIDES WITH TWO LISTS AND
LIST DEPENDENCE (2015), https://hrdag.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/2015-hrdag-estimatingundoc-homicides.pdf [https://perma.cc/QE6J-QT35].
118. Ball, supra note 117.
119. Id.
120. See, e.g., United States v. Higgs, 141 S. Ct. 645, 646 (2021) (mem.) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(noting that people executed during the Justice Department’s six-month execution spree had been
convicted twenty-one (Daniel Lee), twenty (Brandon Bernard), sixteen (Alfred Bourgeois), sixteen
(Wesley Purkey), twelve (Lisa Montgomery), and twenty years (Dustin Higgs) before their
executions).
121. Id. at 652 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (quoting Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 427 (2009)).
122. Id. at 647.
123. Executions Database, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions/
execution-database [https://perma.cc/5QVA-AGV7] (listing executions from January 17, 1977, through
December 11, 2020).
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2. Psychological Harm
What starts with the body creeps into the mind. Before delving more
deeply into what I have labeled “psychological” harm, a note about how I use
that term is warranted. I use the term psychological harm as a contrast to the
direct, physical harm discussed above. “Psychological harm” in this Article
refers to those harms that manifest as a result of police action, but which are not
directly physically inflicted on an individual by a police officer. Instead, the
harm is indirect, such as that caused by, for example, observing a police killing.
I do not intend to insinuate that these harms do not have physical effects. They
do, and they can be devastating.
While a significant amount of empirical research supports the idea that
police violence causes immense psychological harm, again, perhaps the most
vivid example of the phenomenon occurred as a result of summer 2020. During
Derek Chauvin’s trial for killing George Floyd, Darnella Frazier, the teenager
who recorded Floyd’s death, took the stand. She described the lasting effect of
having witnessed Floyd die, “It’s been nights I’ve stayed up apologizing to
George Floyd for not doing more and not physically interacting and not saving
his life.”124 Ms. Frazier was only one of several bystanders, including several
other children, who gave tearstained testimony at Chauvin’s trial.125 But
Frazier’s interactions with the Minneapolis police would unfortunately not be
through yet. Only months after she gave that testimony, a police officer killed
her uncle, crashing into him at an intersection while in a high-speed chase with
a robbery suspect.126 As she noted in a Facebook post soon after, part of the pain
caused by her uncle’s death was that “he had NOTHING to do with” the police
or the robbery.127
Frazier’s experiences highlight part of what makes the harms discussed
thus far, both physical and psychological, fit well within the emergency
definition. Not only are these harms widespread, they are wildly unpredictable.
Frazier has committed no crime, but she will likely never be the same after
Minneapolis police subjected her to the murder of one man and then killed her
uncle the next year. Likewise, her uncle was killed while doing nothing more
than driving at an intersection. And as previously discussed, the vast majority
of people subjected to police stops and frisks are innocent, allowed to go on
their way. While, as the next section will discuss, certain populations are more
124. Eric Levenson & Aaron Cooper, Firefighter, 9-Year-Old and Teens Give Powerful Testimony in
Derek Chauvin Trial, CNN (Mar. 30, 2021), https://www.cnn.com/2021/03/30/us/derek-chauvin-trialday-2/index.html [https://perma.cc/C9C8-VSUH].
125. Id.
126. Nicholas Bogel-Burroughs, Bystander Killed in Police Crash Is Uncle of Teen Who Filmed George
Floyd’s Death, N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/07/us/darnella-frazieruncle-minneapolis-police.html [https://perma.cc/UTM5-5H5H (dark archive)].
127. Id.
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likely to fall victim to these police harms, predicting exactly who the victim will
be and when seems nearly impossible. Indeed, this seems true even at the
jurisdictional level. While major cities like New York or Chicago might be
expected to have some nonzero number of high-profile police violence, few
would have predicted Minneapolis or Louisville as the core of international
protests.
It is perhaps this unpredictability that helps to explain why researchers
have consistently identified negative impacts on those who witness, but are not
themselves subjected to, police violence. While observing these sorts of
secondary effects of police violence are a relatively new area of study, the
findings consistently point in a single direction. Exposure to police violence has
a significant negative effect on large parts of the population.
In one study, for example, exposure to police killings of unarmed Black
people was estimated to contribute an additional fifty-five million excess poor
mental health days among Black American adults.128 By comparison, diabetes
was responsible for approximately seventy-five million such days among the
same population.129
These effects extend beyond generalized mental health. Another study
found statistically significant increases in late preterm birth among pregnant
people exposed to police violence within their census tract during their
pregnancy, with even greater increases in moderate preterm birth among Black
women when there was a Black person killed by the police.130 One of the authors
of the piece hypothesized that the effects may be even worse than their study
showed.131 Given the history of studies showing male babies are more sensitive
to in utero stress, it was surprising that this study showed stronger associations
when mothers were pregnant with female babies.132 This raised the possibility
that “that there might be some miscarriage happening that we’re not capturing
because we were only able to use the birth records . . . . If there is early fetal
loss that’s happening, that could explain why we’re seeing these really strong
associations in the female births.”133

128. Jacob Bor, Atheendar S. Venkataramani, David R. Williams & Alexander C. Tsai, Police
Killings and Their Spillover Effects on the Mental Health of Black Americans: A Population-Based, QuasiExperimental Study, 392 LANCET 302, 308 (2018).
129. Id.
130. See Dana E. Goin, Anu Manchikanti Gomez, Kriszta Farkas, Catherine Duarte, Deborah
Karasek, Brittany D. Chambers, Andrea V. Jackson & Jennifer Ahern, Occurrence of Fatal Police Violence
During Pregnancy and Hazard of Preterm Birth in California, 35 PAEDIATRIC & PERINATAL
EPIDEMIOLOGY 469, 473 (2021).
131. Julia Craven, How Police Killings Might Be Affecting Preterm Birth, SLATE (Mar. 30, 2021,
4:01 PM), http://slate.com/news-and-politics/2021/03/how-police-killing-might-be-affecting-preterm
-birth.html [https://perma.cc/2M6P-NXR7].
132. Id.
133. Id.
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And still another study found that exposure to police killings had
significant short-, medium-, and long-term effects on educational
achievement.134 “In the days immediately after a police killing, absenteeism
spikes among nearby students.”135 Then, these students experience GPA drops
that last for several semesters; they are more likely to be diagnosed “with
emotional disturbance—a chronic learning disability associated with PTSD and
depression—and twice as likely to report feeling unsafe in their neighborhoods
the following year.”136 Finally, students exposed as ninth graders see drops in
high school graduation and college enrollment rates of 3.5% and 2.5%,
respectively.137 Smaller, but still significant, effects occur in students exposed to
police killings in tenth and eleventh grades as well.138 Interestingly, these results
“are driven entirely by [B]lack and Hispanic students in response to police
killings of other underrepresented minorities.”139
These studies are only the tip of the iceberg. Other work has found links
between increases in post-traumatic stress and the people of Ferguson after
police killed Michael Brown,140 and that young Black men’s descriptions of
exposure to police violence fit the DSM-V criteria for trauma exposure.141 And
numerous other studies and personal reports have identified that repeated
exposure to police killings is causing Black people vicarious trauma, as well as
police exposure causing numerous other negative effects.142

134. Desmond Ang, The Effects of Police Violence on Inner-City Students, 136 Q.J. ECON. 115, 117–18
(2021).
135. Id. at 117.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 117–18.
139. Id. at 118.
140. Jennifer M. First, Laura Danforth, Cynthia M. Frisby, Benjamin R. Warner, Marcus W.
Ferguson, Jr. & J. Brian Houston, Posttraumatic Stress Related to the Killing of Michael Brown and Resulting
Civil Unrest in Ferguson, Missouri: Roles of Protest Engagement, Media Use, Race, and Resilience, 11 J. SOC’Y
FOR SOC. WORK & RSCH. 369, 369 (2020).
141. Jocelyn R. Smith Lee & Michael A. Robinson, “That’s My Number One Fear in Life. It’s the
Police”: Examining Young Black Men’s Exposures to Trauma and Loss Resulting from Police Violence and Police
Killings, 45 J. BLACK PSYCH. 143, 171–73 (2019).
142. See, e.g., Chaz Arnett, Race, Surveillance, Resistance, 81 OHIO ST. L.J. 1103, 1128 & n.166
(2020); Deion S. Hawkins, “After Philando, I Had To Take a Sick Day To Recover”: Psychological Distress,
Trauma and Police Brutality in the Black Community, HEALTH COMMC’N, Apr. 26, 2021, at 1, 1; see also
Abigail A. Sewell, Kevin A. Jefferson & Hedwig Lee, Living Under Surveillance: Gender, Psychological
Distress, and Stop-Question-and-Frisk Policing in New York City, 159 SOC. SCI. & MED. 1, 1 (2016)
(“[M]en exhibit more non-specific psychological distress and more severe feelings of nervousness,
effort, and worthlessness in aggressively surveilled neighborhoods.”); Abigail A. Sewell & Kevin A.
Jefferson, Collateral Damage: The Health Effects of Invasive Police Encounters in New York City, 93 J. URB.
HEALTH S42, S42 (2016) (finding broad negative mental and physical health consequences in those
neighborhoods with more invasive police contact).
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3. Sociological Harm
The final head on the policing-emergency Cerberus is sociological harm.
This is the harm caused by the police’s tendency to aid in the maintenance of
racial, economic, and other hierarchies that undermine our professed devotion
to equality. Numerous examples of this harm have already presented
themselves. Police disproportionately stop, frisk, and kill unarmed Black
people. Black and Hispanic students suffer educational setbacks from exposure
to police killings while white and Asian students do not. Black mothers and
their babies suffer negative effects from exposure to police killings that white
mothers and babies do not. Many Black people feel that the police are
inescapable.143 All of these help to maintain the United States’ racial hierarchy.
But police’s involvement in sociological harm extends far beyond this and is
often even more direct. The sociological harm of policing is not merely a
byproduct, it sometimes appears to be the point.144 Once again, an episode from
summer 2020 shows this well.
While I have largely painted the summer 2020 protests and uprisings
positively, I do not mean to say they were entirely peaceful. They were not.
Martin Luther King Jr. famously said that a “riot is the language of the
unheard.”145 Some in the uprisings took that language to heart and turned up
the volume. While some people may have been looters, acting solely to satisfy
their own greed and self-interest, much of the violence and destruction simply
cannot fit that description. Protestors burned police precincts to the ground,146
trashed cop cars,147 and defaced and destroyed monuments to colonizers and
oppressors around the country148 and, indeed, around the world.149
143. See Jordan Blair Woods, Traffic Without the Police, 73 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1475 & n.2 (2021)
(describing and citing the “long line of scholarship [that] documents how traffic stops . . . enable racial
profiling on roads and highways and disproportionately target people of color as well as the poor”).
144. See generally Paul Butler, The System Is Working the Way It Is Supposed To: The Limits of Criminal
Justice Reform, 104 GEO. L.J. 1419 (2016) [hereinafter Butler, The System Is Working] (describing how
problems like police violence and the widespread arrests of Black people for petty offenses are integral
features of policing and punishment in the United States).
145. Martin Luther King, Jr., The Other America, Speech at Stanford University (Apr. 14, 1967),
https://www.crmvet.org/docs/otheram.htm [https://perma.cc/G593-3RN9].
146. Minneapolis Police Station Torched amid George Floyd Protest, POLITICO (May 29, 2020,
7:10 AM), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/05/29/minneapolis-police-protest-george-floyd-2883
61 [https://perma.cc/BUX5-RSAK].
147. Azi Paybarah & Nikita Stewart, Symbol of N.Y.C. Unrest: A Burning Police Car, N.Y. TIMES
(June 2, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/31/nyregion/police-cars-nyc-protests.html [https://
perma.cc/WCL8-48T7 (dark archive)].
148. Alan Taylor, The Statues Brought Down Since the George Floyd Protests Began, ATLANTIC (July
2, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/photo/2020/07/photos-statues-removed-george-floyd-protestsbegan/613774/ [https://perma.cc/25K3-8VMR (dark archive)].
149. Nora McGreevy, Toppled Statue of British Slave Trader Goes on View at Bristol Museum,
SMITHSONIAN MAG. (June 7, 2021), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/protesters-throw
-slavers-statue-bristol-harbor-make-waves-across-britain-180975060/ [https://perma.cc/7L6X-7A3R].
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Police around the country responded to this destruction in various ways,
some with relative calm and some with violence. But perhaps the most visually
striking government and police response to protestor violence and looting
happened in Chicago. And it is there that I turn to demonstrate the police’s
sociological harm—the harm of hierarchy.
In Chicago, after protests and again after the high-end stores along the
city’s “Magnificent Mile” were looted, Mayor Lori Lightfoot ordered public
transit closed, streets blocked, and the bridges over the Chicago River lifted,
physically separating Chicago’s disproportionately Black, Brown, and poor
South and West Sides from its wealthier, whiter downtown business district
and North Side.150 When combined with her issuance of a curfew to begin
thirty-five minutes after her press conference, the effect was to strand protestors
who needed to travel from one side of the city to the other to return home, and
to make those same protestors subject to arrest for violating the curfew.151
Allegations of police kettling and harassment of those who tried to aid stranded
protestors followed.152 This would not be the last time Mayor Lightfoot raised
the bridges to separate the city, doing so again in the wake of other protests as
well as the 2020 presidential election.153 For many, this striking visual—white,
wealthy neighborhoods being protected from trapped protestors by police and,
effectively, a moat—was simply the latest manifestation of police’s long history
of being enforcers for our society’s racial, economic, and other upper classes.154
In earlier times, the police’s role in hierarchy maintenance was patently
obvious. Lynchings nearly universally involved acquiescence by law

150. See Maya Dukmasova, Chicago’s Mayor Turns City’s Infrastructure into Weapons Against Protesters,
APPEAL (Nov. 13, 2020), https://theappeal.org/chicago-mayor-bridges-protest/ [https://perma.cc/
M5U8-HCX3] (noting that Mayor Lightfoot first raised the bridges after protests on May 30 but then
repeatedly used the tactic throughout the summer and into the autumn election season).
151. Kelly Bauer & Bob Chiarito, Chicago Curfew Set at 9 P.M. amid Protests for George Floyd, BLOCK
CLUB CHI. (May 30, 2020, 8:28 PM), https://blockclubchicago.org/2020/05/30/chicago-curfew-set-at9-p-m-amid-protests-for-george-floyd/ [https://perma.cc/3DQC-F89D] (quoting Mayor Lightfoot as
saying the curfew gave police the power to “clean out and clear out” the downtown area); Bayne &
Schumer, May 30, supra note 98.
152. See Bayne & Schumer, May 30, supra note 98 (discussing police kettling); Jim Dayley & Kiran
Misra, City Cited a School for Feeding Protestors, S. SIDE WKLY. (June 8, 2020), https://southsideweekly.
com/city-cited-chicago-freedom-school-feeding-protester/ [http://perma.cc/743V-GVHW] (reporting
that the Chicago Freedom School, a nonprofit organization, was cited by the police for “operating a
retail food establishment” after police gained entry to the building the night of the protests and
photographed pizza boxes “clearly emblazoned with the logo of [a] pizzeria” in the organization’s
kitchen).
153. See Dukmasova, supra note 150. It was not lost on observers during the election that the raised
bridges helped to cordon off Trump Tower. Id.
154. See, e.g., Butler, The System Is Working, supra note 144, at 1469 (“[T]he system [of law and
policing] is working the way it is supposed to, as a means to control African-Americans and devalue
their lives . . . .”).
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enforcement, and they often involved active law enforcement participation.155
Likewise, the police’s role in maintaining racial segregation through the midtwentieth century is essentially undeniable. The photographs of Southern
police turning dogs, weapons, and hoses on civil rights protestors from that era
are ubiquitous.156 But police played their role in creating and maintaining racial
segregation in the North and West as well.157
This segregative role continues today. Monica Bell, for instance, has
catalogued “six mechanisms that link policing and residential segregation: mass
criminalization, patrolling borders, coordinating with other bureaucracies,
constructing jurisdiction, constructing neighborhood reputations (as high-crime
or as racist), and distributing racialized economic value.”158 In this work, Bell
joins a line of scholars interrogating the connection between police and the
construction of place, particularly race-based place.159
But police do not merely work to uphold racial hierarchy along the Blackwhite axis. Other scholars have explored the police’s role in racial place-based
differential treatment among Asian and Latinx communities as well.160 Native

155. See Jesse Carr, History of Police Involvement with Lynching, ST. SANCTIONED,
https://statesanctioned.com/history-of-police-involvement-with-lynching/ [http://perma.cc/RG4A-M
XNF] (Feb. 11, 2021) (noting that “as many as 75%” of lynchings involved either the direct or indirect
assistance of law enforcement).
156. See, e.g., Charles Moore, Untitled [Police Dogs Are Turned onto Protesters by Order of Eugene “Bull”
Connor, Commissioner of Public Safety, During a Civil Rights Demonstration, Birmingham, Alabama]
(photograph), in PRINCETON U. ART MUSEUM, https://artmuseum.princeton.edu/collections/
objects/137003 [https://perma.cc/296C-WGL8].
157. See, e.g., Matthew Fleischer, How White People Used Police To Make L.A. One of the Most
Segregated Cities in America, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 11, 2020, 12:26 PM), https://www.latimes.com/
opinion/story/2020-08-11/white-people-used-police-brutality-los-angeles-most-segregated-city-inamerica [https://perma.cc/H5R8-8VVQ (dark archive)]; Sandra Bass, Policing Space, Policing Race:
Social Control Imperatives and Police Discretionary Decisions, 28 SOC. JUST. 156, 162 (2001) (noting that
northern “police were often slow to respond to acts of white violence against blacks and in some
instances allowed whites to engage in terrorist attacks against black homeowners”).
158. See Bell, Anti-Segregation Policing, supra note 83, at 689.
159. See, e.g., Jeannine Bell, The Hidden Fences Shaping Resegregation, 54 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
813, 816–18 (2019); Fagan & Ash, supra note 20, at 132; Devon W. Carbado, Blue-on-Black Violence: A
Provisional Model of Some of the Causes, 104 GEO. L.J. 1479, 1493–95 (2016); Tracey L. Meares,
Programming Errors: Understanding the Constitutionality of Stop-and-Frisk as a Program, Not an Incident, 82
U. CHI. L. REV. 159, 164–65 (2015); Capers, Policing, Race, and Place, supra note 20, at 60–72; see also
Jeffrey A. Fagan, Policing and Segregation, N.Y.U. FURMAN CTR. (July 2017), http://furmancenter.org/
research/iri/essay/policing-and-segregation [https://perma.cc/V85Y-SCXB] (“The combination of
criminal sanctions and mounting fees tends to reinforce both social and spatial boundaries, and in turn
deepen racial and economic concentrations in ‘poverty traps.’ In effect, the new policing reinforces
segregation by imposing a criminal justice tax on everyday movements and activities.” (footnote
omitted)).
160. See, e.g., Bass, supra note 157, at 157 (discussing policing in Chinatown, the possible sacrifice
of Koreatown in order to protect more affluent white neighborhoods, and the history of Mexican
American-LAPD relations).
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American reservations, meanwhile, are explicitly subjected to differential police
treatment through a doctrinal labyrinth of jurisdictional hurdles.161
Importantly, this maintenance of racial hierarchy crosses economic and
socio-professional boundaries. Indeed, several law professors have written about
how police interactions have confirmed their inability to outperform their place
in this country’s racial hierarchy.162 And even Black police officers have written
about how they, like so many Black children, are given “the talk” about deferring
to police lest they be killed.163
While this discussion has focused on police’s role in maintaining racial and
ethnic hierarchies, their actions extend far beyond just racial lines. Policing
plays a role in economic stratification, as well as in maintaining subordination
along lines of immigration status, gender, and sexuality. Focusing on Ferguson,
Missouri, and New York City, New York, Jeffrey Fagan and Elliott Ash, for
example, have explored how the aggressive policing of particular communities
has created significant “economic consequences [that] go beyond the criminal
stigma and the weight of [legal financial obligations] to include burdens on
work, family, and housing that can multiply the disadvantage by spilling over
to family members.”164 Commentators have likewise written extensively about
the police’s role in controlling immigration, essentially creating the new field of
study called “crimmigration.”165 Here, police may play an especially outsized
role because immigration proceedings can be triggered with only an arrest.166
Finally, no discussion of the police’s role in maintaining hierarchy would
be complete without mentioning gender and sexuality. While I cannot give a
161. See, e.g., Elizabeth Reese, Affirmation of Inherent Tribal Power To Police Blurs Civil and Criminal
Indian Law Tests, SCOTUSBLOG (June 7, 2021, 10:29 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2021/
06/affirmation-of-inherent-tribal-power-to-police-blurs-civil-and-criminal-indian-law-tests/ [https://
perma.cc/CDX2-ZC7Z] (describing the Court’s recent opinion in United States v. Cooley, 141 S. Ct.
1638 (2021), as attempting to “do no harm” to what others have called the “indefensible morass” of
laws governing “authority over criminal conduct on reservations”).
162. See PAUL BUTLER, LET’S GET FREE: A HIP-HOP THEORY OF JUSTICE 1–19 (2009);
Carbado, (E)Racing, supra note 20, at 952–64.
163. See Andre McGregor, I Was a Black FBI Agent. White Cops Didn’t Always See Me as Equal,
CNN (June 8, 2020, 6:30 AM), https://amp.cnn.com/cnn/2020/06/08/opinions/black-police-fbiracism-mcgregor/index.html [https://perma.cc/WN5Z-U9LN]. McGregor, a Black former FBI agent,
describes how he was told that if he stopped a robbery, he “needed to put my gun down once I saw the
red and blue lights pulling up, lie on the ground with my arms extended, let the cops handcuff me
alongside the criminal, and they will sort out who I actually was later.” Id. McGregor also recounts
how, when showing his FBI credentials when stopped on duty by local police, the officer asked, “Do
you have another ID?” Id.
164. Fagan & Ash, supra note 20, at 54.
165. See Daniel I. Morales, Transforming Crime-Based Deportation, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 698, 700
(2017); see also, e.g., Ingrid V. Eagly, Criminal Justice for Noncitizens: An Analysis of Variation in Local
Enforcement, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1126, 1211 (2013); Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Policing
Immigration, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 87, 132–35 (2013).
166. See, e.g., Eisha Jain, Arrests as Regulation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 809, 827–33 (2015) (explaining
“how arrests operate as an immigration-screening device”).

100 N.C. L. REV. 1209 (2022)

1236

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 100

fulsome analysis of this phenomenon in this piece, one aspect of policing that
is especially salient in this area is especially worth highlighting because it is
emblematic of how police operate generally. That is the role of
underenforcement.
While much of this discussion has focused on ways that police overenforce
the law to the detriment of subordinated communities, especially in the gender
and sexuality spaces, police also help to ensure subordination through
underenforcement. While there is much debate about the abolition of police, at
the present time, for too many people they remain the only option for
protection. In fewer places is that clear than in the sexual and domestic violence
contexts. Infamously, police have not treated rape seriously in a variety of ways,
from dismissing or shifting blame to victims who come forward, to simply
ignoring them or failing to do even basic investigation.167 Likewise, police have
often been woefully unhelpful when dealing with gendered domestic violence.
Too often men who committed violence against their female partner would not
even be arrested when police were called. So, women’s movements successfully
advanced pro-arrest policies for batterers. But even this pro-carceral success
seems to have backfired; with the advent of these policies the number of men
arrested for domestic violence offences increased by over 100%, but the number
of women arrested increased by over 500%.168 “Follow-up investigations of
women arrested under these laws reveal that they are often victims of violence
who are subject to patterns of battery at the hands of their partners.”169
Unfortunately and unsurprisingly, the police’s role in maintaining gendered
hierarchy was and is intersectional.170 And this discussion only begins to scratch
the surface of the police’s role in upholding gendered and sexual hierarchies.171
* * *

167. See Yxta Maya Murray, Rape Trauma, the State, and the Art of Tracey Emin, 100 CALIF. L. REV.
1631, 1657–60 (2012) (describing these phenomena).
168. See Shabnam Javdani, Naomi Sadeh & Edelyn Verona, Gendered Social Forces: A Review of the
Impact of Institutionalized Factors on Women and Girls’ Criminal Justice Trajectories, 17 PSYCH. PUB. POL’Y
& L. 161, 193–95 (2011).
169. Id. at 194.
170. See generally Kali Nicole Gross, African American Women, Mass Incarceration, and the Politics of
Protection, 102 J. AM. HIST. 25 (2015) (examining how racialized and gendered notions of protection
contributed to Black women's disproportionate incarceration in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries and influenced the relationship among Black womanhood, violence, and mass incarceration).
171. For additional issues, see, for example, Dara E. Purvis & Melissa Blanco, Police Sexual
Violence: Police Brutality, #MeToo, and Masculinities, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 1487, 1494–99 (2020) (sexual
violence committed by police); Leigh Goodmark, Transgender People, Intimate Partner Abuse, and the
Legal System, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 51, 72–78 (2013) (mistreatment of transgender persons);
Scott W. Stern, Rethinking Complicity in the Surveillance of Sex Workers: Policing and Prostitution in
America’s Model City, 31 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 411 passim (2020) (role of police in regulating sex
work); Ann C. McGinley, Policing and the Clash of Masculinities, 59 HOW. L.J. 221, 242–47 (2015)
(masculine culture of police work).
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I end this section describing the policing emergency with an observation.
I have framed this discussion partially as a case study of the summer 2020
uprisings because that, I believe, is the greatest example of policing’s status as
an emergency and of that emergency’s intractability. The summer 2020
protests—possibly the largest protest movement in American history—did not
sufficiently motivate our traditional mechanisms of government to solve this
emergency. Minneapolis Police, the same department that killed George Floyd,
killed another man during a traffic stop shortly before the 2021 New Year.172 In
Columbus, Ohio, two men were killed within a month of each other after the
protests. One man, Casey Goodson Jr., was outside his own home and
seemingly holding a sandwich.173 The other, Andre Maurice Hill, was stopped
while parked in his own car and holding a cellphone.174 And despite the massive
outcry and attention paid to police abolition throughout the summer, New York
City and Austin, Texas, were the only large cities to cut police budgets by more
than 10% in a Bloomberg CityLab analysis.175 That same analysis showed that
more than half of the cities in its dataset increased spending or kept it unchanged,
and “the difference between police spending as a share of the general funds fell
less than 1% from last year.”176
So, the policing emergency continues apace. That emergency is, at its core,
one of violence. It is tied to race, class, gender, sexuality, socioeconomic status,
and numerous other lines of subjugation within our society, but its core remains
as violence. This emergency seemingly has a history as long as that of the police
themselves.177 And it continues to take new and disturbing turns, with many
police observers, including the FBI, warning of white supremacist infiltration
of police departments,178 and dozens of police officers from around the country
172. See Daniel Politi, Minneapolis Police Release Bodycam Footage of Fatal Shooting in Traffic Stop,
SLATE (Jan. 1, 2021, 12:09 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2021/01/minneapolis-policebodycam-shooting-stop-dolal-idd.html [https://perma.cc/3XA5-MPJT].
173. Wright, supra note 11.
174. Id.
175. Holder et al., supra note 24.
176. Id.; see also Fola Akinnibi, Sarah Holder & Christopher Cannon, Cities Say They Want To
Defund the Police. Their Budgets Say Otherwise., BLOOMBERG (Jan. 12, 2021), https://www.bloom
berg.com/graphics/2021-city-budget-police-funding/ [https://perma.cc/TW8W-5DUX (dark archive)]
(“Even as the 50 largest U.S. cities reduced their 2021 police budgets by 5.2% in aggregate—often as
part of broader pandemic cost-cutting initiatives—law enforcement spending as a share of general
expenditures rose slightly to 13.7% from 13.6%, according to data compiled by Bloomberg CityLab.
And many cities like Minneapolis and Seattle have watered down or put on pause changes that were
proposed or even passed at the height of the 2020 demonstrations against racism and police brutality.”).
177. See Jill Lepore, The Invention of the Police, NEW YORKER (July 13, 2020), https://www.new
yorker.com/magazine/2020/07/20/the-invention-of-the-police [https://perma.cc/4MYS-3A7H (dark
archive)] (“The government of slavery was not a rule of law. It was a rule of police.”).
178. See Associated Press, Army Vet Risked His Life To Expose Who Was in the KKK, NPR (Dec. 22,
2021, 7:04 AM), https://www.npr.org/2021/12/22/1066645155/army-vet-risked-his-life-to-exposewho-was-in-the-kkk [https://perma.cc/C5TM-M5FX]; Michael German, Hidden in Plain Sight: Racism,
White Supremacy, and Far-Right Militancy in Law Enforcement, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Aug.
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taking part in a violent attempted insurrection at the Capitol building in
Washington, D.C.179 With the policing emergency’s core established, Section
I.C will complicate this picture by introducing a closer-to-the-ground problem
for reformers: thousands of local police departments.
C.

Identifying Local Emergencies

What Section I.B describes—the physical, psychological, and sociological
harms caused by state-sanctioned violence from law enforcement—is the core
of the policing emergency. That core emergency stems from the system of
policing that has developed and been implemented throughout the United
States, and given international protests, seemingly throughout other countries
as well.
But especially in the United States, where policing is handled primarily at
the local and county levels, this emergency may have thousands of local
variants.180 Nevertheless, most of these variants will relate broadly to one of five
categories: excessive force, corruption, lack of accountability, cover-ups, and
supremacist ties or behaviors.181 A state or local official attempting to determine
whether the policing emergency has manifested in a particular agency, and if
so, how, can look to these five categories to evaluate the agency and tailor her
response.
These identifiers have two origins. First, they help to solidify the three
types of harm discussed above into more easily observable phenomena within a
given jurisdiction.182 Second, they mimic the objections that both traditional
and radical reformers have made to the police. Campaign Zero, the organization
27, 2020), http://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/hidden-plain-sight-racism-white
-supremacy-and-far-right-militancy-law [https://perma.cc/3LJZ-3BNC]; Kenya Downs, FBI Warned of
White Supremacists in Law Enforcement 10 Years Ago. Has Anything Changed?, PBS NEWSHOUR (Oct.
21, 2016, 4:10 PM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/fbi-white-supremacists-in-law-enforcement
[https://perma.cc/2MBA-4ZRN]; FBI COUNTERTERRORISM DIV., WHITE SUPREMACIST
INFILTRATION OF LAW ENFORCEMENT 3 (2006), http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/402521/
doc-26-white-supremacist-infiltration.pdf [https://perma.cc/7W84-PRSW].
179. See Eric Westervelt, Off-Duty Police Officers Investigated, Charged with Participating in Capitol
Riot, NPR (Jan. 15, 2021, 1:07 PM), https://www.npr.org/2021/01/15/956896923/police-officers-acrossnation-face-federal-charges-for-involvement-in-capitol-ri [https://perma.cc/RWH3-VXEG].
180. See SHELLEY S. HYLAND & ELIZABETH DAVIS, BUREAU JUST. STAT., NCJ 252835, LOCAL
POLICE DEPARTMENTS, 2016: PERSONNEL 1 (Jan. 27, 2021), https://bjs.ojp.gov/content/pub/pdf/
lpd16p.pdf [https://perma.cc/2VY5-85WS] (noting that over 12,000 local police departments existed
throughout the United States as of June 30, 2016).
181. I call this last category “supremacist” because it may stand in for a variety of supremacist
groups. In American policing, this will most likely mean white supremacist. But ties to groups
preaching the supremacy of any race, class, religion, gender, sexuality, etc., should be cause for concern,
especially in a pluralist country like the United States.
182. Cf. Bell, Anti-Segregation Policing, supra note 83, at 690 (identifying six mechanisms of prosegregative policing because “[t]hey are flexible categories that aim to organize the exceedingly complex
world of segregative policing into a tractable, analyzable structure”).
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responsible for the #8Can’tWait campaign,183 for example, dedicates significant
attention to limiting the police’s ability to use force—either through
demilitarization or through changes to police policies—and to holding police to
account when they do use force by, for example, increasing community
oversight and removing parts of police contracts that undermine
accountability.184 Their abolitionist counterpart, #8toAbolition, meanwhile,
focuses on both the violent and supremacist nature of policing, stating that
“[p]risons, police, and prosecutors work closely together to sustain white
supremacist, capitalist, ableist, and cisheteropatriarchal systems of extraction
and death.”185 #8toAbolition argues for “deplatform[ing] white supremacist
public officials,” for “repeal[ing] all laws that hide, excuse, or enable police
misconduct,” and terminating and not rehiring officers who have used excessive
force.186
Beyond these two groups, I note that the largest public outcry against
police, both in summer 2020 and earlier, has been fueled by the police’s use of
excessive force, corrupt cover-ups, and the failure to hold police accountable for
their actions. Indeed, some events have encapsulated all of these categories.
Officer Jason Van Dyke’s killing of Laquan McDonald, for example, involved
the use of excessive force, police reports filled out by other officers lying about
the facts of the incident to protect Van Dyke, officers sabotaging the equipment
that records their interactions, and a supervisor disposing of evidence; of the
sixteen officers the inspector general found engaged in covering-up this
shooting, only half were either fired or faced criminal charges, with only Van
Dyke being convicted.187
Commentators, too, have focused on variations of these themes. Monica
Bell, for instance, has explained how policing perpetuates racial segregation, and

183. In the midst of the summer 2020 uprisings, #8Can’tWait introduced eight policy reforms that
they claimed would reduce police violence. Alex Shultz, DeRay Mckesson on the 8 Reforms That Could
Dramatically Reduce Police Violence, GQ (June 3, 2020), https://www.gq.com/story/deray-mckessoninterview-8-cant-wait [https://perma.cc/D6W6-YS6D]. They subsequently apologized when they
received criticism that these technocratic reforms distracted from the revolutionary potential of the
moment. See Wilson, supra note 91.
184. See Solutions, CAMPAIGN ZERO, https://www.joincampaignzero.org/solutions#solutionsover
view [https://perma.cc/9NRQ-ASRN].
185. #8TOABOLITION, supra note 83.
186. 1. Defund Police, 8TOABOLITION, https://www.8toabolition.com/defund-the-police [https://
perma.cc/Z2UA-X5V2].
187. See Morgan Winsor, 4 Chicago Police Officers Fired over Alleged Cover-Up of Laquan McDonald
Shooting, ABC NEWS (July 19, 2019, 5:47 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/US/chicago-police-officersfired-alleged-cover-laquan-mcdonald/story?id=6443306 [http://perma.cc/B7EH-4W8A]; Ray Sanchez
& Omar Jimenez, 16 Police Officers Participated in an Elaborate Cover-Up After Laquan McDonald’s Death,
Report Alleges, CNN (Oct. 10, 2019, 8:17 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/10/10/us/chicago-inspectorgeneral-laquan-mcdonald-shooting [https://perma.cc/Y3FL-EUMS].
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has attempted to remake policing into an antisegregative force.188 Joanna
Schwartz has found that police seem immune to accountability through
litigation, with even successful lawsuits largely ignored unless they generate
sufficient public attention.189 Other scholars have focused on issues of excessive
force like taser use and abuse,190 accountability and corruption problems like the
Blue Wall of Silence191 or the power of police unions,192 and the white
supremacist affiliations of law enforcement.193 All of which is to say, though
these five categories have not previously been named and listed as such, they
are well grounded in both the activism and academic discussion surrounding the
policing emergency.
Before delving into each category, a note of caution. These categories are
not meant to be an exhaustive taxonomy. Just as there are over 15,000 law
enforcement agencies in the United States, there may be 15,000 different ways
that the policing emergency manifests. A benefit of addressing the policing
emergency through emergency managers at the state and local levels is that
these different manifestations are likely to be tied to local history, culture, and
custom, and an emergency manager operating at the local level will be able to
adjust her tactics to account for those local differences.
Excessive Force. A pattern of excessive force is the most obvious signifier
of the violence-based emergency. Here, deciding whether force is excessive and
whether a pattern of it exists could be made by reference to constitutional law.
And indeed, if there are significant legal judgments or settlements related to
the police’s use of excessive force, that is an excellent signal that the policing
emergency has taken root in a department. For example, the CPD and NYPD
each cost their city’s taxpayers $4 million in excessive force lawsuits in 2019.194
188. See generally Bell, Anti-Segregation Policing, supra note 83 (explaining how policing perpetuates
residential segregation and offering an alternative legal framework based on fair housing law and
consent decrees as well as practical approaches that police departments could take to advance an
antisegregation agenda).
189. See Joanna C. Schwartz, Myths and Mechanics of Deterrence: The Role of Lawsuits in Law
Enforcement Decisionmaking, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1023, 1076–77 (2010).
190. See generally Michelle E. McStravick, Note, The Shocking Truth: Law Enforcement’s Use and
Abuse of Tasers and the Need for Reform, 56 VILL. L. REV. 363 (2011) (analyzing the lack of uniform
guidelines to instruct officers when the use of a taser is appropriate).
191. See, e.g., Huq & McAdams, supra note 35, at 221.
192. See generally Benjamin Levin, What’s Wrong with Police Unions?, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 1333
(2020) (analyzing what the common critiques of police unions should mean for policing reform and the
future of public-sector unionism).
193. Robin D. Barnes, Blue by Day and White by (K)night: Regulating the Political Affiliations of Law
Enforcement and Military Personnel, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1079, 1091–97 (1996).
194. CITY OF CHI., REPORT ON CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT 2019 LITIGATION 3 (Oct. 1,
2020), https://www.chicago.gov/content/dam/city/sites/police-reform/docs/PoliceLitigationReportRevised10-1-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/YM5X-UJXL]; Christina Carrega, Millions in Lawsuit
Settlements Are Another Hidden Cost of Police Misconduct, Legal Experts Say, ABC NEWS (June 14, 2020,
10:12 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/US/millions-lawsuit-settlements-hidden-cost-police-misconductlegal/story?id=70999540 [https://perma.cc/JF5L-3ZSK].
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However, because of the many difficulties in bringing a successful excessive
force claim—from finding a lawyer to take one’s case to overcoming legal
hurdles both procedural and substantive—it is likely that a focus on judgments
or settlements will understate a department’s excessive force problem. Instead,
it is likely more accurate to determine what force policed communities believe
is excessive195 or to compare the force used by a department to other, less violent
groups performing the same work.196
Corruption. Corruption is an emergency signifier because it can breed
violence.197 Because corruption is, by its nature, activity outside of the bounds
of the law, enforcing the rules of this black market often requires violence.198
The Baltimore Police Department provides the most recent, egregious example
of this. There, a corrupt squad of officers ran a criminal racket so egregious that
it would make Alonzo Harris199 blush. They robbed; they sold guns and drugs;
and they framed potentially thousands of people.200 One officer even kept “a
grappling hook with a rope, sledgehammer, machete, [and] masks” in his patrol
car in case he came across someone to rob.201 That such a group could exist on a
police force, and that they could operate for years, is an obvious example of the
policing emergency at work.
Lack of Accountability. In turn, a lack of accountability enables the
continuation of corrupt and violent regimes. Even if, for example, there are
relatively few officers who account for the vast majority of the police force’s
violence, an inability to hold those officers accountable ensures not only that
their own violence continues, but could delegitimize the entire force in the eyes
of the community and attract recruits who would like to do violence to policed
communities without consequence. Police union contracts are the most obvious

195. See Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, The Wages of Antiquated Procedural Thinking: A
Critique of Chicago v. Morales, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 197, 209–11 (discussing the importance of
community views on deciding whether police behavior should be allowed).
196. See, e.g., Li Cohen, Health Care Workers Replaced Denver Cops in Handling Hundreds of Mental
Health and Substance Abuse Cases — and Officials Say It Saved Lives, CBS NEWS (Feb. 6, 2021,
12:04 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/denver-health-professionals-replaced-cops-in-handlinghundreds-of-low-level-incidents-for-6-months-and-successfully-did-so-with-no-arrests/ [http://perma
.cc/E5UN-2PMV].
197. See Thomas W. Dunfee & Timothy L. Fort, Corporate Hypergoals, Sustainable Peace, and the
Adapted Firm, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 563, 586 (2003) (noting that “[a] recent study showed a
direct correlation between corruption and violence” and explaining why this correlation may exist).
198. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Miron, Violence, Guns, and Drugs: A Cross-Country Analysis, 44 J.L. & ECON.
615, 616–17 (2001) (finding a link between drug prohibition and increased homicide rates across
countries).
199. TRAINING DAY (Village Roadshow Pictures 2001).
200. Ray Sanchez, Former Baltimore Officers Convicted in Corruption Trial, CNN (Feb. 12, 2018, 8:24
PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/02/12/us/baltimore-police-corruption-trial/index.html [http://perma
.cc/Z5DS-DYWV].
201. Id.
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example of this pervasive lack of accountability.202 Among myriad ways that
they inhibit accountability, they may delay officer interrogations after
incidents, require destroying personnel records, or even limit the length of
investigations.203 Officers in several jurisdictions, for example, cannot be
interviewed about a use-of-force incident for at least forty-eight hours after it
occurs, creating the possibility of diminished memories, at best, or coordinated
shifts in their story, at worst.204
Cover-Ups. Cover-ups, perhaps most infamously the Blue Wall of Silence,
are differentiated from a lack of accountability because they suggest a broader
systemic and cultural failure within a police department. While a lack of
accountability may come from something like a collective bargaining
agreement, something that does not require the bad act of any individual officer,
cover-ups are different. They involve choices made by officers to protect the
bad acts of their fellows. CPD has had numerous egregious examples of the
harms that flow from cover-ups. One former officer who refused to find another
officer’s shooting justified described the culture as “like the film Serpico”
because fellow officers would not respond to calls for aid from those who did
not maintain the code of silence.205 And after Officer Jason Van Dyke murdered
Laquan McDonald, an Inspector General’s report found that sixteen other
officers helped to cover up that crime.206
Supremacy. Finally, supremacist ties and behaviors suggest the presence of
the policing emergency for reasons both historical and practical. Historically,
and some argue through the present day,207 police have played an important role
in the maintenance and perpetuation of white supremacy, colonialism, cisheteronormativity, patriarchy, ableism, economic inequality, and the general
202. See generally Stephen Rushin, Structural Reform Litigation in American Police Departments, 99
MINN. L. REV. 1343 (2015) [hereinafter Rushin, Structural Reform Litigation] (explaining how police
unions commonly attempt to block reforms that might “increase oversight or otherwise burden” police
officers).
203. Id. at 1377.
204. See Jaeah Lee, Why Cops Are Told To Keep Quiet After a Shooting, MOTHER JONES (Aug. 12,
2015), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2015/08/why-do-police-departments-delay-interviewing
-officers-involved-shootings/ [https://perma.cc/XCQ7-5KNS]; see also Joanna C. Schwartz, Police
Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885, 890 (2014) (empirically examining the scope of police
indemnification and finding that only “.02% of the over $730 million spent by cities, counties, and
states” in her dataset was actually paid by police officers).
205. Bob Chiarito, What Happens When Chicago Cops Speak Up About Police Misconduct? Their Lives
Are Ruined, Whistleblowers Say, BLOCK CLUB CHI. (Sept. 10, 2020), https://blockclubchicago.org/2020/
09/10/what-happens-when-chicago-cops-speak-up-about-police-misconduct-their-lives-are-ruined-wh
istleblowers-say/ [https://perma.cc/WF57-APNA].
206. See Chip Mitchell & Patrick Smith, Lightfoot Releases Records on Police ‘Cover-Up’ for Officer
Who Killed Laquan McDonald, NPR (Oct. 10, 2019), https://www.npr.org/local/309/2019/10/10/76889
0035/lightfoot-releases-records-on-police-cover-up-for-officer-who-killed-laquan-mc-donald [https://
perma.cc/F4V8-QJAZ].
207. See #8TOABOLITION, supra note 83 (“At its root, policing and prisons are systems designed
to uphold oppression.”).
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maintenance of an unequal hierarchical society.208 Indeed, some activists and
academics argue that this sort of hierarchy maintenance is, if not the reason for
policing’s current form, one of its primary effects.209 As the Kerner Commission
found over fifty years ago, “To some Negroes police have come to symbolize
white power, white racism and white repression. And the fact is that many
police do reflect and express these white attitudes.”210 This history stretches
further, with one researcher finding that “as many as 75%” of lynchings involved
either the direct or indirect assistance of law enforcement,211 and historians
linking the creation of U.S.-style police to slave patrols.212 But even without this
historical link, modern supremacist movements—and especially white
supremacist movements—have been responsible for numerous acts of mass
violence,213 and are described “as the most lethal domestic terrorist threat to the
United States.”214 They have previously shown a desire to use police’s power to
enact their potentially genocidal goals.215 Finding ties to these groups within a
department thus suggests another way that the policing emergency may have
manifested.
II. EMERGENCY MANAGERS
Numerous states have enacted laws that allow them to rescue failing cities
through emergency managers, or through emergency manager-like processes.
This part builds on the existing taxonomies of emergency managers to discuss
how those laws function throughout the country.216 After discussing the
208. See supra Section I.C.3.
209. See, e.g., Capers, Policing, Race, and Place, supra note 20, at 46 (“[R]acial incongruity in
assessing whether reasonable suspicion exists to justify a Terry stop. As a result of this practice, lawabiding minorities entering predominantly white neighborhoods are frequently stopped and questioned
as to the reason for their presence in the neighborhood.”); Gruber, supra note 20, at 873 (describing
“bluelining” as “maintaining raced and classed spatial and social segregation through the threat and
application of violence”).
210. NAT’L ADVISORY COMM’N ON CIV. DISORDERS, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY
COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 5 (1968), https://belonging.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/
kerner_commission_full_report.pdf?file=1&force=1 [https://perma.cc/TD74-EGXK].
211. Carr, supra note 155.
212. See Lepore, supra note 177.
213. See, e.g., Talia Lavin, The Boundaries of Whiteness Are Protected with Blood and Bullets, NATION
(Aug. 5, 2019), https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/replacement-theory-racism-white-supre
macy/ [https://perma.cc/JNS6-MN36] (discussing how the white supremacist “great replacement”
theory inspired four mass shootings in less than a year).
214. German, supra note 178.
215. Id.; see also supra note 178 and accompanying text (discussing FBI warnings about infiltration
of the police by white supremacist groups).
216. See Clayton P. Gillette, Dictatorships for Democracy: Takeovers of Financially Failed Cities, 114
COLUM. L. REV. 1373, 1435 (2014) [hereinafter Gillette, Dictatorships]; Omer Kimhi, A Tale of Four
Cities-Models of State Intervention in Distressed Localities Fiscal Affairs, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 881 (2012)
[hereinafter Kimhi, Four Cities]; Anthony G. Cahill & Joseph A. James, Responding to Municipal Fiscal
Distress: An Emerging Issue for State Governments in the 1990s, 52 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 88, 91 (1992).
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functioning of these emergency managers, this part discusses the literature
surrounding them, focusing on the interaction between emergency managers
and democracy, as well as the use of emergency managers in the educational
realm.
A.

The Spectrum of Emergency Managers: From Oversight to Dictatorial Control

What is an emergency manager? As this Article uses the term, emergency
managers are individuals or small groups empowered to fix some designated
emergency in a locality that the usual operation of local government has failed
to address.217 These managers are given their powers by a higher level of
government to oversee, or to take over in more aggressive cases, some lower
level of government. Historically, these managers have operated in two
contexts. In the fiscal realm, states have empowered them to address budgetary
crises in localities. In the educational realm, emergency managers have been
used to attempt to rescue financially and academically failing schools. In this
educational context, managers have been empowered by both state- and citylevel officials, like mayors, to usurp the more localized functioning of the school
system.
Emergency managers’ powers fall into three rough buckets. At their least
intrusive, emergency managers simply provide oversight and advice to a
locality. In intermediate cases, emergency managers may have some powers to
intervene in the functioning of local government, but that local government
nevertheless remains intact. In their most extreme manifestations, emergency
managers can entirely replace a locality’s government, usurping all of its powers.
Although this Article separates them, it is important to note that emergency
managers’ powers tend to be additive. Most emergency manager laws provide
for oversight of the distressed community. And emergency manager laws that
provide for some limited intervention into the locality’s elected government
usually also provide for oversight. Of course, an emergency manager given neardictatorial powers will also have the power of oversight, as well as all of the
previously described limited interventionary powers. Moreover, an emergency
manager’s powers are not necessarily fixed for all times and situations. Some
laws, instead, grant or take away powers from emergency managers depending
on how dire the locality’s status is at that moment.218

217. Because their history involves groups as well as individuals, some past commentators have
used the term “takeover boards.” See, e.g., Gillette, Dictatorships, supra note 216, at 1378–79.
218. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Nassau Cnty. Interim Fin. Auth., 959 F.3d 54, 57 (2d Cir. 2020), cert.
denied, 141 S. Ct. 1063 (2021) (describing how Section 3650 of the New York Public Authorities Law
allows the Nassau County Interim Finance Authority to gain additional powers when certain budgetary
requirements are not met in Nassau County); see also Gillette, Dictatorships, supra note 216, at 1391
(discussing graduated interventions).
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1. Oversight and Limited Intervention
Oversight, monitoring, and the provision of expert advice are nearuniversal facets of emergency manager regimes.219 These powers are, generally
speaking, exactly what they sound like. In the fiscal context, some states provide
continuous oversight, while others intervene only once a crisis already appears
imminent.220 Ideally, states judge the need for oversight based on a
preestablished objective measure.221
Often, state-level expert advice and oversight is necessary because of
breakdowns in local government.222 These breakdowns can range from a simple
lack of local expertise to address a complex fiscal problem to the intentional
wrongdoing of local officials.223 Wherever a locality might fall on this scale,
oversight can perform an important corrective function when the regular
operation of the local democratic process has produced an untenable result.
Presumably, then, after the state has provided oversight and advice, the local
politicians and populace can course correct by acting on better information.
Sometimes, this is exactly what happens.224
But if the locality is unable or refuses to correct its mistakes, then oversight
also provides another important function by providing information to the state.
Indeed, it appears that some states have enacted ongoing or early oversight

219. See PEW CHARITABLE TRS., THE STATE ROLE IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCIAL
DISTRESS 17–18 (2013) [hereinafter STATE ROLE], https://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/assets/
2016/04/pew_state_role_in_local_government_financial_distres.pdf [http://perma.cc/SN4X-EDDW]
(noting that all states but New Hampshire allow for the supervision of finances and provision of
technical assistance).
220. Compare STATE ROLE, supra note 219, at 30–32 (discussing the North Carolina Local
Government Commission’s ongoing oversight), with 53 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 11701.102-A (Westlaw through 2022 Reg. Sess. Act 8) (allowing municipalities to request guidance
in their financial planning from the state as a “preemptive step”), and N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW § 3669(1)
(McKinney 2021) (giving the Nassau County Interim Finance Authority additional powers when,
among other metrics, “the county shall have incurred a major operating funds deficit of one percent or
more”).
221. See, e.g., STATE ROLE, supra note 219, at 30–32 (discussing reliance on North Carolina towns’
“fund balance,” the difference between its assets and liabilities). See generally N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1591 to 159-180 (LEXIS through Sess. Laws 2021-192 (end) of the 2021 Reg. Sess. of the Gen. Assemb.)
(detailing North Carolina’s Local Government Commission, its powers, and the various options for
state aid to localities).
222. See STATE ROLE, supra note 219, at 32.
223. See, e.g., Tresa Baldas, Kwame Kilpatrick: Detroit Bankruptcy Wasn’t My Fault, DETROIT FREE
PRESS (June 15, 2018, 6:12 PM), https://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/detroit/2018/06/
15/kilpatrick-detroit-bankruptcy-sentence-archer/705523002/ [https://perma.cc/PA3S-L9JR] (noting
Kilpatrick’s decision to restructure Detroit’s pension debt, which “soured when U.S. interest rates
plummeted, sticking the city with a $50 million-per-year bill”); STATE ROLE, supra note 219, at 32
(noting that the town board of Maxton, North Carolina, laid off police officers and raised taxes and
fees after state officials warned them the town would run out of money).
224. See, e.g., STATE ROLE, supra note 219, at 32.
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regimes for exactly this reason.225 By providing early oversight and technical
services, the state can identify those localities most at risk for fiscal distress and
encourage (or force) them to course correct before more drastic steps are
necessary.226
While most emergency manager powers usurp local authority, oversight,
especially in its nonmandatory forms, can be purely democracy enhancing.
Without disempowering elected officials, expert advice and analysis can provide
new information to elected leaders, enabling them to better serve their
constituents, and provide information to constituents about the effectiveness
(and honesty) of their elected officials.227
Historically, most emergency managers fall between the extremes of pure
oversight and dictatorial control.228 They are empowered to override local
officials’ will on some, but not all, issues, and they ultimately do not have the
power to make structural changes to local government. There are any number
of limited powers that this type of emergency manager might have. A state
could imbue her with virtually any power that the state has. For example, past
emergency managers have been able to break union contracts,229 to hire and fire
governmental employees,230 or to control municipal budgeting231 and assets.232

225. See id. at 30–32 (discussing how North Carolina has avoided fiscally troubled localities
through the use of active state oversight).
226. See id.
227. See Gillette, Dictatorships, supra note 216, at 1405–12 (discussing the recurring problem of lack
of budgetary transparency in financially distressed cities and that problem’s effect on constituents’
democratic participation).
228. See id. at 1391–95 (discussing takeover boards with the power to approve municipal decisions
but not displace municipal decision makers).
229. See U.S. Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 25 (1977) (“[A]n impairment [of the
obligations of private contracts] may be constitutional if it is reasonable and necessary to serve an
important public purpose.”); see also Stephen F. Belfort, Unilateral Alteration of Public Sector Collective
Bargaining Agreements and the Contract Clause, 59 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 1–2 (2011); Stephen F. Belfort, Public
Sector Bargaining: Fiscal Crisis and Unilateral Change, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1221, 1252–55 (1985) (discussing
statutory preemption of collectively bargained agreements); Buffalo Teachers Fed’n v. Tobe, 464 F.3d
362, 368 (2d Cir. 2006) (affirming the dismissal of a Contract Clause claim based on a wage freeze).
Notably, “State[s] or political subdivisions thereof” are exempt from the National Labor Relations Act.
Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449, 450 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 152(2)).
230. Compare Savage v. City of Pontiac, 483 F. App’x 943, 944 (6th Cir. 2012) (affirming a due
process challenge to a firing by an emergency manager because he exceeded the authority provided him
by statute), with MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 141.1552(i), (ff) (Westlaw through P.A.2022, No. 4, of
the 2022 Reg. Sess., 101st Leg.) (expanding emergency managers’ authority to control municipal
government staffing levels).
231. See STATE ROLE, supra note 219, at 17 (finding that, as of early 2013, fourteen of twenty states
with intervention systems provided for emergency financing while nineteen of twenty provided for
“[s]upervis[ing] [f]inances . . . [i]ncluding [a]pproving [b]udgets”).
232. See Michelle Wilde Anderson, The New Minimal Cities, 123 YALE L.J. 1118, 1167–73 (2014)
[hereinafter Anderson, The New Minimal Cities] (discussing the increasingly commonplace sale of
public assets as a means for cities to alleviate fiscal crises).
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2. The (Benevolent?) Technocratic Dictator
Unlike previously discussed managers—who may exercise some powers of
local government while leaving elected officials in place—dictatorial emergency
managers take over the entire government. In effect, they become the dictator
of the distressed city. Unaccountable to the residents they oversee or the local
politicians they replace, everyone under their authority is left hoping that the
manager is more Cincinnatus than Caligula. As Louis Schimmel, former
emergency manager of Pontiac, Michigan, said in response to being asked
whether the law empowering him gave power to a “dictator”: “I guess I’m the
tyrant in Pontiac, then, if that’s the way it is.”233
Perhaps the most famous example of these dictatorial managers occurred
in Detroit, Michigan. There, after significant political battles over their use,234
Republican Governor Rick Snyder appointed Kevyn Orr as emergency manager
to see Detroit through its fiscal troubles.235 Upon his appointment Orr was
imbued with the power of the mayor and city council, all of whom were
effectively booted from office.236 While not garnering universal praise,237 Orr’s

233. Paul Abowd, Michigan’s Hostile Takeover, MOTHER JONES (Feb. 15, 2012), https://www.
motherjones.com/politics/2012/02/michigan-emergency-manager-pontiac-detroit/#correction [https://
perma.cc/PU5U-GGJ8].
234. See id.
235. See Nathan Bomey, John Gallagher & Mark Stryker, How Detroit Was Reborn, DETROIT FREE
PRESS (Jan. 22, 2015, 5:37 PM), https://www.freep.com/story/news/local/detroit-bankruptcy/2014/11/
09/detroit-bankruptcy-rosen-orr-snyder/18724267/ [https://perma.cc/AE22-MLSG]; Monica Davey,
Billions in Debt, Detroit Faces Millions in Bills for Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 7, 2013), https://
www.nytimes.com/2013/10/08/us/billions-in-debt-detroit-faces-millions-in-bills-for-bankruptcy.html
?auth=login-email&login=email [https://perma.cc/J8CC-A8VA (dark archive)].
236. Orr quickly reinstated these local politicians to handle the day-to-day running of the city,
though he effectively remained their boss. See Emergency Manager, City of Detroit, Order No. 1 (Mar.
25, 2013) [hereinafter Detroit Emergency Manager Order], https://detroitmi.gov/sites/detroitmi
.localhost/files/migrated_docs/emergency-manager-reports/Order1.pdf [https://perma.cc/R2VP-CA7
R].
237. See, e.g., Susan Tompor, Even 5 Years Later, Retirees Feel the Effects of Detroit’s Bankruptcy,
DETROIT FREE PRESS (July 18, 2018), https://www.freep.com/story/money/personal-finance/susantompor/2018/07/18/detroit-bankruptcy-retirees-pension/759446002/ [https://perma.cc/K8JC-2K73];
Rose Hackman, What Happens When Detroit Shuts Off the Water of 100,000 People, ATLANTIC (July 17,
2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2014/07/what-happens-when-detroit-shuts-offthe-water-of-100000-people/374548/ [https://perma.cc/7E6M-8HRL (dark archive)] (noting a
statement from the United Nations that the water shutoffs may violate the human right to water); Ned
Resnikoff, Detroit City Council Votes To Remove Emergency Manager, MSNBC (Sept. 25, 2014), https://
www.msnbc.com/msnbc/detroit-city-council-votes-remove-emergency-manager-msna421081 [https://
perma.cc/577E-AK6H]. Technically, the council voted to keep Orr on until the end of the city’s
bankruptcy proceedings, but the council’s resolution required Orr to return the running of the city back
to elected officials immediately. Resnikoff, supra.
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tenure and shepherding the city through bankruptcy was viewed as a success in
many corners.238
Despite their place in the popular consciousness, the use of these dictatorstyle managers has, for most of this country’s history, been relatively rare. States
employed them in the 1930s, when the Great Depression wrecked municipal
finances and caused many local governments to default on their obligations.239
Since the Great Depression, these total state takeovers have remained few and
far between. The most prominent examples prior to the Great Recession are
Massachusetts’ takeover of Chelsea in 1991, and the 1996 expansion of the
control board’s powers over Washington, D.C.240
In both of those cases, and generally from the Great Depression through
the turn of the millennium, these dictatorial takeovers have been largely ad hoc.
But in the Great Recession and its aftermath some states began to codify this
once extreme, ad hoc procedure. Specifically, in 2012 and 2014, Rhode Island
and Michigan passed laws that allowed emergency managers to completely
displace local officials.241
A brief look at these statutes shows that Kevyn Orr’s tenure in Detroit was
not atypical in terms of who these most powerful managers are meant to be and
how they operate. First, both statutes explicitly state that the manager (or
receiver, as Rhode Island calls the position) shall have all of the powers of the
local governing bodies.242 Beyond this, both statutes make clear that a manager’s
powers trump those of any local elected officials.243
Rhode Island and Michigan imagine different relationships between the
manager and local officials, although this difference may be one more of form
than of substance. Rhode Island provides that local officials “shall continue to
238. See, e.g., Opinion, Kevyn Orr Was the Right Man for Detroit, DETROIT NEWS (Nov. 11, 2014),
https://www.detroitnews.com/story/opinion/editorials/2014/11/11/detroit-rises-kevyn-orr/18814737/
[https://perma.cc/LU2A-TUG5] [hereinafter The Right Man].
239. See David R. Berman, Takeovers of Local Governments: An Overview and Evaluation of State
Policies, 25 PUBLIUS 55, 57 (1995) (finding that during the Great Depression, “[a]s a last resort, several
states took complete control of specific cities facing financial emergencies, placing them in
receivership”).
240. Gillette, Dictatorships, supra note 216, at 1395–96 (discussing these Massachusetts and
Washington, D.C., takeovers); see also Berman, supra note 239, at 62–64 (discussing the takeover of
Chelsea); Stephen R. Cook, Tough Love in the District: Management Reform Under the District of Columbia
Financial Responsibility and Management Assistance Act, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 993, 1010–11 (1998) (“The
new Section 207(d)(1) allows the [District of Columbia Financial Responsibility and Management
Assistance Authority] to ‘stand in the shoes’ of the Mayor or any department or agency head and issue
any orders within their power to issue.”).
241. See 45 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-9-7(c) (LEXIS through Ch. 429 (all legislation) of the 2021
Sess.); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 141.1547(1)(b), 141.1549(2) (Westlaw through P.A.2022, No. 4,
of the 2022 Reg. Sess., 101st Leg.); see also Gillette, Dictatorships, supra note 216, at 1394–96 (discussing
these laws).
242. 45 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-9-7(b)–(c); id. § 45-9-18; MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 141.1549(2).
243. 45 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 45-9-7(c); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 141.1549(2).
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be elected . . . and shall serve in an advisory capacity to the receiver.”244
Michigan does not even allow local officials a defined advisory role, instead
taking away all powers “except as may be specifically authorized in writing by
the emergency manager.”245 The Detroit example shows, however, that
Michigan managers likely see some benefit to keeping local officials in their
(advisory) positions. Orr’s first act as emergency manager was to restore the
salary and benefits of the mayor and city council in recognition of their “vital
role in the collaborative process of addressing Detroit’s financial emergency.”246
But Orr did not have to do this—along with their many other powers,
Michigan’s emergency manager statute allows managers to hire any staff or
other professional assistance “as the emergency manager considers necessary to
fulfill his or her appointment.”247 This power makes practical sense. To the
extent that the manager is brought in to fix problems caused by a lack of
expertise, incompetence, or corruption by local officials, it seems foolhardy to
require the manager to employ those same officials to clean up their mess. But
with no obvious statutory limit, this power could allow an emergency manager
to replace an entire city’s worth of workers.
These statutes also highlight two final questions: Who are these
emergency managers, and what can’t they do? As to who these people are, they
have two qualities worth highlighting. First, despite the ostensibly and ideally
apolitical nature of emergency managers, they are, above all, political
appointees. Both the Rhode Island and Michigan statutes give some political
actor the ability to remove the emergency manager at will.248 This means that
while emergency managers are politically unaccountable to the people under
their purview, they are politically accountable through their appointing
authority. In a place like Detroit, where the racial and political demographics of
the city are opposite those of the state, this creates the difficult situation of an
emergency manager subject to removal by a political actor who may have
substantially different priorities than the people she oversees.249
244. 45 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 45-9-7(c).
245. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 141.1549(2).
246. Detroit Emergency Manager Order, supra note 236.
247. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 141.1549(4).
248. See 45 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 45-9-7(a) (“The director of revenue may, at any time, and
without cause, remove the receiver and appoint a successor, or terminate the receivership.”); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 141.1549(3)(d) (“Except as otherwise provided in this subdivision, the
emergency manager shall serve at the pleasure of the governor.”).
249. This situation, where an emergency manager is imposed on a locality by those in power who
are of a different political party, race, or both, is not uncommon or limited only to Michigan. See
McKillop Bradford Erlandson, Note, Revisiting Progressive Federalism: Voice, Exit, and Endless Money, 68
U. MIA. L. REV. 853, 872 (2014) (“Communities deemed eligible for this sort of hostile takeover are
generally under minority rule, politically out of step with the governor, and lack the economic power
at the state level to defend themselves.”); see also DOMINGO MOREL, TAKEOVER: RACE, EDUCATION,
AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 12 (2018) (concluding after a systematic study of every school district
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Beyond this political reality, emergency managers all seem to be
technocrats,250 usually with subject-matter expertise in business or law.251 Rhode
Island does not list statutory requirements for its emergency managers, but its
highest profile one was the receiver for Central Falls, Robert G. Flanders, Jr.
At the time of his appointment, he was a former Associate Justice of the Rhode
Island Supreme Court and had developed a practice based on a variety of
commercial disputes through experience at a number of prestigious law firms.252
Perhaps unsurprisingly, Justice Flanders was also a graduate of two prestigious
schools—Brown University and Harvard Law School.253
Michigan, meanwhile, builds minimum technocratic requirements into its
statute. It states that “[t]he emergency manager shall have a minimum of 5
years’ experience and demonstrable expertise in business, financial, or local or
state budgetary matters.”254 Unlike this expertise requirement, any ties to the
place that the manager is about to overtake are optional.255 Unsurprisingly, the
people appointed to be emergency managers in Michigan bear the traditional
markers of technocratic excellence. Kevyn Orr, for example, graduated from the
University of Michigan Law School and was a partner at Jones Day before his
appointment.256

to be taken over by its state “that race, economics, and politics are equally important factors associated
with state takeovers . . . [and] increases in black political empowerment in cities are associated with the
increased likelihood of a state takeover”); Michelle Wilde Anderson, Democratic Dissolution: Radical
Experimentation in State Takeovers of Local Governments, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 577, 590 (2012)
[hereinafter Anderson, Democratic Dissolution] (finding that the proportion of African Americans
governed by an emergency manager in Michigan “climbs to 57% if one assesses the share of the AfricanAmerican population currently governed by an emergency manager either in their city or in their school
district”).
250. I use the word technocrat here to mean a person with significant subject-matter expertise
gained through traditional avenues of education and professional experience. Technocrat, MERRIAMWEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/technocrat [http://perma.cc/7M2A-V6XQ].
I primarily use the term as a contrast with the community-based experts that I discuss as potential
emergency managers in Section III.E.
251. See Gillette, Dictatorships, supra note 216, at 1420 & n.234 (discussing numerous technocratic
appointees to emergency management positions including, amongst others, an investment banking
partner, “a former federal judge and law firm partner; the former Secretary of the U.S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development; a political science professor; the head of New York Telephone; a
stock broker; an investment banker; and the head of a New York City-based business”).
252. See Robert G. Flanders, Jr., WHELAN CORRENTE & FLANDERS LLP, https://whelancorrente.
com/our-attorneys/robert-g-flanders-jr/ [https://perma.cc/R23B-GEQ5].
253. Id.
254. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 141.1549(3)(a) (Westlaw through P.A.2022, No. 4, of the 2022
Reg. Sess., 101st Leg.).
255. Id. § 141.1549(3)(b) (“The emergency manager may, but need not, be a resident of the local
government.”).
256. See Kevyn D. Orr, JONES DAY, https://www.jonesday.com/en/lawyers/o/kevyn-orr?tab=
experience [https://perma.cc/8YP9-MUPR].
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Finally, is there anything these emergency managers can’t do? Not really.
As discussed in Part IV, there may be limits in both state and federal
constitutional law that limit what even a dictatorial emergency manager can do.
But it bears noting that these most powerful emergency managers have
been empowered by new state statutes. As such, those empowering statutes can
and do contain clauses giving the manager’s actions precedence over conflicting
statutes.257 In practice, this means that an emergency manager may be more
powerful than the local elected government, which could be constrained by any
manner of preexisting state laws.
Beyond this, Michigan does put some express limits on an emergency
manager’s power to take unilateral action that appears designed to prevent
corruption.258 Perhaps most consequentially, the manager’s ability to sell certain
public utilities or to dissolve a municipal government are subject to a vote by
the local government’s electors.259 Michigan also requires its emergency
managers to go through additional procedural steps when doling out contracts
or selling assets valued above $50,000.260 These things, however, are merely
procedural checks on a Michigan manager’s power, not substantive limitations.
Absolute limits on a manager’s power are few and far between. A Rhode
Island receiver cannot, for example, directly abrogate union contracts.261 (They
have altered those contracts through more indirect ways.262) And there is only
one thing that a Michigan emergency manager absolutely cannot do: despite
having the power to “reject, modify, or terminate” collective bargaining
agreements, she cannot impair “[a] provision of an existing collective bargaining
agreement that authorizes the payment of a benefit upon the death of a police
officer or firefighter that occurs in the line of duty.”263

257. See, e.g., 45 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-9-12 (LEXIS through Ch. 429 (all legislation) of the 2021
Sess.) (“Notwithstanding any general or special law to the contrary, unless otherwise specified, the
provisions of this chapter shall supersede any conflicting provisions of the city, town, or fire district’s
charter, local ordinance, rule or regulation.”).
258. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 141.1552 (specifically delineating a number of powers, and limits
on those powers, of an emergency manager). Rhode Island does not explicitly limit its receivers’ ability
to take unilateral action along these anticorruption lines. See Guy R. Bissonnette, Rhode Island Municipal
Insolvency Lite, 60 R.I. BAR J. 19, 20–21 (2012).
259. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 141.1552(4) (selling or utilizing assets of utilities furnishing light, heat,
or power); id. § 141.1552(1)(cc) (dissolving a municipal government).
260. Id. § 141.1552(3) (requiring either competitive bidding or state treasurer review on contracts
valued above $50,000); id. § 141.1555(1) (requiring state treasurer approval of local government assets
valued above $50,000).
261. See 45 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-9-9.
262. See Bissonnette, supra note 258, at 21 (noting that the Central Falls receiver “insist[ed] on
changes in staffing, wages, benefits, etc. with the various municipal unions based on economic
necessity” and ultimately abrogated those contracts through his power to take the city into municipal
bankruptcy).
263. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 141.1555(2).
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3. Beginning and Ending Emergency Manager Control
How an emergency manager’s control begins and ends warrants special, if
brief, mention. The triggers to begin and end emergency manager control can
broadly be categorized as either objective or political. What I will call “objective
triggers” begin or end an emergency manager’s control based on an objective
metric at least nominally outside of the political control of elected officials. By
contrast, “political triggers” begin or end an emergency manager’s control
through the democratic process. Importantly, there is no inherent requirement
that each of these triggers be used in isolation. Indeed, an emergency manager’s
appointment or removal may well be tied to some combination of these
possibilities.264
Objective triggers are simply those that are based on something
measurable. For example, North Carolina’s Local Government Commission
relies primarily on a local government’s fund balance, which is the difference
between its assets and liabilities.265 Other states use time-based objective
triggers. Pennsylvania, for example, terminates a municipality’s “distressed
status” after, at most, five years.266
By using the term “objective” I do not intend to suggest that these triggers
are politically incorruptible. Both Michigan and Rhode Island use nominally
objective triggers that leave significant discretion to the person making the
appointment or termination decision.267
By contrast, political triggers provide an explicit democratic check on
emergency managers. That democratic check can come from above—meaning
from the government entity that created the emergency manager—or from
below—meaning from those whom the emergency manager oversees.
Political triggers from above can be truly discretionary exercises of
political power. In both Michigan and Rhode Island, the most powerful
emergency manager regimes, the emergency manager is subject to at-will
removal by some state official.268 And at least in Michigan, emergency managers

264. See, e.g., id. § 141.1549(6)(c) (allowing an emergency manager to be removed by a two-thirds
vote of the local government if she has served for at least eighteen months).
265. STATE ROLE, supra note 219, at 30–31.
266. See 53 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 11701.254(b)(2) (Westlaw through 2022 Reg.
Sess. Act 8).
267. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 141.1549(6)(b) (stating that an emergency manager shall
serve “[u]ntil the financial emergency is rectified”); 45 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-9-7(a) (allowing
appointment of a receiver when a previously established budget commission “concludes that its powers
are insufficient to restore fiscal stability” and provides “a statement of the reasons why it has been
unable to restore fiscal stability to the city, town, or fire district”).
268. See 45 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-9-7(a) (“The director of revenue may, at any time, and without
cause, remove the receiver and appoint a successor, or terminate the receivership.”); MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 141.1549(3)(d) (“Except as otherwise provided in this subdivision, the emergency manager
shall serve at the pleasure of the governor.”).
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may be very aware at whose pleasure they serve. As Michael Stampfler, one of
the emergency managers for Pontiac, Michigan, recounted, the political
pressures he felt were “enormous,” and “phone calls from the Deputy State
Treasurer, whose boss is appointed by the Governor, are not uncommon to
make powerful ‘suggestions’ on how the Emergency Manager should do his
job.”269
By comparison, political checks on emergency managers from below are
limited, if they exist at all. Michigan’s emergency manager statute allows
localities to remove an emergency manager after eighteen months of her
control. But that vote requires a supermajority and does not remove state
oversight totally, instead shifting it into a less intrusive form.270 Rhode Island
does not even provide this sort of limited removal from below.
B.

Discussions of Emergency Managers and Democracy

Despite existing for several decades, the emergency manager phenomenon
was largely ignored by the legal academy until recently.271 While some scholars
have focused on the functioning of these boards generally,272 commentators have
taken particular interest in the effects emergency control may have on aspects
of democracy.273 Within that particular interest, scholars have primarily focused

269. Erlandson, supra note 249, at 873–74.
270. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 141.1549(6)(c).
271. See Kimhi, Four Cities, supra note 216, at 883–84 (explaining that there had been “almost no
literature on the way states handle local fiscal crises and the way state boards function”).
272. See, e.g., Heather M. Forrest, State Court Receivership Alternative to Chapter 9, 29 AM. BANKR.
INST. J. 8, 83 (2010); Clayton P. Gillette, Bondholders and Financially Stressed Municipalities, 39
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 639, 652 (2012); Clayton P. Gillette, Fiscal Federalism, Political Will, and the
Strategic Use of Municipal Bankruptcy, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 281, 320–21 (2012); Kimhi, Four Cities, supra
note 216, at 883–84; Omer Kimhi, Reviving Cities, Legal Remedies to Municipal Financial Crises, 88 B.U.
L. REV. 633, 654–55 (2008); Cook, supra note 240, at 993; Note, Missed Opportunity: Urban Fiscal Crises
and Financial Control Boards, 110 HARV. L. REV. 733 passim (1996).
273. See, e.g., Juliet M. Moringiello, Dispossessing Resident Voice: Municipal Receiverships and the
Public Trust, 53 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 733, 743–44 (2020); Sydney L. Hawthorne, Do Desperate Times
Call for Desperate Measures in the Context of Democracy? Michigan’s Emergency Manager Law & the Voting
Rights Act, 41 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 181, 209–10 (2017); Collin Weyers, Note, Death by
Denominator: Reconsidering Constitutional Intra-State Deference in an Age of “Emergency Management,” 2018
WIS. L. REV. 1261, 1271–73; Lora Krsulich, Note, Polluted Politics, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 501, 509–10
(2017); Gillette, Dictatorships, supra note 216, at 1397–98; Anderson, The New Minimal Cities, supra note
232, at 1154; Chris Lewis, Does Michigan’s Emergency-Manager Law Disenfranchise Black Citizens?,
ATLANTIC (May 9, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/05/does-michigans
emergency-manager-law-disenfranchise-black-citizens/275639/ [https://perma.cc/7HHA-TLFP (dark
archive)]; Anderson, Democratic Dissolution, supra note 249, at 577; Richard C. Schragger, Democracy
and Debt, 121 YALE L.J. 860, 879 (2012) [hereinafter Schragger, Democracy and Debt]; Richard C.
Schragger, Citizens Versus Bondholders, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 787, 801–02 (2012) [hereinafter
Schragger, Citizens Versus Bondholders]; Lyle Kossis, Note, Examining the Conflict Between Municipal
Receivership and Local Autonomy, 98 VA. L. REV. 1109, 1134–37 (2012); John C. Philo, Local Government
Fiscal Emergencies and the Disenfranchisement of Victims of the Global Recession, 13 J.L. SOC’Y 71, 87 (2011).
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on Michigan and Rhode Island, which feature the strongest, dictatorial form of
emergency manager.274
Virtually every scholar to discuss the issue recognizes the antidemocratic
potential of strong emergency managers, as well as how that antidemocratic
potential plays out in practice.275 As in Detroit, emergency managers have often
been used by Republican-run states to take over economically poor Democratic
cities and school districts with large Black and Brown populations.276 And as I
have just discussed, in the strongest form of emergency manager oversight, the
state truly does take over these cities, totally displacing the city’s elected
officials.
For most scholars to grapple with the issue, the antidemocratic nature of
emergency managers makes them a tool to be scorned.277 Michelle Wilde
Anderson labels cities forced to undergo dictatorial emergency management as
subject to “democratic dissolution.”278 In doing so, she invokes the idea of true
dissolution of a municipality, the “death of the legal corporate form and the
associated municipal government.”279 But she argues that true dissolution,
unlike democratic dissolution, has the function of merging a struggling
municipality with a larger area in order to pool resources and “improve
economies of scale in service provision.”280 And unlike the imposition of an
emergency manager, true dissolutions have not been done without the consent
of the locality.281 As Anderson recognizes, in many ways a true dissolution has
the same benefits and drawbacks of earlier, less intrusive, emergency
management regimes wherein the state would provide additional resources in
exchange for some additional budgetary oversight powers or control.282

274. See, e.g., Anderson, Democratic Dissolution, supra note 249, at 581.
275. See, e.g., Gillette, Dictatorships, supra note 216, at 1409 (recognizing in the midst of a defense
of emergency managers that “as unelected bodies, takeover boards necessarily violate procedural
democratic norms, regardless of the quality of services they deliver”).
276. See supra note 249 and accompanying text.
277. See Schragger, Democracy and Debt, supra note 273, at 879 n.80; Schragger, Citizens Versus
Bondholders, supra note 273, at 801. See generally Krsulich, supra note 273; Anderson, Democratic
Dissolution, supra note 249.
278. Anderson, Democratic Dissolution, supra note 249, at 581.
279. Id. at 601; see also id. at 600–01 (“In the context of local government law, dissolution refers to
the termination or revocation of an incorporated municipality’s charter and the reversion of the city’s
territory to dependence on county or township government.”). For a more in-depth discussion of true
dissolution, see generally Michelle Wilde Anderson, Dissolving Cities, 121 YALE L.J. 1364 (2012).
280. Anderson, Democratic Dissolution, supra note 249, at 601.
281. Id. at 601–02.
282. Id. at 603; cf. Sullivan v. Nassau Cnty. Interim Fin. Auth., 959 F.3d 54, 57 (2d Cir. 2020),
cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 1063 (2021) (noting that the State of New York provided Nassau County with
approximately $100 million along with the creation of the financial control board); Krsulich, supra note
273, at 516 (noting that New York State provided over $10 billion in bonds loaned to New York City
when it engaged in emergency oversight in the 1970s).
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But Anderson argues that democratic dissolution is dissolution without
these benefits. Neither Michigan nor Rhode Island requires local consent before
an emergency manager is imposed by the state, and neither state provides
additional resources when emergency managers take control. In this way,
democratic dissolution is an incomplete dissolution. The municipal entity
remains intact but has its democratic self-rule reconsolidated at the state level.283
According to Anderson, “The core problem with the statutes in Michigan
and Rhode Island is that legislators fell prey to the illusion that by entirely
sacrificing one of these value sets, local democracy, they could ameliorate local
fiscal crisis.”284 To accomplish this feat, these laws “consolidate all local
authority in a single unelected official,” empower the governor to be the sole
arbiter of that selected official’s performance, withdraw local transparency and
public accountability mechanisms, and “do not require local consent.”285
These problems are exacerbated because it is not clear that emergency
managers of this type are effective. They are not merely number crunchers who
come in to clean up after wasteful, incompetent, or corrupt local officials.
Instead, they must solve complicated problems with structural roots, and they
must do so on a relatively quick timeline. This opens a host of issues, including
fire sales of assets, special interest capture of the manager herself, risking
“severe collateral damage to local health, safety, and welfare values” in the name
of fiscal health,286 and the possibility that “critical political legitimacy and
participation assets at the local level may be damaged, with heightened localstate political polarization and lower rates of local electoral participation.”287
While these downsides range between possible and nearly certain, Anderson
notes that empirical support is lacking that a Michigan- or Rhode Island-style
emergency manager can achieve the goal of mitigating the contagion effects of
a municipal default.288
Others have echoed and expanded on these criticisms. Lora Krsulich
argues that states should turn away from emergency managers toward
alternative solutions like administrative law because emergency manager-based
solutions are not backed by strong evidence, may exacerbate existing racial
inequalities, are subject to political gamesmanship, and do not solve the problem
of the limited flexibility inherent in city budgeting.289 Richard Schragger has
283. See Anderson, Democratic Dissolution, supra note 249, at 601–03.
284. Id. at 605. Anderson argues that the “most critical” values at play are: (1) “local health, safety,
and welfare”; (2) “democratic values”; (3) “public integrity”; (4) “efficiency”; and (5) “the management
of negative externalities affecting other cities and the state (including the credit worthiness of these
governments).” Id.
285. Id. at 606–08.
286. Id. at 609–12.
287. Id. at 614.
288. See id. at 613.
289. Krsulich, supra note 273, at 508–10.
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called these emergency manager laws “punitive,” and argues that they come
about in part because of a “political gap between cities and state legislatures”
wherein Republican governors suffer little political consequence for their
takeover of Democratic cities.290 Elsewhere, he posits that emergency manager
laws like Michigan’s may impose “conditions of assistance [that are] so onerous
as to undermine local self-government.”291
Clayton P. Gillette, however, significantly complicates this otherwise
overwhelmingly negative picture.292 Gillette notes that the antidemocratic
critique of emergency managers, even in their strongest form, focuses less on
the expressive function of democratic participation and more on a belief that
emergency managers will take steps out of line with the wishes of those they
oversee.293 Under this framing, the antidemocratic critique relies in substantial
part on the assumption that local officials have faithfully represented their
constituents’ interests. But that assumption does not obviously hold. Gillette
observes that localities facing fiscal distress often face significant population
loss. This raises the possibility that, as Gillette argues, “residents believe that
they are not receiving public goods and services that are worth the tax price
necessary to obtain them.”294 In turn, it may be that those who remain in a
distressed locality do so not because of political satisfaction, but because they
face overwhelming exit costs.295 Beyond this, Gillette also finds that many
historical and recent examples of state takeovers are proceeded by budgetary
opacity. That lack of transparency suggests local officials may be, instead of
acceding to resident preferences, hiding the proverbial ball to protect their own
political fortunes.296
Having established that the democratic critique of emergency
management may be overstated, Gillette makes the positive argument that a
properly constructed emergency management regime can be democracy
enhancing.297 Emergency management would have this effect because the
290. Schragger, Citizens Versus Bondholders, supra note 273, at 801–02.
291. Schragger, Democracy and Debt, supra note 273, at 879 n.80.
292. See Gillette, Dictatorships, supra note 216, at 1399.
293. As Gillette notes, voters can continue to vote for national, state, and even local elected officials
even while under the oversight of an emergency manager. The only difference is that those local
officials will have diminished responsibilities and power. See id.
294. Id. at 1402.
295. Id.; see also Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416,
419 (1956). The Tieboutian model is, of course, not without its limits. See, e.g., Gillette, Dictatorships,
supra note 216, at 1402 n.145 (citing Dennis Epple & Allan Zelenitz, The Implications of Competition
Among Jurisdictions: Does Tiebout Need Politics?, 89 J. POL. ECON. 1197, 1216 (1981), for the proposition
that “immobility of land permits self-interested local officials to usurp land rents even with interjurisdictional competition”).
296. Gillette, Dictatorships, supra note 216, at 1405–12.
297. Cf. infra Part IV (discussing the reasons that an emergency management regime in the policing
context may be democracy-enhancing).
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consolidated government of a strong emergency management regime could
subvert the ability for powerful constituencies to gain disproportionate benefits
in the typically fragmented decision-making process of local government,298 or
more radically, emergency management could create structural changes to
government.299 These changes would expose local residents to structural
governance possibilities they otherwise would not have experienced, leaving
them better informed at the conclusion of the emergency manager’s tenure and
so better able to consider whether keeping the newly imposed structure or
returning to their former system was ideal.300
These theoretical possibilities, however, may not reflect reality because
instead of neutral benevolent dictators,
takeover boards are necessarily political bodies comprising individuals
appointed by state executives who may have an underlying agenda.
Given the political nature of all the relevant actors, it would be
incongruous to assume that local decision-making processes distorted by
political interests will be replaced by one devoid of political motivations
that tend to deviate from majority preferences.301
To align this political reality with the theoretical ideal, Gillette identifies
two key factors necessary to an emergency manager regime’s success: defining
a clear set of objectives for the manager to acceptably pursue,302 and constraining
the emergency manager—whether through transparency requirements, the
possibility of termination, or other measures—so that she takes actions
consistent with a benevolent dictator instead of her own self-interest.303
Ultimately, Gillette, Anderson, and the other commentators to engage
with the emergency manager phenomenon recognize the power of emergency
management to affect democratic principles and process, as well as substantive
change. Where they differ most strenuously is in their conclusions regarding
whether the tool of emergency management can be democracy enhancing and
whether, despite any effect it may have on democratic principles or process, any
substantive changes emergency management may cause are beneficial to society
or a solution to the problems the emergency management set out to solve. I do
not contend to settle these debates once and for all. Instead, as I will discuss
further in Parts III and IV, I posit that that the democratic and substantive
effects of emergency management are likely to differ in the policing context.

298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.

Gillette, Dictatorships, supra note 216, at 1420–33.
Id. at 1420, 1433–45.
Id.
Id. at 1446.
Id. at 1446–54.
Id. at 1446, 1454–61.
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Educational Emergency Managers: From Fiscal Crises to Failing Schools

While emergency managers have been used to rectify fiscal crises since the
Great Depression, more recently, they have also been used to fix school systems
with poor academic performance.304 This new development was first used in
1989, gained more widespread use leading up to the new millennium, and
gained federal approval through the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001
(“NCLB”),305 which contained several provisions that encouraged state takeover
of local school districts.306
The legal academy has paid insufficient attention to the lessons we might
learn from this relatively modern use of emergency manager oversight.
Commentators discussing emergency management have certainly mentioned
the takeovers of “academically bankrupt” school districts.307 But those scholars
have not discussed the different lessons that we might learn from this expansion
of emergency manager use.
By contrast, there are scholars who have recognized and discussed the use
of emergency managers for academically failing school districts.308 But instead
of connecting their work to the broader literature and history of emergency
management, they have narrowly focused on areas within the education field.
In doing so, they have insufficiently recognized how the expansion of
emergency manager use from the fiscal to the educational arena suggests the
possibility of emergency managers as a trans-substantive tool.

304. See Mayraj Fahim, No Magic Solution Available for Improved Education in U.S. Cities, CITY
MAYORS (Sept. 19, 2005), http://www.citymayors.com/education/cityschools_usa.html [https://
perma.cc/4JXC-C62H] (noting that the first full operational takeover of a school district by a state
occurred in New Jersey in 1989, and the tactic did not gain prominence over fiscal takeovers until the
period from 1995–2000); see also Kristi L. Bowman, Before School Districts Go Broke: A Proposal for Federal
Reform, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 895, 927 & nn.176–79 (2011).
305. Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20
U.S.C.).
306. As Oluwole and Green describe,
[t]hree of the NCLB’s corrective actions could provide authority for State takeover of school
districts: (1) replacement of district personnel ‘relevant to the failure to make adequate yearly
progress’; (2) appointment of a trustee or receiver through the state department of education
to manage the district’s affairs; and (3) restructure or dissolution of the school district.
Joseph O. Oluwole & Preston C. Green, III, State Takeovers of School Districts: Race and the Equal
Protection Clause, 42 IND. L. REV. 343, 346 (2009) (footnotes omitted) (citing 20 U.S.C.
§ 6316(c)(10)(C)(iii), (v)–(vi)). NCLB has since been repealed by the Every Student Succeeds Act,
Pub. L. No. 114-85, 129 Stat. 1802 (2015) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.), but
that Act did not forbid or otherwise hamper states’ and cities’ ability to take over their school districts.
307. See, e.g., Fahim, supra note 304 (using this phrase).
308. See, e.g., MOREL, supra note 249, at 2; Oluwole & Green, supra note 306, at 343; Morgan
Craven, Paula Johnson & Terrence Wilson, Eradicating the School-to-Prison Pipeline Through a
Comprehensive Approach to School Equity, 42 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 703, 712–15 (2020);
Bowman, supra note 304, at 925–30.
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This use of emergency management to attempt to rectify an
underperforming public good has important lessons for emergency managers’
use as tools for police reform, as well as for their use in other contexts. Perhaps
most importantly, the apparent failure of school-district emergency managers
to create lasting improvements in student educational outcomes suggests that
emergency managers are not the silver bullet solution that reformers might wish
them to be. Instead, in both the fiscal and educational context, emergency
managers appear to perform best when targeting specific problems within
institutions that the institutions’ normal participants can or will not solve.
Beyond this, educational emergencies also exemplify another possibility
for the structure of emergency management. While fiscal emergency managers
are almost always appointed by a state government to oversee a locality,
educational emergency managers have sometimes been appointed by city
officials to oversee that city’s school system.309
Indeed, the shift toward using emergency manager takeovers to alleviate
academic problems is rife with potential lessons for the use of emergency
managers more broadly. A true taxonomy of the role emergency managers have
played in education reform is beyond the scope of this Article.310 However,
there are some basic lessons and pitfalls of which anyone seeking to use
emergency managers for police reform should be aware.
First, while emergency managers in the education realm have widely been
considered successful at solving fiscal problems within a school district, their
success in increasing academic performance is much more dubious.311 As Kristi
L. Bowman explained, “this is not surprising—accomplishing the former is
much more straightforward than addressing the countless factors which
influence the latter.”312 But this is not to say that there has been no success. Both
the Jersey City School District313 and Logan County, West Virginia, saw test
score gains after being placed under emergency manager control.314
309. See generally MICHAEL W. KIRST, MAYORAL INFLUENCE, NEW REGIMES, AND PUBLIC
SCHOOL GOVERNANCE (2002), https://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1054&
context=cpre_researchreports [https://perma.cc/FE56-UPGX] (discussing the structure and outcomes
of mayoral takeovers of school districts); Fahim, supra note 304 (noting the mayoral takeovers of school
districts in Boston and Chicago).
310. For a thorough overview of the then-current state and national law in this area, see generally
Oluwole & Green, supra note 306. For an updated fifty-state survey of state responses to the Every
Student Succeeds Act, see Thompson Reuters, State Implementation of No Child Left Behind/Every
Student Succeeds Act, 0040 SURVEYS 11 (2021).
311. See MOREL, supra note 249, at 11; see also Craven et al., supra note 308, at 714 (“State takeovers
of local school boards have not been shown to result in significant improvements in reading and math
scores, attendance, or graduation rates post-takeover.”); Bowman, supra note 304, at 927 (“[T]he
consensus in the limited literature is that fiscal stability is much easier to achieve than academic
improvement.”).
312. Bowman, supra note 304, at 927.
313. Fahim, supra note 304.
314. Id.
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More broadly, mayoral takeovers of school districts have been “linked to
increases in student achievement at the elementary grades [and] gains in
achievement are especially large for the lowest performing schools.”315 Mayoral
takeovers, however, may be “less effective for upper grades, where the
cumulative effects of many years of poor schooling are not easily reversible.”316
State takeovers, meanwhile, may cause student achievement to suffer if they
bring about “administrative and political turmoil.”317 Even so, “[a]fter a period
of adjustment . . . state takeovers may also be able to produce positive
achievement gains.”318 As these broad-stroke conclusions suggest, takeovers of
school districts may, but do not always, lead to academic improvements.319
Second, takeovers may have other benefits that contribute to student
learning, specifically increased resources and the end of gridlock. Mayoral
takeover in Sacramento, for example, “ended the bickering and deadlock that
plagued the [school] district’s governance for years” and led to “renewed
confidence and interest in the schools” that translated into “the district’s first
bond measure for school repairs in more than 20 years.”320 Similarly, in Chicago,
mayoral control led to increased funding for schools through the mayor’s
newfound willingness to support their budgets.321 Other cities saw similar
increases in access to resources thanks to mayoral power and influence.322
Third, beyond their effectiveness as tools in nonfiscal contexts, the use of
takeovers to address struggling schools provides further examples of the
structural issues that arise when using emergency managers. Just as in the fiscal
context, the level of control seized in an educational takeover varies. Some
takeovers have not been takeovers at all. Instead, these low-control incidents
have involved a threatened takeover; the primary exertion of power comes from
the state or city’s influence, such as endorsing candidates for the school board.323
But there are high control takeovers akin to the Michigan-style dictatorial
emergency manager. In these, the takeover may involve the alteration of

315. KENNETH K. WONG & FRANCIS X. SHEN, DOES SCHOOL DISTRICT TAKEOVER WORK?
ASSESSING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CITY AND STATE TAKEOVER AS A SCHOOL REFORM
STRATEGY 14 (2001), https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED468271.pdf [https://perma.cc/MY69-JJ5F].
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. See MOREL, supra note 249, at 3 (noting that the evidence of takeovers’ effectiveness at the
time they became a popular tool “[a]t best . . . was mixed and inconclusive”).
320. KIRST, supra note 309, at 8 (quoting Alan Richard, Sacramento Mayor’s Legacy: Improved
Schools, EDUC. WEEK (Feb. 2, 2000), https://www.edweek.org/leadership/sacramento-mayors-legacyimproved-schools/2000/02 [https://perma.cc/A4AN-JAYV]).
321. Id. at 10.
322. See id. at 8–10.
323. Id. at 4–8.
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bargaining rights, total control over the school board, or other substantial
involuntary changes.324
Likewise, educational takeovers suggest the possibility for tailoring the
expertise needed for an emergency manager. Unlike in the fiscal context,
educational managers have come from a wider variety of backgrounds because
takeovers under the auspices of academic distress have varied goals, and so the
type of manager needed depends on those goals. In Chicago, the takeover had
“a strong emphasis . . . on improving the efficiency of the public schools.”325
Reflecting that focus, the mayor chose “a business-style CEO” to lead the
district.326 Meanwhile, the takeover in Boston was more focused on standards
and curriculum issues, so the mayor appointed “a strong educator-leader” with
previous experience as a school district superintendent.327
Finally, perhaps the biggest difference between fiscal and academic
takeovers—and the most important lesson they provide—comes from observing
their duration. In both fiscal and academic takeovers, when there is minimal
level of intrusion into the locality, the “takeover” may last for lengthy periods
of time, or indeed it may be a permanent fixture in the relationship between the
state and its locality. As described above, North Carolina, for example, keeps
watch over local finances on an ongoing basis.328
But in the education realm, highly intrusive takeovers regularly last for
years, if they end at all. The State of Rhode Island took over the Central Falls
School District in 1991 and maintains that control today,329 and New Jersey’s
control of Newark’s schools lasted for twenty-five years.330 Chicago, with a
mayoral takeover that began in the 1990s, does not seem like it will fully return
to an elected schoolboard until 2027 at the earliest.331 As these examples show,
at least in the education context, a perceived emergency can give rise to

324. Id. at 7–8.
325. Id. at 9.
326. Id. at 10.
327. Id.
328. See supra note 221 (discussing the North Carolina advisory board).
329. MOREL, supra note 249, at 40–44 (noting that the state took over the Central Falls School
District in 1991 and maintained control in 2016); Ashley Cullinane, Central Falls Schools To Start Aug.
2, Plan Could Differ from Remainder of State, NBC 10 NEWS (July 23, 2020), https://turnto10.
com/news/coronavirus/reopening-schools/central-falls-schools-to-start-aug-27-plan-could-differ-from
-remainder-of-state [https://perma.cc/8RXU-3BGF] (noting that the district “remains under state
financial control”).
330. Adam Clark, N.J.’s Takeover of Newark Schools Is Officially Over — 25 Years Later, NJ.COM,
https://www.nj.com/education/2020/07/njs-takeover-of-newark-schools-is-officially-over-25-yearslater.html [https://perma.cc/G7QR-BMBH] (July 2, 2020, 8:39 AM).
331. See Cassie Walker Burke, Chicago Elected School Board Bill Will Head to Governor, Despite
Lingering Questions, CHALKBEAT CHI. (June 16, 2021, 6:22 PM), https://chicago.chalkbeat.
org/2021/6/16/22537184/chicago-elected-school-board-bill-clears-hurdle-but-questions-remain [http://
perma.cc/3PCB-R9A4].
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permanent structural changes in the relationships between local and state
governments, or between those governments and the people that they govern.
III. EMERGENCY MANAGERS FOR THE POLICING EMERGENCY
How can, and why should, emergency managers be brought to bear on this
policing emergency? Recognizing the diversity inherent in the thousands of law
enforcement agencies across the country, I do not attempt to provide a onesize-fits-all answer to this question. Instead, this part provides a set of
guideposts and questions that will help policymakers to build an emergency
manager law that addresses their localized version of this emergency. First,
though, it will answer the threshold question of why emergency managers
should be used.
A.

Why Emergency Managers?

There is nothing that an emergency manager can do that a sufficiently
motivated legislature and executive could not. This is because an emergency
manager, even at its most powerful, is simply the full emergency powers of the
state funneled into a single person or small group of people.
However, there are four major reasons to use an emergency manager in
the policing context. The first is a simple jurisdictional match. Policing in most
cases is a local enterprise.332 Because an emergency manager is assigned to a
particular locality, they can be attuned to that local variation in a way that more
universal tools may not be.
Three other reasons require more discussion. First, both the passage of
emergency manager legislation and the emergency manager form itself can alter
the political landscape in a way that allows for the enactment of reform that
would not be possible through the normal political process. Second, in some
localities, a policing emergency manager may serve the same negative
externality-reducing functions as emergency managers in the fiscal context. And
third, because the emergency manager is ideally less concerned with the political
ramifications of her actions, imbuing her with the emergency powers of the state
can allow her to make “hard choices,” fulfilling goals that political actors have
the power and personal desire, but not the political will, to accomplish.333

332. See supra Section I.D.
333. It is for these reasons that policing emergency management avoids the inside/outside problem.
See generally Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Inside or Outside the System?, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1743
(2013) (discussing the inside/outside problem). Even if emergency managers should largely be viewed
as delegates of their appointing authority, these reasons—and especially the possibility for sunrise
effects and “hard choices”—suggest that an emergency manager may nevertheless be willing to make
decisions that an elected official would not directly make.
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1. Solving Structural Problems
A prime reason for the use of emergency managers is their ability to solve
structural problems. Indeed, both emergency managers themselves as well as
the passage of emergency manager legislation can shift the political landscape.
One way passing an emergency manager statute might do this is through
sunrise lawmaking.334 Sunrise lawmaking is the passage of a statute or other
piece of law that does not go into effect immediately.335 Sunrise lawmaking has
several benefits that make it especially amenable to use in the policing
emergency manager context. It allows lawmakers to act with an eye toward the
future, thereby (hopefully) invoking their better angels because they may not
have to live under the regime they would create nor would they have to deal
with the political blowback of that regime.336 Similarly, sunrise lawmaking may
defuse the political opposition because legislation would not go into effect
immediately and so would present only an uncertain and hypothetical threat to
the status quo. Moreover, an emergency manager statute with sunrise effects
could be triggered by some future police behavior, giving police the opportunity
to alter their own behavior before being put under an emergency manager’s
supervision. Once police know what would trigger emergency manager
oversight, they can make the changes necessary to avoid those triggers if they
so choose.
But the benefits of emergency managers extend far beyond the potential
advantages of sunrise lawmaking. Perhaps their greatest benefit is the ability to
cut through the tangled web of state and local laws, regulations, and customs
that protect police from reform. It does this in two ways: first, by taking
advantage of its status as an emergency tool; second, by creating a manager at the
state level, that manager can have the full powers of the state, and those powers
can take precedence over previously enacted state and local legislation.
As discussed in Section I.A, when a government labels something an
“emergency” that is not simply a rhetorical device. Instead, it can unlock an
expanded amount of power while also leading the courts to grant deference to
334. See generally Daniel E. Herz-Roiphe & David Singh Grewal, Make Me Constitutional, but Not
Yet: Sunrise Lawmaking and Democratic Constitutionalism, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1975 (2015) (offering a
theoretical account of sunrise lawmaking focused on the constitutional context); Saul Levmore & Frank
Fagan, Legislative Sunrises: Transitions, Veiled Commitments, and Carbon Taxes, in THE TIMING OF
LAWMAKING 130, 132–33 (Saul Levmore & Frank Fagan eds., 2017).
335. See Herz-Roiphe & Grewal, supra note 334, at 1979; see also AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S
UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY 474 (2012) (calling
sunrise lawmaking “a different species of rules that should properly go into effect—that should
‘sunrise’—only after a substantial time delay”).
336. See Herz-Roiphe & Grewal, supra note 334, at 2002–03 (suggesting that, contrary to James
Madison’s belief that it is “‘in vain’ to hope that ‘enlightened statesmen’ will pursue the ‘public good’”
because of their personal interests, sunrise lawmaking may act to put lawmakers behind something like
John Rawls’ veil of ignorance).
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the exercise of that power. This emergency status may be especially necessary
when dealing with police, who may be protected by constitutional provisions,337
as well as so-called “home rule” and special legislation state constitutional
provisions that protect the autonomy of a locality.338 But even constitutional
provisions can give way when the government provides a sufficiently weighty
reason for its action.339 And there is precedent for courts deferring to state
action in the home-rule context as well.340
Second, by passing new legislation to create emergency managers, states
can clear the field of most, if not all, of the older state laws, local laws, municipal
charters, and other legal impediments that serve to make reforming the police
procedurally complex. This is because of two basic features of the potential state
law. First, localities are creatures of the state, and so absent something like a
constitutional home-rule provision, the state can do with the locality what it
wishes up to and including dissolving that locality. Second, earlier governments
cannot, generally speaking,341 bind later ones. Here, this means that the
legislature passing an emergency manager law can include provisions that give
the emergency manager’s powers precedence over any other preexisting law.342
Combined, these elements allow an emergency manager to take steps to fix the
policing emergency that would be impossible through the standard local
political process.
Once an emergency manager is empowered, the structure of emergency
manager oversight also makes it a distinctly useful tool. As both Anderson and
Gillette have noted, emergency management serves to shift political power up
and away from local democratic politics.343 In the fiscal context, this has meant
shifting from the city to the state. In the education context, it may mean shifting
from a local school board to the mayor. That newly consolidated power is then
given to the emergency manager.

337. See infra Section IV.B.
338. See Anthony O’Rourke, Rick Su & Guyora Binder, Disbanding Police Agencies, 121 COLUM. L.
REV. 1327, 1364–66 (2021). See generally DALE KRANE, PLATON N. RIGOS & MELVIN B. HILL JR.,
HOME RULE IN AMERICA: A FIFTY-STATE HANDBOOK 14 (2001) (examining the powers and
functions of municipalities and counties that operate under home rule within each state). O’Rourke et
al. discuss how some states have gotten around special legislation provisions, but the Michigan and
Rhode Island examples provide another. There, the states created legislation that could create an
emergency manager for any place in the state, but then empowered some agency or political actor to
determine which locality actually needed the emergency manager oversight.
339. See infra Section IV.B (discussing the Contract Clause).
340. See O’Rourke et al., supra note 338, at 1364–65.
341. Provisions like the Contract Clause are the exceptions that prove this rule.
342. See, e.g., 45 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-9-12 (LEXIS through Ch. 429 (all legislation) of the 2021
Sess.).
343. See Anderson, Democratic Dissolution, supra note 249, at 602; Gillette, Dictatorships, supra note
216, at 1376–78.
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This creates two important disruptions in the traditional police-reform
process. First, the shift from the local to some higher political body makes those
political actors responsible for reform more removed from the political power
of a local police department. While Anderson and numerous others have decried
the removal of local democratic accountability in the fiscal context, here it serves
to disempower the police—a powerful interest group that has too often fought
to ward off even minor reforms that would benefit the public or increase
accountability.344
Second, by then shifting that power to an emergency manager, it makes
reform efforts much more resistant to political pressure and gamesmanship.
One of the key benefits of an emergency manager is the unitary nature of the
position.345 Emergency management decreases the fragmentation of local
government, removing many of the possible choke points that people opposing
reform can use to maintain the status quo.346
A simple illustration will show how this works. Imagine a small city
attempting to implement some police reform, say a community oversight board.
That reform will almost certainly need to pass through at least one committee—
chaired by one individual, with several other members, and likely several other
staff to serve the committee’s membership—and then go to a vote of the city
council, and finally be signed by the mayor. Each of those points and each of
those people represent a “vetogate”—an opportunity for police lobbying to stop
the bill, or at the least, to weaken it.347
By contrast, while an emergency manager may well listen to the police’s
ideas, the political pressure she would feel to implement those ideas should be
greatly reduced, if not eliminated. While the police may exercise some influence
over the manager’s appointing authority, an emergency manager does not have
to worry about running for another term, and as I will soon discuss, should not
be beholden to any particular constituency.
Streamlining the process for enacting changes is especially important in
the police reform context because, in addition to the problems created by
fragmentation within government, there is additional fragmentation caused by
the many possible reforms that need to be enacted and the diverging
philosophies among reformers. While these levels of fragmentation have
analogs in the education or fiscal context, the difference here is that police are
344. See O’Rourke et al., supra note 338, at 1343–54.
345. This unitary nature is lessened, but not eliminated, by having an emergency board instead of
a single manager.
346. Cf. Gillette, Dictatorships, supra note 216, at 1420–22 (discussing fragmentation within local
governments as a cause of fiscal distress).
347. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Vetogates, Chevron, Preemption, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1441, 1444–53 (2008); Josh Chafetz, Congress’s Constitution, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 715, 725 & n.44 (2012)
(discussing how bicameralism serves as an “absolute vetogate”).
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an especially powerful and unified interest group.348 This makes them well
positioned to resist substantive reforms that may gather only a portion of the
pro-reform coalition.
Beyond emergency managers’ ability to cut through fragmentation, the
push to pass an emergency manager law, as well as a manager’s tenure, could be
unifying for reformers. Because of the previously discussed fragmentation,
directly passed substantive reforms are likely to draw varying degrees of buy-in
from potential interest groups and stakeholders, depending on the link between
each group’s specialty and the reform. But an emergency manager can serve as
a lightning rod. Because an emergency manager has the ability to pass many
reforms, considering or implementing one could unify reformers. It may of
course also unify those opposed to reform. But as the summer of 2020 showed,
in a political economy that would allow for the passage of a policing emergency
manager law, and especially a strong emergency manager law, it is likely that
the reformers would have the upper hand in a proverbial one-on-one battle.
2. Externalities
Beyond their structural-problem-solving potential, there are localities
where a policing emergency manager can have the same externality-reducing
function as fiscal emergency managers. This is for several reasons. The most
obvious is the simple fact that people regularly travel across multiple police
jurisdictions. Because policing is a local exercise, this means that there are
people who will interact with a police force, who have no say in how that force
is run. An emergency manager can help fix the negative effects of this
democratic deficit. Second, and relatedly, the various psychological and
sociological harms discussed in Section I.C are not limited by the jurisdictional
boundaries of a department, and so a police department’s actions could have
significant statewide, or even national, effects. Finally, the liability for a police
force’s civil rights violations could overwhelm a local fisc, creating the potential
that some larger unit of government—the county, state, or even a more solvent
nearby locality—will be pressured into assuming responsibility.
Perhaps the paradigmatic example of this last phenomenon is East
Cleveland, Ohio. The East Cleveland Police Department has engaged in what
can only be described as flagrant legal violations over the years and now has the
enormous liabilities to match. One Ohio jury awarded a plaintiff sideswiped by

348. See, e.g., Catherine L. Fisk & L. Song Richardson, Police Unions, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
712, 721 (2017) (analyzing “fifty years’ worth of instances in which cities have implemented reforms to
reduce police violence and improve police-community relations” and finding that “[a]ll of the proposed
reforms involved the cooperation of the rank-and-file, and many involved active cooperation with the
union”).
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a police cruiser going over seventy miles per hour over $11 million.349 Another
jury awarded three wrongfully convicted men $5 million each.350 Still another
man was awarded $50 million after East Cleveland police beat him while he was
in handcuffs and then locked him in a storage room for four days without food
or a restroom.351
As heinous as these cases are, other governments in Ohio likely would not
be affected by them if it were not for the fact that East Cleveland is, to be blunt,
broke.352 So broke, in fact, that the city’s law director once said if several
wrongfully convicted men suing the city won, “They would just have to get
behind the other judgment holders.”353 Virtually assured that they cannot collect
from East Cleveland, civil rights litigants have turned to pushing for the state
to cover East Cleveland’s debts.354 East Cleveland, too, has long pushed to
merge with neighboring Cleveland as a potential solution to its financial
shortfalls, shortfalls that have been massively exacerbated by civil rights
judgments.355 Higher levels of Ohio government—whether the state, the
county, or even the city of Cleveland—thus have a significant incentive to solve
the policing emergency in East Cleveland.
As Gillette has noted, that incentive to prevent externalities has long
motivated (or at least justified), the use of emergency managers in the fiscal
context.356 Here, it has the additional benefit of expanding the range of political
actors who might be willing to create a policing-emergency-manager regime.
While a policing emergency manager in many scenarios is likely to be a liberalled reform, under this externality paradigm, conservatives too may approve, or

349. Phil Trexler, Ohio Taxpayers May Pay East Cleveland Legal Bill, WKYC (Apr. 12, 2019, 12:08
AM), https://www.wkyc.com/article/news/investigations/the-investigator-ohio-taxpayers-may-pay-ea
st-cleveland-legal-bill/95-dfbac413-b6e2-4c75-9b6a-fe504487a3b5 [https://perma.cc/B467-GYCM].
350. Cory Shaffer, Judge Finds East Cleveland Law Director Acted Unethically in Wrongful
Imprisonment Case, Disqualifies Her from Representing Police Officers, CLEVELAND.COM (May 13, 2020,
1:30 PM), https://www.cleveland.com/court-justice/2020/05/judge-finds-east-cleveland-law-directoracted-unethically-in-wrongful-imprisonment-case-disqualifies-her-from-representing-police-officers.
html [https://perma.cc/Z892-HCQ8].
351. Cory Shaffer, Jury Awards $50 Million to Man Beaten, Locked in East Cleveland Police
Department Storage Room, CLEVELAND.COM (Aug. 9, 2019, 5:21 PM), https://www.cleveland.com/
court-justice/2019/08/jury-awards-50-million-to-man-beaten-locked-in-east-cleveland-police-depart
ment-storage-room.html [https://perma.cc/G2SM-DSW7].
352. See Alexia Fernandez Campbell, A Suburb on the Brink of Bankruptcy, ATLANTIC (June 8, 2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/06/a-suburb-on-the-brink-of-bankruptcy/486188/
[https://perma.cc/C2PM-8586 (dark archive)].
353. Eric Heisig, Federal Judge Sanctions East Cleveland for Suggesting Comatose Detective Should Be
Deposed in Lawsuit, CLEVELAND.COM, https://www.cleveland.com/court-justice/2017/11/federal_
judge_sanctions_east_c.html [https://perma.cc/M6TC-CP8M] (Jan. 11, 2019, 2:47 PM).
354. See Trexler, supra note 349.
355. See Campbell, supra note 352.
356. See Gillette, Dictatorships, supra note 216, at 1445.
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even champion, it. Indeed, this same sort of fiscal justification has led to
bipartisan efforts to reduce mass incarceration.357
3. Hard Choices
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, an emergency manager is likely to
accomplish necessary reforms that political actors have the power and personal
desire, but not the political will, to complete. One might call this the “hard
choices” function of emergency management.358 While it may be the most
important function, it is also the most controversial. Ideally, politically
accountable actors would take the actions necessary to best advance the public
interest. But especially in the policing context, for a variety of reasons that does
not happen.
Police, as I have discussed, have been especially resistant to reforms. As
numerous commentators have noted, police exist in a distorted political
marketplace. Federal attempts at reform are limited even in the best of times.359
And there is reason to think that those reforms, while initially successful, do
not stick without continued buy-in from police leadership.360 Moreover, the
federal consent decree process can be financially costly and, because of that cost,
may lead to public backlash as taxes are raised or services are cut.361 Past
attempts at state-level reform have often been no better.362 Those people most
affected by the police’s brutality, in turn, are disproportionately excluded from
democratic processes.363 And police unions then magnify these problems by
putting up roadblocks to officer accountability through both their negotiated
contracts and lobbying for statutory protection like officer bills of rights.364

357. See John F. Pfaff, The Complicated Economics of Prison Reform, 114 MICH. L. REV. 951, 951–52
(2016).
358. The hard choices function of emergency management has some similarity to its ability to cut
through structural impediments. See supra Section III.A.1. But the hard-choices function differs in
focus. While structural impediments are about simplifying complexity that stifles reform, hard choices
are about a lack of political willpower to act in the public interest. These two obstacles, however, often
work in concert, and there is not always a hard line between them.
359. See Sunita Patel, Toward Democratic Police Reform: A Vision for Community Engagement
Provisions in DOJ Consent Decrees, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 793, 794–95 (2016) (noting that the
Obama DOJ opened thirty-six investigations into police departments).
360. See Rushin, Structural Reform Litigation, supra note 202, at 410–11.
361. See O’Rourke et al., supra note 338, at 1345.
362. Id.
363. Id. at 1345–46 (citing Monica C. Bell, Police Reform and the Dismantling of Legal Estrangement,
126 YALE L.J. 2054, 2142–44 (2017)).
364. Id. at 1347; see also Fair Police Contracts, CAMPAIGN ZERO, https://www.joincampaignzero.
org/contracts/ [https://perma.cc/U9CS-WGLW]; Stephen Rushin, Police Union Contracts, 66 DUKE
L.J. 1191, 1208–09 (2017).
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Moreover, the very constitutional doctrine attempting to regulate police may
instead serve to further insulate them from political pressure.365
And those are just the legal ways that the political marketplace around
police has been distorted. As discussed above, too often police work amongst
and perpetuate a culture of cover-up: where perjury is so common that it has a
cute name—“testilying”366—documents are falsified; and those who dare to
speak out, whether officer or civilian, are retaliated against.367
This twisted political landscape has several ramifications. Most obviously,
it means that passing lasting substantive reforms through the traditional
political process is likely to be more difficult than one would otherwise expect.
But just as importantly, it means that even if political actors have both the desire
and the power to pass reforms, they may not be able to cross the political
minefield necessary to enact those reforms.
A sufficiently empowered emergency manager could overcome all of these
hurdles. Both contractual and statutory officer bills of rights could be
overridden. An obstinate police chief could be replaced with a more reformminded one. Incentives for the rank and file could be realigned to ensure those
who engage in wrongful or illegal behavior, such as perpetuating the code of
silence, face consequences, and those who live up to the motto that police
“protect and serve” are rewarded. And an emergency manager could give cover
to those political actors who might desire change, but nevertheless do not have
the political will to enact it. Indeed, this last phenomenon has been observed in
the context of forced police reform elsewhere.368 More radically, an emergency
manager could begin the process of fundamentally rethinking what we mean
when we talk about public safety and make tangible changes to further that new
vision.369
I have suggested reasons that an emergency manager may be a more
feasible tool for police reform than those we have previously utilized. But I end
this section by noting that despite these reasons, the process of addressing the
policing emergency through an emergency manager is, like virtually all police
reform, a gargantuan political lift. In some places, especially given the political
365. See William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV. 780,
792–94 (2006).
366. See I. Bennett Capers, Crime, Legitimacy, and Testilying, 83 IND. L.J. 835, 836 (2008).
367. See infra notes 398–400 and accompanying text; see also CIV. RTS. DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.
& U.S. ATT’Y’S OFF. N. DIST. OF ILL., INVESTIGATION OF THE CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT
51 (2017) [hereinafter CHICAGO DOJ REPORT], https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/925846/download
[https://perma.cc/983X-ZT49].
368. See Rushin, Structural Reform Litigation, supra note 202, at 1404 (noting that DOJ civil rights
litigation “also appears to be uniquely successful because it provides police chiefs with legal cover to
implement top-down reforms”).
369. Cf. Gillette, Dictatorships, supra note 216, at 1395–404 (discussing the potential for structural
changes to government during an emergency manager’s tenure); Barry Friedman, What Is Public Safety?,
102 B.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 11–13) (on file with author).
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valence of and structural issues within states versus cities,370 it may well be
impossible.
Nevertheless, I note that the question of political feasibility is distinct
from that of legal and theoretical possibility. This Article is concerned primarily
with the latter issues both because the novelty of the proposal means that it is
impossible to predict the exact political economy necessary for its success and
because the political likelihood of a policing emergency manager in any given
place will depend on both the specifics of the proposal and the vagaries of state
and local politics in that place at that time.
The rest of this part will turn to the questions that political actors should
ask as they attempt to empower policing emergency managers. In answering
these questions, I seek to shed light on the various benefits, drawbacks, and
trade-offs that are inherent to policing emergency managers.371
B.

What Goals?

At its core, the policing emergency is about one word: violence. Solving
the policing emergency, then, would seem to require reducing the police’s
ability to inflict violence. Success for an emergency manager, concurrently,
would mean that unnecessary police violence has been lessened, if not
eliminated, and that when police do wrongfully commit violence, they face
appropriate consequences.
But there are numerous pathways to achieving that broad goal. Some argue
that better training is the answer.372 Others suggest that building stronger bonds
between police and the communities they serve is the path.373 Still others say
that democratic control over the police,374 or defunding or abolishing the police

370. See, e.g., Nestor M. Davidson & Richard C. Schragger, Do Local Governments Really Have Too
Much Power? Understanding the National League of Cities’ Principles of Home Rule for the Twenty-First
Century, 100 N.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 1); Miriam Seifter, Further from the
People? The Puzzle of State Administration, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 107, 107 (2018) (identifying a lack of civil
society oversight at the state level).
371. While current emergency manager statutes, or perhaps even emergency statutes more
generally, might allow for some of the benefits of a dedicated policing emergency manager statute, as
these questions will show, the potential position of policing emergency manager is a sufficiently distinct
enterprise such that creating a new statute is ideal. See infra note 442 and accompanying text.
372. See, e.g., Seth W. Stoughton, How Police Training Contributes to Avoidable Deaths, ATLANTIC
(Dec. 12, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2014/12/police-gun-shooting-trainingferguson/383681/ [https://perma.cc/ECN2-LPW8 (dark archive)].
373. See Community Policing, BUREAU JUST. STAT., https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=81
[https://perma.cc/Z8BQ-CE3C] (defining community policing as “[a] philosophy promoting
organizational strategies that support the systematic use of partnerships and problem-solving
techniques between the police and the community”).
374. See, e.g., Joshua Kleinfeld, Manifesto of Democratic Criminal Justice, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1367,
1367 (2017) (offering “a full-throated defense of the democratic criminal justice vision”).

100 N.C. L. REV. 1209 (2022)

2022]

MANAGING THE POLICE EMERGENCY

1271

entirely,375 is necessary. These are far from all of the possibilities,376 and each of
these positions has its detractors.377
The choice between these many approaches is far beyond the scope of this
Article. Further still, which policy choices an emergency manager is empowered
to pursue, and which will be most effective, likely depends on the political
economy of each place that wishes to create an emergency manager.
There are, however, two nonsubstantive goals that an emergency manager
should pursue. First, she should ensure that her chosen solutions do not
unintentionally increase or entrench the police’s power. Second, she should
work to prevent backsliding after her tenure.
One of the most potent lessons from modern abolitionist teachings is that
not all reforms are created equal. Too often, attempts to “fix” the police instead
result in expanding their power. Calls for training, for example, can simply
expand police budgets without changes to police behavior,378 and attempts to
diversify the force can lead to expanding the force while making minimal
substantive changes to how the police operate.379
To counter this, I suggest that emergency managers focus on
implementing what Ruth Wilson Gilmore and others have called “non-

375. See, e.g., Kaba, supra note 90 (advocating for abolishing the police).
376. See, e.g., Tracey Meares, Policing and Procedural Justice: Shaping Citizens’ Identities To Increase
Democratic Participation, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1525, 1532–35 (2017) (discussing the power and appeal of
procedural justice, as well as President Barack Obama’s Task Force on Twenty-First Century Policing,
which “made recommendations to build trust and legitimacy of policing, the foundational pillar on
which all of our other recommendations rested”).
377. See, e.g., Phillip Atiba Goff, A Better Solution for Starbucks, N.Y. TIMES (May 30, 2018),
http://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/30/opinion/starbucks-unconscious-bias-training.html [http://perma
.cc/K7SA-434X (dark archive)] (arguing that “[i]nstead of training sessions, Starbucks could make
more of a difference by helping cities fund non-police options for people worried about suspicious
behaviors”); Philip V. McHarris, Community Policing Is Not the Answer, APPEAL (Dec. 2, 2019),
https://theappeal.org/community-policing-is-not-the-answer/ [https://perma.cc/H36N-AA9G]; John
Rappaport, Some Doubts About “Democratizing” Criminal Justice, 87 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 739–807 (2020);
Paul H. Robinson, Opinion, Don’t Abolish the Police. It Didn’t Work for 1960s Communes and It Won’t
Work for Us., USA TODAY (June 21, 2020, 6:00 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/
2020/06/21/abolishing-police-unworkable-1960-s-communes-2020-cities-column/3216029001/ [http://
perma.cc/VX6D-KTA9].
378. See Patrick S. Forscher, Calvin K. Lai, Jordan R. Axt, Charles R. Ebersole, Michelle Herman,
Patricia G. Devine & Brian A. Nosek, A Meta-Analysis of Procedures To Change Implicit Measures, 117 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 522, 544–45 (2019); Robert J. Smith, Reducing Racially Disparate Policing
Outcomes: Is Implicit Bias Training the Answer?, 37 U. HAW. L. REV. 295, 306 (2015).
379. See JAMES FORMAN JR., LOCKING UP OUR OWN: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN BLACK
AMERICA 78 (2017) (discussing how some Black officers in Washington, D.C., were disdainful of the
Black people they policed). But see Bocar A. Ba, Dean Knox, Jonathan Mummolo & Roman Rivera,
The Role of Officer Race and Gender in Police-Civilian Interactions in Chicago, 371 SCIENCE 696, 696 (2021)
(finding that Black, Hispanic, and female officers in Chicago make fewer stops and arrests and use less
force that white and male officers, though racial disparities are not eliminated).
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reformist reforms.”380 Non-reformist reforms are “those measures that reduce
the power of an oppressive system while illuminating the system’s inability to
solve the crises it creates.”381 By expressing the goal that an emergency manager
operate within the framework of non-reformist reforms, emergency managers
will be able to focus on changes that “will undermine the prevailing political,
economic, social system from reproducing itself and make more possible a
radically different political, economic, social system.”382
Non-reformist reforms’ focus on radical systemic change may seem
incompatible with some forms of the emergency manager, such as one that
primarily provides oversight or expert advice with no or limited powers to
intervene. But policing, for a variety of reasons, has shown itself especially able
to reinforce and protect itself from a full accounting of its wrongs, even in the
face of massive public opposition.383 Even an independent oversight body is
likely to need to undertake systemic changes—such as tearing down the
infamous Blue Wall of Silence—in order to fulfill its transparency and advising
functions.
Indeed, an emergency manager might choose to pursue policies that are
both favored by traditional reformers and ultimately non-reformist. An example
of such reforms is curtailing the police’s ability to use force through changes to
a use-of-force policy, combined with shifting review for violations of that policy
to an empowered citizen’s oversight board. These policies are non-reformist
because they shift power away from the police—the power to take certain
violent actions and the power to say those actions were justified—thereby
undermining the prevailing status quo. But, they are also the sort of internal
governance and democratization changes that traditional reformers have long
sought.
Second, and relatedly, emergency managers should have the express goal
of preventing backsliding to the pre-emergency manager status quo. Backsliding

380. See RUTH WILSON GILMORE, GOLDEN GULAG: PRISONS, SURPLUS, CRISIS, AND
OPPOSITION GLOBALIZING CALIFORNIA 242 (2007); Amna A. Akbar, Demands for a Democratic
Political Economy, 134 HARV. L. REV. F. 90, 98–106 (2020) (citing ANDRE GORZ, STRATEGY FOR
LABOR: A RADICAL PROPOSAL 7 (Martin A. Nicolaus & Victoria Ortiz trans., 1967) (discussing nonreformist reforms).
381. Dan Berger, Mariame Kaba & David Stein, What Abolitionists Do, JACOBIN (Aug. 24, 2017),
https://www.jacobinmag.com/2017/08/prison-abolition-reform-mass-incarceration [https://perma.cc/
RV4D-LEF2 (dark archive)]; see also GILMORE, supra note 380, at 242 (similarly defining nonreformist reforms as “changes that, at the end of the day, unravel rather than widen the net of social
control through criminalization”).
382. Akbar, supra note 380, at 104.
383. See O’Rourke et al., supra note 338, at 1337–54 (discussing structural obstacles to police
reform, including lack of political will, police unions, police culture, and policy trade-offs inherent in
reform).

100 N.C. L. REV. 1209 (2022)

2022]

MANAGING THE POLICE EMERGENCY

1273

is a problem that past structural reform litigation has faced, and so an emergency
manager should stay especially attuned to the possibility.384
This goal would require emergency managers to engage in reforms that
are “sticky,” meaning those difficult to overturn through normal processes. The
most obvious way to do this is by requiring a supermajority to undo the
emergency manager’s work.385 But as the police themselves have shown,
stickiness can also be created through institutional design. The Minneapolis
example shows this clearly. Despite amassing the political will to get the
majority of the city council to vote to disband the police department, they were
stopped by an unelected commission.386 After that, the original political will for
major change largely dissipated.387 Other examples abound throughout the
United States’ governmental structures.388
C.

What Powers?

If a policing emergency manager has been given the goal of eliminating
the physical, psychological, and sociological harms that flow from police
violence to the greatest extent possible, what powers does she need to meet this
goal? That answer depends on how she has been told to accomplish her goals.
An emergency manager’s substantive powers can broadly be put into the
continuum discussed above: from those that allow her to provide oversight and
advice to giving her full dictatorial control. An emergency manager can likely
reduce police violence with any of these powers. Regardless of which
substantive powers she has, however, an emergency manager will also need both
truth-seeking powers and the power to remove structural blockades to reform
in order to have any hope of substantive change.

384. See Rushin, supra note 202, at 1410–12.
385. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 141.1549(6)(c) (Westlaw through P.A.2022, No. 4, of
the 2022 Reg. Sess., 101st Leg.) (requiring a two-thirds vote to remove the emergency manager); see
also, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029, 1047–50 (2004) (describing
a proposal for increasingly large supermajorities to vote to continue a state of emergency); Adrian
Vermeule, Self-Defeating Proposals: Ackerman on Emergency Powers, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 631, 632
(2006) (discussing Ackerman’s “supermajoritarian escalator” proposal).
386. Herndon, supra note 24.
387. Martin Kaste, Minneapolis Voters Reject a Measure To Replace the City’s Police Department, NPR,
https://www.npr.org/2021/11/02/1051617581/minneapolis-police-vote [https://perma.cc/383Y-XAUE]
(Nov. 3, 2021, 12:25 AM).
388. See, e.g., Herz-Roiphe & Grewal, supra note 334, at 1983–84 (“Our frequently derided ‘donothing Congress,’ for example, does not ‘do nothing’ because it finds the status quo ideal—it does
nothing because it is incapable of actively choosing anything.”); Michael J. Teter, Gridlock, Legislative
Supremacy, and the Problem of Arbitrary Inaction, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2217, 2230 (2013)
(describing an instance of congressional gridlock where a single Senator was able to stop more than
eighty pieces of legislation that had early enjoyed bipartisan support).
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1. Substantive Powers
Oversight and advice powers allow an emergency manager to identify
problems within the police force and to recommend changes before those
problems fester and become worse. If, for example, community police meetings
begin to become combustible or sparsely attended, an emergency manager could
recommend steps to remedy the problem before the entire community-policing
program falls into desuetude.389 And as noted above, effectively implemented
oversight powers will likely require structural changes to the systems and
culture that protect police officers from accountability. More than any other
manager, however, an emergency manager charged primarily with oversight and
advising a police force would need to rely on her powers of persuasion, and so
some expertise that police, politicians, and the community would respect, along
with the need to be able to communicate with these varying constituencies, is
vital. This expertise need not sit entirely within one person. For these reasons
an emergency manager charged with oversight and advice might instead be best
constituted as a multimember board with representatives from varying
constituencies.
Moving from oversight and advice to the ability to unilaterally implement
change, perhaps the most useful power an emergency manager tackling the
policing emergency can have is the ability to change a police department’s useof-force policy and the discipline that accompanies violations of that policy.390
In a way, this seems obvious. If the core of the emergency is violence, the ability
to control when police use violence seems crucial. But key to this power is not
only the ability to set the policy, but also to set and ensure discipline. It is a
mainstay of deterrence theory that certainty of punishment is more valuable to
controlling behavior than uncertain, but severe, consequences.391 Assuming that
police are relatively rational actors, it seems unlikely that any utility they gain
from committing violence in all but the most extreme scenarios outweighs the

389. See, e.g., Nissa Rhee, Manny Ramos & Andrea Salcedo, The Rise and Fall of Community Policing
in Chicago, CHI. READER (Sept. 22, 2016), https://www.chicagoreader.com/chicago/caps-cpdcommunity-policing-analysis/Content?oid=23635982 [https://perma.cc/CS5D-AUDH] (relaying the
story of Chicago’s failed foray into community policing).
390. At its most powerful, this would include the power to disarm officers in some or all situations,
such as setting a use-of-force policy that disallows the use of certain weapons. While this may seem
extreme, it may not make a huge difference in the day-to-day lives of officers given that nearly threequarters of them have never fired their service weapon outside of training. See Rich Morin & Andrew
Mercer, A Closer Look at Police Officers Who Have Fired Their Weapon on Duty, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Feb.
8, 2017), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/02/08/a-closer-look-at-police-officers-whohave-fired-their-weapon-on-duty/ [https://perma.cc/CAN2-6SSX].
391. See Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76
HARV. L. REV. 441, 452 n.21 (1963) (“It is of course a commonplace of classical criminal-law theory
that certainty and immediacy of punishment are more crucial elements of effective deterrence than its
severity.”).
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possibility of certain and material discipline, such as an inability to be promoted,
firing, or referring them for criminal prosecution.
Even if an emergency manager cannot rewrite the use-of-force policy
unilaterally, there are numerous other powers that a state might like to imbue
an emergency manager with short of giving her dictatorial control. For example,
the ability to contravene the collective bargaining agreement to create new
disciplinary procedures would at least ensure that the current use-of-force
policy is being followed strictly and that officers are not escaping the
consequences of their actions through opaque or tilted disciplinary
procedures.392
But to truly end the policing emergency, an emergency manager will likely
need near dictatorial control over not only the police, but also issues of public
safety more broadly. Remember, the policing emergency is not only about the
flashpoints that lead to massive protests and public outcry. Instead, the policing
emergency is about the broader harms—physical, psychological, and
sociological—that police cause. Fixing this emergency likely requires not only
the power to destroy, but the power to create. I argued earlier that one of a
policing emergency manager’s goals should be to ensure that the changes she
brings about are not subject to immediate backsliding. It seems that nothing
could create a greater risk of backsliding than removing or disempowering
police—often the only avenue the state provides to safeguard a person’s safety
and security—while replacing them with nothing.393
A policing emergency manager, then, would ideally be empowered to
create non-police alternatives to the many public safety issues that arise that do
not require the omnipresent threat of violence. Doing so would require an
emergency manager to have the power to either retrain police to respond to
calls not as law enforcement, but as social workers, mental health counselors, or
as all-around nonviolent problem solvers, or to hire new people in their place.394
Retraining would allow police to retain positions as city workers, thereby
preventing the massive displacement that the alternative—firing the police and
hiring people who already have that training—would cause. Of course, some
police would not (or could not) take on these new tasks, and so the emergency

392. See, e.g., O’Rourke et al., supra note 338, at 1348–49 (“Several classic studies describe the
culture of rank-and-file policing as one of violence and hostility toward those who seek to check it.
Updating this literature, Professor Barbara Armacost has shown how the organizational structures of
modern police departments incentivize aggressive policing while facilitating systemic misconduct.”).
393. See FORMAN, supra note 379, at 122–23 (arguing that the growth of Black carcerality in
Washington, D.C., was in part due to it being the only option presented despite a desire for broader
social reforms).
394. See, e.g., #8TOABOLITION, supra note 83 (highlighting several “community-led models of
building safety and collective care” that seek to address problems as wide-ranging as community
violence, sexual assault, and housing).
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manager would also need the power to terminate them (or to move them to
some other government job) and to hire new people in their stead.
Importantly, even if an emergency manager is not fully empowered to solve
the policing emergency, there are many steps she might take towards
ameliorating it. Foremost among them would be to remove police from
situations where they are unnecessary. Routine traffic enforcement does not
require an armed officer to be present and in fact can be more effectively
handled without police intervention in many cases.395 Mental health calls and
safety checks similarly do not seem to require an armed response.396 Yet both
scenarios have turned deadly when police became involved.397
2. Removing Structural Blockades and Truth-Seeking Powers
The power to cut through structural blockades and to seek the truth is
necessary for any emergency manager, but is especially necessary for a policing
emergency manager. Much has been written about the many legal and cultural
impediments to holding police accountable for their actions.398 The “Blue Wall
of Silence,” the culture of police to jealously guard each other’s secrets and
harshly punish anyone who does not fall in line, is infamous.399 As the president
395. See Sarah A. Seo, A Path to Non-Police Enforcement of Civil Traffic Violations, JUST. COLLAB.
INST. (Aug. 24, 2020), https://tjcinstitute.com/research/a-path-to-non-police-enforcement-of-civiltraffic-violations/ [https://perma.cc/MC8Y-QGVW] (arguing for removing armed police from civil
traffic enforcement and increasing the use of automation); TRANSP. ALTS., THE CASE FOR SELFENFORCING STREETS 12–19 (2020), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5cab9d9b65a707a9b36f4
b6c/t/5eec1235fe73d720da412589/1592529462229/CaseForSelfEnforcingStreets.pdf [https://perma.cc
/XYH5-7L5U] (arguing for increasing safety of public streets through city planning and automation).
See generally SARAH A. SEO, POLICING THE OPEN ROAD: HOW CARS TRANSFORMED AMERICAN
FREEDOM (2019) (examining how the rise of the car led to more intrusive policing and serious
consequences for racial equality in the criminal justice system).
396. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 196.
397. Charles Kinsey. See Police in Fla. Shoot Caretaker Next to Autistic Man Playing in Street, CBS
NEWS (July 20, 2016, 10:56 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/police-in-florida-shoot-caretakernext-to-autistic-man-playing-in-the-street/ [https://perma.cc/W5LS-WCW5]. Atatiana Jefferson. See
Maria Trahan Martinez, Nicholas Bogel-Burroughs & Dave Montgomery, Woman Was Playing Video
Game with Her Nephew When Shot by Fort Worth Police, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 13, 2019), https://www.
nytimes.com/2019/10/13/us/fort-worth-texas-shooting-jefferson.html [https://perma.cc/9HRJ-XXQA
(dark archive)] (reporting on the police shooting of Atatiana Jefferson, who was shot in her home after
a neighbor called to report two doors ajar).
398. See, e.g., Huq & McAdams, supra note 35, at 240–52 (discussing legal attacks on delay
privileges for police officers); Christopher Slobogin, Testilying: Police Perjury and What To Do About It,
67 U. COLO. L. REV. 1037, 1039 (1996) (discussing “testilying,” the police’s ability to lie under oath
and get away with it); Allison Patton, The Endless Cycle of Abuse: Why 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Is Ineffective in
Deterring Police Brutality, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 753, 760 (1993) (discussing the failures of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983).
399. See, e.g., Nicole Gonzalez Van Cleve, The Chicago Culture That Created Jason Van Dyke,
ATLANTIC (Oct. 9, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/10/laquan-mcdonaldsdeath-almost-didnt-come-light/572476/ [https://perma.cc/4Y59-QV79 (dark archive)] (describing a
culture of officers shading testimony at best, outright lying at worst, and intimidating anyone who tried
to stop them); see also CHICAGO DOJ REPORT, supra note 367, at 46–93 (describing numerous ways
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of the police officer’s union for the Chicago Police Department explained,
“there’s a code of silence everywhere, everybody has it . . . so why would the
[Chicago Police] be any different.”400 Some impediments, like qualified
immunity, are largely outside of any emergency manager’s control.401 There is
little, after all, that a state-created emergency manager can do about the state of
Fourth Amendment law or other constitutional doctrines.
But impediments that an emergency manager cannot touch are few and far
between. Most of the structural impediments to reform are creatures either of
state and local law or of culture. As discussed above, with some limitations, both
state and local governments can abrogate most contracts, including collective
bargaining agreements, when the public good demands it.402 This is a power
that can be passed on to an emergency manager. An emergency manager, in
turn, could use this power to defang those provisions of the collective bargaining
agreement that shield officers from accountability. Similarly, as in Michigan,403
an emergency manager’s enabling statute could supersede other state or local
laws—like a law enforcement officer’s bill of rights404—that might provide
police with enhanced procedural protections that too often serve to allow them
to escape accountability.
Even cultural impediments are not beyond an emergency manager’s touch.
Here, broad truth-seeking powers, combined with the power to hire, fire, and
discipline, are most useful. Any policing emergency will require the power to
subpoena both documents and testimony, as well as the power to act on that
information and to make discovered information public. In turn, managers will
also need the power to protect officers from retaliation who cooperate with their
the Chicago Police Department and city created deficient accountability mechanisms); id. at 75
(quoting one sergeant as saying “if someone comes forward as a whistleblower in the Department, they
are dead on the street”).
400. Van Cleve, supra note 399, at 74 (alterations in original).
401. See generally Aziz Z. Huq, Judicial Independence and the Rationing of Constitutional Remedies, 65
DUKE L.J. 1 (2015) (analyzing the doctrinal instruments federal courts use to allocate scarce
adjudicative resources over competing demands for constitutional remedies). But see Adam Davidson,
Procedural Losses and the Pyrrhic Victory of Abolishing Qualified Immunity, 99 WASH. U. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2022) (arguing that qualified immunity may be less of an impediment to accountability
than it is often portrayed).
402. But see Kanerva v. Weems, 13 N.E.3d 1228, 1244 (Ill. 2014) (holding that the Illinois
Constitution’s Pension and Retirement Rights Clause, ILL. CONST. art. XIII, § 5, prohibited the
legislature from altering certain state employee health benefits). While this Article brackets state
constitutional issues, cases like Kanerva display how any state wishing to utilize an emergency manager
will have to grapple with the intricacies of state constitutional law, in addition to federal constitutional
challenges.
403. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 141.1552(i), (ff) (Westlaw through P.A.2022, No. 4, of
the 2022 Reg. Sess., 101st Leg.).
404. See Rebecca Tan, There’s a Reason It’s Hard To Discipline Police. It Starts with a Bill of Rights 47
Years Ago., WASH. POST (Aug. 29, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/history/2020/08/
29/police-bill-of-rights-officers-discipline-maryland/ [https://perma.cc/K33C-LFEF (dark archive)]
(discussing the advent of the “Law Enforcement Officers Bill of Rights”).
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investigations, and to discipline those who seek to obfuscate or retaliate. If a
police department is sufficiently obstinate, this may mean that mass turnover is
necessary and an emergency manager should have the power to take that step.405
A final note about an emergency manager’s powers: While the education
context shows that emergency managers can be created by governments on
either the state or the local level, the nature of local power, which is derived
from the state, means that state-created emergency managers will always be
more powerful than those created on the local level. More importantly, this
means that a locality creating an emergency manager must always be mindful
of its subordinate role and of the possibility that the state will undermine its
attempts.406 In places where the state and city have different political
allegiances, this lurking threat from the state can serve as a significant check on
what an emergency manager may be empowered to do.
D.

What Limits?

Once a city or state has chosen the goals and powers of its emergency
manager, what limits should it place on those powers? There are three types of
limits that might constrict an emergency manager: express limits; political
checks; and the end of the emergency manager’s tenure. Express limits on an
emergency manager’s power should be rare. Because emergency managers are
called to address emergencies, the governments empowering them should
recognize that actions that would be considered drastic in a nonemergency
situation may be necessary. It therefore seems advisable not to rule out options
ex ante. Michigan provides an example of the sort of protection from extreme
action that an emergency manager might understandably be prevented from
taking: it forbids emergency managers from cancelling death benefits for the
survivors of police officers and firefighters killed in the line of duty.407 Similar
express limits might seek to protect actions that cannot be undone after an
405. Compare the successes and failures of progressive district attorneys in Philadelphia, where
Larry Krasner was able to fire assistant district attorneys hostile to his efforts, and in Los Angeles,
where antireform lower-level district attorneys with civil service protections sued newly elected
District Attorney George Gascon to stop his reforms. See Chris Palmer, Julie Shaw & Mensah M.
Dean, Krasner Dismisses 31 from Philly DA’s Office in Dramatic First-Week Shakeup, PHILA. INQUIRER
(Jan. 5, 2018), https://www.inquirer.com/philly/news/crime/larry-krasner-philly-da-firing-prosecutors
-20180105.html-2 [https://perma.cc/ZSM7-Q9QC]; Eric Leonard & Andrew Blankstein, Prosecutors To
Ask Court To Stop Some of New District Attorney’s Reform Directives, NBC 4 (Dec. 29, 2020),
https://www.nbclosangeles.com/news/local/prosecutors-to-ask-court-to-stop-some-of-new-districtattorneys-reform-directives/2495114/ [https://perma.cc/V2HG-UK9X] (discussing the restraining
order sought by the Association of Deputy District Attorneys to stop some of newly elected District
Attorney George Gascon’s reform efforts).
406. See, e.g., Joshua S. Sellers & Erin A. Scharff, Preempting Politics: State Power and Local
Democracy, 72 STAN. L. REV. 1361, 1383–92 (2020); Richard C. Schragger, The Attack on American
Cities, 96 TEX. L. REV. 1163, 1170–83 (2018) [hereinafter Schragger, The Attack on American Cities].
407. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 141.1555(2) (Westlaw through P.A.2022, No. 4, of the 2022
Reg. Sess., 101st Leg.).
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emergency manager’s tenure, like destroying or selling something of natural or
historical significance.
Political checks on an emergency manager’s actions should also be
relatively rare, though not as rare as express limits. As discussed above, political
checks on an emergency manager can come from above—meaning from
whoever created and appointed the emergency manager—or from below—from
the people over whom the emergency manager exercises her power.408
While a number of emergency manager statutes have significant political
checks from above, allowing the governor or other appointing official to remove
the emergency manager at will, this can create a corrupting influence. Having
this sort of strong political check ensures that instead of being the dispassionate,
technocratic expert an idealized emergency manager is meant to be, the
emergency manager becomes another appointed political agent.409 This sort of
strong political check from above is especially problematic in places where the
state and locality have opposing politics. There, the emergency manager is in
its most antidemocratic form. Instead, political checks from above, to the extent
they exist at all, should only exist to review an emergency manager’s decisions
that would be most prone to corruption. For example, the issuing of large
government contracts or sale of government assets should be subject to
review.410
Political checks from below are rarer than those from above in the
educational and fiscal contexts, perhaps for obvious reasons. The regular
democratic process in the locality has led to the emergency, and so the
emergency manager needs to be able to subvert and ignore that process. But the
policing emergency context is different. Here, part of the failure of the
democratic process is that the police have become democratically unaccountable
and antidemocratic. Therefore, introducing political checks from below may
help to fix the emergency. Much of the literature arguing for the
democratization of criminal law suggests exactly this step.411 But communityfocused political checks on the police should not be confused with political checks
on the emergency manager. The former are within democratizers’ ken, the latter
408. Perhaps the most important “political” check on an emergency manager is having a process to
remove her for cause. This check can be subsumed into one of the other political checks, if, for example,
the appointing official has the ability to remove the emergency manager at will. See, e.g., 45 R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 45-9-7(a) (LEXIS through Ch. 429 (all legislation) of the 2021 Sess.) (allowing the director
of revenue to remove the receiver “at any time, and without cause”). A termination-for-cause
limitation, however, seems so obviously necessary as to not merit further discussion.
409. See Gillette, Dictatorships, supra note 216, at 1446 (discussing the “more realistic[]” assumption
“that takeover boards are necessarily political bodies comprising individuals appointed by state
executives who may have an underlying agenda”).
410. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 141.1552(3) (requiring either competitive bidding or
state treasurer review on contracts valued above $50,000); id. § 141.1555(1) (requiring state treasurer
approval of local government assets valued above $50,000).
411. See, e.g., Kleinfeld, supra note 374, at 1367.
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may stifle a manager’s ability to make structural or large changes, becoming a
hindrance to everyone’s goals.
Finally, an emergency manager’s power is limited by the ability to end her
tenure.412 Here, while there are multiple possibilities for what may trigger the
end of an emergency manager’s tenure, one option seems to stand above the
rest. That option is a temporal minimum, followed by a political check from
below. This is functionally Michigan’s system, and in the policing context
adopting it nearly in full makes sense. A sufficiently long period of time—
Michigan allows eighteen months—when the emergency manager does not have
to worry about being removed allows her to take action as her mandate and
expertise command. Then, once she has had enough time to implement changes
and for the locality to see those changes’ effects, either the locality’s elected
officials or its citizens can vote to decide whether to continue her tenure.
Alternately, an emergency manager’s tenure might end based on some
predecided objective metrics. In the policing emergency context, this means
finding metrics that signify long-lasting decreases in police violence and the
harms that flow from it. As discussed above regarding non-reformist reforms
and stickiness, that a metric account for the lastingness of the change is key. For
example, an emergency manager’s tenure should not end because the amount of
police violence dropped if the only reason for that drop was a work slowdown.
While a slowdown may have the intended effect of reducing the opportunity
for police to engage in violence,413 it represents at most a temporary reprieve
from the norm.
However a state or locality chooses to end an emergency manager’s tenure,
what is most important is that they do ensure her tenure ends. An extended or
even semipermanent emergency manager may be appropriate if that manager’s
role is to oversee or provide expert advice to the local government.414 But, as
the history of educational emergency managers shows, without a clear end point
for an emergency manager’s tenure, what began as a seizure of local control to
deal with an emergency can become the new normal.415
E.

Who Should the Manager Be?

Finally, once a government has decided what an emergency manager’s
goals, powers, and limits are, it must figure out who should fill the position.
412. See Gillette, Dictatorships, supra note 216, at 1456–61.
413. See Christopher M. Sullivan & Zachary P. O’Keeffe, Evidence That Curtailing Proactive
Policing Can Reduce Major Crime, 1 NATURE HUM. BEHAV. 730, 733 (2017) (examining the NYPD
slowdown of 2015 and finding that reports of major crimes fell by 3–6% during that slowdown).
414. See STATE ROLE, supra note 219, at 30–32 (discussing the North Carolina Local Government
Commission).
415. See, e.g., MOREL, supra note 249, at 40–44 (noting that the state took over the Central Falls
School District in 1991 and maintained control in 2016); Clark, supra note 330 (discussing the twentyfive-year takeover of Newark schools by New Jersey).
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Here, there are two major decisions: Should the emergency manager be an
individual or a board? And what qualifications should the emergency manager
have?
There are clear trade-offs between having an individual emergency
manager and a board. While an individual manager can act swiftly, she will
necessarily have a narrower field of expertise than a board. By contrast, while a
board presents an opportunity to have representation from diverse
constituencies with varying expertise, the greater number of perspectives
increases the chances of gridlock and may generally slow the decision-making
process. For these reasons, as a manager’s powers shift from providing oversight
and advice to dictatorial control, the likelihood that a board will be the ideal
choice over a single person shifts as well. The board’s broader base of knowledge
is especially useful when its primary goal is to advise others, while the
individual’s ability to act swiftly and decisively is more valuable when she has
many potential choices that she must make.416
Choosing which qualifications to search for in an emergency manager is
similarly a game of trade-offs, though at least in some jurisdictions, it may be
possible to have it all. The two broad categories of qualifications most relevant
to choosing an emergency manager are subject-matter expertise and knowledge
of the community.417 To be clear, by community I do not refer simply to
everyone within a locality’s borders. Instead, I refer primarily to those from a
locality’s community—most likely Black or Brown and economically
deprived—who are most heavily policed.
Subject-matter expertise is most likely to come from academics, longserving law enforcement officers, lawyers, judges, or other professionals who
have operated within or been exposed to the carceral system. Knowledge of the
community is likely to be held by community leaders of civic organizations,
religious leaders, politicians, or even by lifelong citizens. The overlap between
these two groups may not be large, but it is not nonexistent. There are likely to
be subject-matter experts who came from or work within the relevant
communities and whom people in the community trust. This is, nevertheless, a
416. The major downside of a having an individual versus a board, limited expertise, can be blunted
by hiring a panel of expert advisers to aid the individual emergency manager. Indeed, like any person
serving in what is essentially an executive function, forming a “cabinet” of sorts will likely be necessary.
417. A third category, management training, is also important given the scale of the task a policing
emergency manager would be asked to undertake. Management training is not so important, however,
that it should allow those without either subject-matter expertise or community knowledge to be
considered. See, e.g., Ron Fonger, Near Total Authority of Emergency Managers Impacted Flint Water Crisis,
UM Study Says, MLIVE (Apr. 29, 2020, 4:47 PM), https://www.mlive.com/news/flint/2021/09/emshelped-cause-the-flint-water-crisis-and-changed-other-michigan-water-systems-um-study-shows.html
[https://perma.cc/SX6U-Q4LT] (noting that Flint’s emergency manager had no expertise in public
health and quoting that emergency manager as saying that despite his total control over the city’s
operations, “his job here was ‘strictly finance’ and ‘did not include ensuring safe drinking water’”).
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balancing act. An especially prodigious subject-matter expert with no
community ties may be the necessary person to address a complex system like
a police department. Or a noted community leader may be ideal because they
are able to understand the history of the police in the community with a depth
that no subject-matter expert can match.
Ultimately, regardless whether the emergency manager is chosen for her
subject-matter expertise, her community knowledge, or some combination of
the two, the ideal emergency manager will be neutral between interest groups.
For this reason, it is best that whoever is chosen is not a repeat player within
the locality’s carceral system. Choosing an active prosecutor, defense attorney,
police officer, or community leader with ties to a single organization, enhances
the possibility that the emergency manager will serve her interest group, or
worse, her own personal interests, instead of fixing the system as a whole.418
IV. THE ANTIDEMOCRATIC OBJECTION AND OTHER LIMITS
A.

The Antidemocratic Objection

There are many potential objections to what an emergency manager might
do. But most of those objections are tied to the substantive decisions an
emergency manager makes, as opposed to the use of an emergency manager as
a tool to make those decisions. Examples of this difference abound in the fiscal
and educational contexts. Objections to the privatization of city services, sale of
public assets, or the proliferation of charter schools are not intrinsically linked
to emergency management, even if they are the choices that emergency
managers have often made.419 Policing emergency managers will almost
certainly face similar substantive objections, but addressing each of those is
beyond this Article’s scope. There is, however, one class of objection that is tied
to emergency managers as a tool in the policing context. That objection is that
emergency managers are antidemocratic.
The core objection from democracy argues that emergency managers are
an inherently antidemocratic force, and that their antidemocratic nature enables
them to take actions that a polity would never choose for itself and that are
ultimately harmful. Worse still, in a world in which states and cities have
opposing politics, and especially where one political party controls the statelevel government through antidemocratic means like gerrymandering or voter
suppression, the state can use emergency managers to further usurp the political
power that cities possess.420

418. See Gillette, Dictatorships, supra note 216, at 1454–56 (discussing the possibility of self-serving
behavior by takeover boards).
419. See supra Section II.C.
420. Cf. Schragger, The Attack on American Cities, supra note 406, at 1167–68.
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The policing context adds another layer to this critique. An emergency
manager, this objection suggests, adds another antidemocratic layer to an already
antidemocratic institution. While the entire criminal legal system has been
criticized by scholars as antidemocratic,421 as Jocelyn Simonson has argued, “in
policing [the antidemocratic problem] is especially acute because of the
domination inherent in the everyday nature of modern policing.”422 Unlike
budgets controlled by local elected officials, or public schools controlled by
elected school boards, police are already minimally democratically accountable
at best. Even sheriffs, who are usually elected, rarely face any real democratic
pushback.423 Those elections have been undercovered by news organizations,424
and the incumbency advantage for a sitting sheriff is often insurmountable.425
And the accountability of police leaders does not necessarily transfer to
democratic accountability for the many police officers who interact with the
citizenry. When cities have attempted to increase democratic responsiveness
through community oversight boards, they have almost uniformly failed to
create significant change.426 Beyond this, police are also troublingly
421. See, e.g., Janet Moore, Democracy Enhancement in Criminal Law and Procedure, 2014 UTAH L.
REV. 543, 550 (exploring the “democracy deficit” in the criminal legal system and “call[ing] for a
democracy-enhancing theory of criminal law and procedure, which refocuses the traditional
justifications of retributivism, deterrence, and rehabilitation by prioritizing self-governance”); Dorothy
E. Roberts, Democratizing Criminal Law as an Abolitionist Project, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1597, 1599 (2017)
(arguing that “the law enforcement bureaucracy is designed to operate in an anti-democratic manner”
and so “needs an abolitionist . . . approach”); Alexandra Natapoff, Speechless: The Silencing of Criminal
Defendants, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1449, 1453 (2005) (discussing how “[c]riminal defendants . . . are . . .
silenced by constitutional doctrines, criminal rules, and their attorneys”).
422. Jocelyn Simonson, Police Reform Through a Power Lens, 130 YALE L.J. 778, 806 (2021).
423. See James Tomberlin, Note, “Don’t Elect Me”: Sheriffs and the Need for Reform in County Law
Enforcement, 104 VA. L. REV. 113, 142–45 (2018) (discussing the failures of elections as an accountability
mechanism for sheriffs, including lack of saliency and structural advantages that increase the
incumbency advantage).
424. See Lindsey Meeks, Undercovered, Underinformed: Local News, Local Elections, and U.S. Sheriffs,
21 JOURNALISM STUD. 1609, 1609–10 (2020) (finding that local newspapers’ coverage of sheriff’s
elections was not comprehensive, especially when the sheriff’s election occurred during a presidential
or midterm election year).
425. See Michael Zoorob, There’s (Rarely) a New Sheriff in Town: The Incumbency Advantage
for County Sheriffs 17 (Nov. 12, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3485700 [https://perma.cc/6HD4-D3TH] (finding that an elected sheriff’s
average tenure greatly exceeds the average tenure of an appointed police chief); Tomberlin, supra note
423, at 143–44 (noting that one scholar has estimated that the average sheriff serves for twenty-four
years).
426. See Jamie Smith Hopkins & Kristine Villanueva, Community Groups Have Consistently Failed
To Improve Policing. These Advocates Are Pushing a New Way., MOTHER JONES (June 11, 2020), https://
www.motherjones.com/crime-justice/2020/06/we-want-community-oversight-wth-real-power-civilian
-oversight-groups-struggle-to-improve-policing/ [https://perma.cc/N5CF-WF86]; Samuel Walker,
Governing the American Police: Wrestling with the Problems of Democracy, 2016 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 615,
633–35 (discussing the genesis and failures of civilian oversight boards before concluding that structural
barriers lead to “only . . . very limited . . . citizen participation in policing”); Udi Ofer, Getting It Right:
Building Effective Civilian Review Boards To Oversee Police, 46 SETON HALL L. REV. 1033, 1035 (2016)
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antidemocratic in other ways, as contact with them has been linked to decreased
civic participation.427
The objection from democracy has significant force. Because an
emergency manager is appointed, she is at best only indirectly democratically
accountable. And even then, she may be totally unaccountable to the people
over whom she has control if those people have insufficient political power to
influence the state-level elected official who appointed the manager. Further,
the risk of capture by pro-status quo forces is real.428 Police are the exact sort of
“small, motivated group[]” that could subvert the ability of an emergency
manager to act for the public good.429 And a captured emergency manager could
do significant harm. She could waste the political will it took to create the
emergency manager position. Worse, she could further entrench or even
magnify the power, policies, and culture that have led to the current policing
emergency.
While the objection from democracy cannot be dismissed, its force is not
overwhelming. First, the objection from democracy can too easily conflate
democracy with majoritarian decision-making. Equally vital to a democracy is
the protection of the rights, security, and well-being of its minority
inhabitants.430 Regardless of their views on how to reform policing, the various
minority (or otherwise subjugated) groups discussed in Section I.B.3 would
certainly prefer a world where their government’s police did not further their
subjugation. A policing emergency manager can and should be focused on
making changes that lessen these sorts of sociological harms.
This reverses a policing emergency manager’s relationship with these
minority groups’ substantive preferences from the fiscal and educational
contexts. In the fiscal context, emergency managers have historically reduced
services for these groups in order to financially benefit disproportionately
majority-group third parties.431 Likewise, in the educational context, the
(“[T]hese [civilian oversight] institutions . . . have often times failed to adequately oversee local law
enforcement agencies, and that many of these regimes were rigged to fail in the first place given their
limited mandates and authorities.”); see also Sharon R. Fairley, Survey Says?: U.S. Cities Double Down
on Civilian Oversight of Police Challenges and Controversy, 2020 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 1, 33–49
(discussing impediments to effective civilian oversight).
427. See infra note 435 and accompanying text.
428. See J. Jonas Anderson, Court Capture, 59 B.C. L. REV. 1543, 1554 (2018) [hereinafter
Anderson, Court Capture] (defining capture as “the situation where regulators have been co-opted by
organized interest groups to adopt policies that run contrary to the public interest”); see also Gillette,
Dictatorships, supra note 216, at 1455–56 (describing takeover board members who were perceived as
acting for the constituencies they profited from instead of the public good).
429. See Anderson, Court Capture, supra note 428, at 1552.
430. See generally THE FEDERALIST NOS. 10, 51 (James Madison).
431. See, e.g., Gillette, Dictatorships, supra note 216, at 1412–19; Anderson, Democratic Dissolution,
supra note 249, at 585–86. Gillette and others discuss this problem through the lens of “contagion,”
meaning the need to protect the rest of the state from the possible spread of the taken-over city’s fiscal
troubles. While fiscal contagion is a real phenomenon, the disparate use of emergency managers in
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democratic critique has rested in part on the idea that emergency managers are
forcing groups into creating education systems that they would not choose for
themselves.432
Second, even if the democratic objection is solely about the power of
engaging in representative democracy, as opposed to achieving certain
substantive outcomes, emergency managers do not have to be, and rarely are,
totally democratically unaccountable to the people they oversee.433 Democratic
accountability is not all or nothing. Certainly, there are trade-offs between a
manager who is empowered to do whatever she believes is best and one who
must go through even a limited democratic process before acting. An
unaccountable manager will likely be able to act more swiftly and to undertake
more radical changes. Adding a layer of oversight with veto power over the
emergency manager’s decisions may also increase the opportunity for capture.
But these are trade-offs that anyone creating an emergency manager will be able
to consider. Democratic accountability could also be built into an emergency
manager statute through the people’s ability to end an emergency manager’s
tenure or to decide whom to appoint as an emergency manager through
something like a snap election.434
Third, and perhaps most importantly, the democratic critique is
significantly blunted when one considers the democracy-enhancing possibilities
that a policing emergency manager creates. Police differ from other areas where
emergency management has been used because police are themselves an
antidemocratic force. Police contact specifically, and criminal justice contact
more broadly, has been linked to decreased civic participation for both the
directly affected person and their close contacts.435 While one view of an
heavily minority cities combined with the comparative demographics of the surrounding suburbs and
state does lead to fiscal emergency management being a tool that can protect whiter and wealthier
interests at minority and poor people’s expense.
432. See, e.g., MOREL, supra note 249, at 9–10.
433. See supra Part III. As the Michigan example shows, emergency managers have historically also
been politically accountable to the person who has the power to remove them. See supra note 269 and
accompanying text.
434. See, e.g., Russell Goldman, Key Points About a Snap Election in Britain, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 18,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/18/world/europe/britain-snap-election-brexit-theresa-mayquestions.html [https://perma.cc/Z4VE-9BW8 (dark archive)] (explaining that a “snap election” is one
called outside of the usual election cycle)Error! Hyperlink reference not valid.. This snap election
function has the additional benefit of not leaving the appointment of the manager to a single political
authority.
435. See Michael Leo Owens & Hannah L. Walker, The Civic Voluntarism of “Custodial Citizens”:
Involuntary Criminal Justice Contact, Associational Life, and Political Participation, 16 PERSPS. ON POL.
990, 1004 (2018) (finding that the negative effect of criminal justice contact on voting is not
ameliorated by contact with civil society organizations, although the effect on nonvoting civic
participation is lessened); Ariel White, Family Matters? Voting Behavior in Households with Criminal
Justice Contact, 113 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 607, 607 (2019) (finding “a short-term demobilization effect
for people who see household members convicted or jailed in the weeks before the election,” but not
finding a lasting effect); Vesla Weaver & Amy Lerman, Political Consequences of the Carceral State, 104
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emergency manager is that it adds a further antidemocratic layer to the already
antidemocratic police, another is that an emergency manager may be necessary
to undo the antidemocratic status quo. To paraphrase the late William Stuntz,
“John Hart Ely had it about right: [an emergency manager] adds the most value
when it advances interests that the political process will not advance on its
own.”436
The reasons for this are several. To the extent that an emergency manager
is tasked with reducing unwanted and unwarranted contact with the police,
there will be, by definition, fewer people who suffer the antidemocratic effects
of police stops and criminal justice contact more broadly.
But an emergency manager could go significantly farther than this. There
is no reason that an emergency manager could not create the sorts of
community-based accountability and oversight mechanisms that objectors from
democracy propose.437 While a period of emergency management could be a
time for staid, technocratic reforms, it does not have to be so limited. As Gillette
argues, perhaps the greatest untapped potential of emergency managers is to
alter the structures of government in ways that regular politics would not
allow.438
At their most powerful, emergency managers represent the concentration
of the full emergency powers of a state or local government into a singular
person who is not only unaccountable to many of the traditional powers-thatbe but is expressly tasked with altering the status quo. In the fiscal or education
contexts, this antagonism to the status quo has meant increasing privatization,
selling public assets, and otherwise decreasing the role of government that is
directly accountable to the citizens under the emergency manager’s purview.
But emergency management does not have to be these things. Especially in the
policing context, antagonism to the status quo could mean increasing the
citizenry’s role in policing decisions both large—like deciding whether a
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 817, 825 (2010) (finding that “even a minor encounter with the police that did not
result in arrest is associated with a reduced likelihood of turning out in an election”). But see Hannah
L. Walker, Extending the Effects of the Carceral State: Proximal Contact, Political Participation, and Race,
67 POL. RSCH. Q. 809, 810 (2014) (finding that proximal contact with the criminal justice system
“increases one’s likelihood of high participation in political activities other than voting, compared with
those without proximal contact”).
436. Stuntz, supra note 365, at 818–23.
437. Indeed, given the majoritarian support for a number of not-yet-enacted police reforms, see,
for example, Li Zhou, Where Americans Stand on Policing Today, VOX (Apr. 9, 2021, 9:10
AM), https://www.vox.com/22372342/police-reform-derek-chauvin [http://perma.cc/4AKY-HMP7];
Steve Crabtree, Most Americans Say Policing Needs ‘Major Changes,’ GALLUP (July 22, 2020),
https://news.gallup.com/poll/315962/americans-say-policing-needs-major-changes.aspx [http://perma
.cc/MUS2-TCYZ], it may be possible for an emergency manager to make major changes solely by
implementing those reforms with majoritarian support that have not been enacted due to the vagaries
of the local political process.
438. See Gillette, Dictatorships, supra note 216, at 1419–20.
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department should continue to exist—and small—such as holding a singular
officer accountable for a disciplinary issue.
An emergency manager’s tenure is a time with the potential for radical,
structural change. When that change is intended to fix an antidemocratic
institution like policing, even if the emergency manager’s decisions are not
democratically made, she can leave a more democratic society in her wake.
B.

Limits on Emergency Powers

Although emergency managers may seem all powerful, there are some
external constraints that anyone wishing to utilize a policing emergency
manager should take account of. Here, while I briefly discuss legislative hurdles,
I focus primarily on the federal constitutional protections given to police union
contracts. That is because these unions and their contracts have regularly been
fronted as one of the largest impediments to reform.439
Legislatures will often act as a backstop for the exercise of an executive’s
emergency powers.440 Emergency statutes may also prohibit taking certain
actions, such as limiting the right to bear arms or of the press, even during an
emergency.441 But because the creation of an effective policing emergency
manager will likely require the passage of new legislation,442 preexisting
legislative limits on emergency powers can be superseded.
What cannot be superseded are the courts and Constitution.443 The courts
have most recently grappled with emergency government actions in the
439. See Levin, supra note 192, at 1340–54.
440. See Legislative Oversight of Emergency Executive Powers, supra note 59.
441. Id.
442. See supra Part III. It may be possible for some states to use existing emergency powers to
create policing emergency managers. But because no emergency statute, indeed not even any existing
emergency manager statute, was made for this scenario, the use of an existing statute is likely to require
shoehorning a policing emergency manager’s actions into an ill-fitting statute. That would almost
certainly invite greater, and potentially more successful, litigation as the policing emergency manager
stretches the old statute’s intended purposes. Moreover, if an executive acted unilaterally under a broad
provision of emergency authority, they might quickly find their work undone. Many emergency
statutes either provide significantly shorter time horizons, often thirty days, for the exercise of
emergency powers by an executive, as compared to the year or more that emergency managers often
need. See Legislative Oversight of Emergency Executive Powers, supra note 59. Or, statutes contain
legislative checks that could cut an emergency manager’s tenure short were a governor to create one
unilaterally. See id. Governors taking unilateral emergency action may also expose themselves to
significant political blowback. See, e.g., Jeremy B. White, Too Little, Too Late? Schools Deal May Not
Alter Newsom Recall Politics, POLITICO (Mar. 4, 2021, 3:34 PM), https://www.politico.com/states/
california/story/2021/03/01/too-little-too-late-schools-deal-may-not-alter-newsom-recall-politics-1366
306 [https://perma.cc/PJ6X-WYD6] (noting that proponents of recalling California governor Gavin
Newsom “capitaliz[ed] on widespread discontent that spiked during a second lockdown this winter”).
443. Because this Article is focused on emergency managers generally, as opposed to an emergency
manager for a particular location, a fulsome analysis of state constitutional hurdles is beyond its scope.
Nevertheless, state constitutions are also likely to provide checks on emergency powers, and anyone
wishing to use emergency managers should investigate those checks thoroughly. Notably, however,
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COVID-19 context.444 The Supreme Court’s action in these cases suggests an
increasing unwillingness to defer to a government’s use of emergency powers.445
But that lack of deference may be tied to the First Amendment implications of
those cases, not a signal of greater scrutiny of emergency power generally.446
Historically, the courts have deferred to the political branches choices during
emergencies,447 and that pattern held here, as courts generally deferred to their
political counterparts when dealing with COVID-19.448
Regardless of the Court’s view of emergency powers generally, the
Contract Clause may present a particular judicial impediment to a policing
emergency manager. That is because many of the obstacles to changing policing
arise through union contracts.449 And challenges to an emergency manager’s
actions have often taken the form of Contract Clause challenges.450
The Contract Clause states that “[n]o State shall . . . pass any . . . Law
impairing the Obligation of Contracts.”451 Despite the clause’s strict language,
the Supreme Court has long recognized that “[t]he Legislature cannot ‘bargain
away the public health or the public morals,’” and states “retain adequate power
to protect the public health against the maintenance of nuisances despite
insistence upon existing contracts,” as well as “to protect the public safety.”452
The Court treats impairments of private and public contracts differently,
giving significant deference to impairments of private contracts and applying
more scrutiny to a contract where “the State’s self-interest is at stake,” that is,
when the state is impairing a contract to which it is a party.453 But even then,
the standard is only whether the impairment “is reasonable and necessary to
serve an important public purpose.”454 More specifically, the Court has said that

courts have an uneven history of enforcing such limits in the face of an emergency. See David Cole,
Judging the Next Emergency: Judicial Review and Individual Rights in Times of Crisis, 101 MICH. L. REV.
2565, 2565–66 (2003) (noting that “the conventional wisdom is that courts function poorly as guardians
of liberty in times of crisis”).
444. See, e.g., S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 716, 716–23 (2021).
445. See id.; Gateway City Church v. Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 1460 (mem.) (2021).
446. See Zalman Rothschild, Free Exercise Partisanship, 107 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2022)
(on file with author); Kenny Mok & Eric Posner, Constitutional Challenges to Public Health Orders
in Federal Courts during the COVID-19 Pandemic 3 (Aug. 1, 2021) (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with author).
447. See Cole, supra note 443, at 2566.
448. See Mok & Posner, supra note 446, at 3 (finding that plaintiffs challenging nonreligious
COVID-19 restrictions won only 14.4% of the time).
449. See infra Section II.B.2.
450. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Nassau Cnty. Interim Fin. Auth., 959 F.3d 54, 62 (2d Cir. 2020), cert.
denied, 141 S. Ct. 1063 (2021); Welch v. Brown, 551 F. App’x 804, 808 (6th Cir. 2014); City of Pontiac
Retired Emps. Ass’n v. Schimmel, 751 F.3d 427, 431 (6th Cir. 2014).
451. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
452. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 436 (1934).
453. U.S. Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 25–26 (1977).
454. Id.
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states should not “impose a drastic impairment when an evident and more
moderate course would serve its purposes equally well,” that they must not
“consider impairing the obligations of its own contracts on a par with other
policy alternatives,” and that the impairment must be “reasonable in light of the
surrounding circumstances.”455
The policing emergency is likely to sit at the core of this “important public
purpose” test. The creation of a policing emergency manager is a government
declaration of emergency, and as discussed below, is a measure that should have
limited duration. Both of these factors were key to the Court’s decision in Home
Building & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell,456 and they have continued to be recognized
as significantly weighing in favor of upholding the state action.457
But beyond this, the contractual impairments likely to be made by a
policing emergency manager are different in kind from those that the Court has
previously evaluated. Previous cases involving contracts where the government
was a party uniformly dealt with contractual impairments that saved the
government money.458 That is unlikely to be the case here. Instead, the
government would be attempting to better effectuate one of its core purposes:
providing for the safety of its citizens.459 Any cost savings, such as that from
terminating bad officers, would be incidental.460
In light of this uncertainty, courts may take several paths. The first is a
traditional Contracts Clause analysis, as discussed above. Assuming that there
is a significant contractual impairment,461 a court would ask whether that
impairment was reasonable and necessary to further an important public
purpose.

455. Id. at 30–31.
456. 290 U.S. 398, 436.
457. See U.S. Tr. Co. of N.Y., 431 U.S. at 23 n.19.
458. See, e.g., Energy Rsrvs. Grp., Inc. v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 413 n.14 (1983)
(“When a State itself enters into a contract, it cannot simply walk away from its financial obligations.
In almost every case, the Court has held a governmental unit to its contractual obligations when it
enters financial or other markets.”).
459. See generally Friedman, supra note 369 (arguing that public safety, or the government’s
obligation to ensure people are safe, should be understood more capaciously than it currently is).
460. The one obvious exception to this would be if a city or state based their declaration of an
emergency on the amount of civil rights settlements a police department was responsible for. But even
then, the fact that the police department was at least arguably responsible for significant deprivations
of citizens’ constitutional rights significantly complicates the economic analysis that the Court has
previously undertaken.
461. There may not be a significant impairment for every contractual alteration a policing
emergency manager makes. See, e.g., Conn. State Police Union v. Rovella, No. 20-CV-01147, 2020 WL
6042071, at *9 (D. Conn. Oct. 13, 2020) (noting that while changes to wages in collectively bargained
agreements constituted a substantial impairment, “[i]t [was] unclear whether the same reasoning should
apply to” a records disclosure provision).
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Alternately, because the impairment is outside the financial realm, courts
may engage the reserved-powers doctrine.462 In short, that doctrine says that a
state cannot contract away certain “essential attribute[s] of its sovereignty.”463
It cannot, for example, “bargain away the police power”464 or the power of
eminent domain.465 When the state is a contracting party, that doctrine focuses
on “a determination of the State’s power to create irrevocable contract rights in
the first place, rather than an inquiry into the purpose or reasonableness of the
subsequent impairment.”466
How this doctrine would operate in this scenario is an open question. The
Court has hinted that it wishes to move away from the “formalistic
distinctions”467 “among the various powers of the State”468 that drove its earlier
reserved-powers jurisprudence.469 At a minimum, it seems likely that
nonfinancial decisions that go to the core of the police’s impact on public
safety—things like whether and how police are armed and what powers of the
state they may enforce—fall within the core police powers of the state that
cannot be contracted away under the reserved-powers doctrine.
In sum, though both statutes and the Constitution provide some bounds
on what political actors may do under their declaration of an emergency, those
limits still allow significant room for political decision making.
CONCLUSION
There is a policing emergency in the United States. We have created a
system of policing that inflicts massive amounts of harm to the people it is
ostensibly designed to protect. That harm extends beyond the people directly
hurt by the police’s physical violence. It causes indirect and psychological
problems to those who observe it and even causes sociological harms, harms that
maintain the hierarchies which undermine our attempts at equality.
This Article has argued that governments can and should recognize this
emergency in their jurisdictions. By doing so, they can unlock a broader range
of powers to address the policing emergency than are available in the usual
course and can lead courts to defer to the exercise of those powers. Governments
have numerous emergency tools in their arsenal, and exploring the full slate of
462. See U.S. Tr. Co. of N.Y., 431 U.S. at 22–24; see also United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S.
839, 888–89 (1996).
463. U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y., 431 U.S. at 21.
464. Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 817 (1880).
465. See W. River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507, 549 (1848); see also U.S. Trust Co. of
N.Y., 431 U.S. at 23–24 & nn.20–21.
466. U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y., 431 U.S. at 23.
467. Id. at 24.
468. Id. at 23.
469. See, e.g., W. River Bridge Co., 47 U.S. at 549 (eminent domain); Stone, 101 U.S. at 817 (police
power).
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those tools is an area for future research. This Article, however, has focused on
one, emergency managers.
Emergency managers are individuals or boards imbued with a state or local
government’s emergency powers to fix a designated crisis in a subunit of the
empowering government. States have long used them to address cities in fiscal
crisis, and both states and cities have used them to address academically and
fiscally failing school districts.
A policing emergency manager can be empowered to cut through the many
structural and political obstacles to police reform. Freed from the vagaries of
local politics, a policing emergency manager can take necessary, even radical,
actions in the public interest that politically accountable leaders never would.
While past commentators have criticized these managers as antidemocratic, the
policing context flips that criticism on its head. Because policing itself is an
institution insulated from political accountability with significant
antidemocratic effects, in this context an emergency manager could be
significantly democracy enhancing.
Ultimately, what the application of emergency managers to the fiscal,
educational, and policing contexts shows is that emergency managers are a tool.
One that can be used for good or ill. Future research can and should situate this
tool outside of these subject-specific contexts into the broader conversation
occurring in the nascent but growing literature recognizing the modern power
struggles between states and their localities.470
There is no guarantee that an emergency manager will be a panacea. But
when even millions of people taking to the streets in the wake of George Floyd’s
murder was not enough to spark significant widespread change, it is clear that
we need more tools. When turned towards the problem of the policing
emergency, an emergency manager could be a powerful tool for good.

470. See, e.g., Anderson, The New Minimal Cities, supra note 232; Schragger, The Attack on American
Cities, supra note 406; Sellers & Scharff, supra note 406; Emily S.P. Baxter, Note, Protecting Local
Authority in State Constitutions and Challenging Intrastate Preemption, 52 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 947
(2019); Erin Adele Scharff, Hyper Preemption: A Reordering of the State-Local Relationship?, 106 GEO.
L.J. 1469 (2018); Weyers, supra note 273; Alejandro E. Camacho & Nicholas J. Marantz, Beyond
Preemption, Toward Metropolitan Governance, 39 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 125 (2020).
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